Commit | Line | Data |
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00b3cd10 PG |
1 | #!/usr/bin/env python3 |
2 | ||
3 | """ | |
83f2d71e | 4 | Intra2net 2017 |
00b3cd10 PG |
5 | |
6 | =============================================================================== | |
704ceaa5 | 7 | crypto -- Encryption Layer for the Deltatar Backup |
00b3cd10 PG |
8 | =============================================================================== |
9 | ||
10 | Crypto stack: | |
11 | ||
12 | - AES-GCM for the symmetric encryption; | |
13 | - Scrypt as KDF. | |
14 | ||
15 | References: | |
16 | ||
17 | - NIST Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter | |
18 | Mode (GCM) and GMAC | |
19 | http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf | |
20 | ||
21 | - AES-GCM v1: | |
22 | https://cryptome.org/2014/01/aes-gcm-v1.pdf | |
23 | ||
24 | - Authentication weaknesses in GCM | |
25 | http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/Ferguson2.pdf | |
26 | ||
6d08915c PG |
27 | Errors |
28 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
29 | ||
30 | Errors fall into roughly three categories: | |
31 | ||
704ceaa5 | 32 | - Cryptographical errors or invalid data. |
6d08915c PG |
33 | |
34 | - ``InvalidGCMTag`` (decryption failed on account of an invalid GCM | |
35 | tag), | |
36 | - ``InvalidIVFixedPart`` (IV fixed part of object not found in list), | |
f6cd676f | 37 | - ``DuplicateIV`` (the IV of an encrypted object already occurred), |
704ceaa5 PG |
38 | - ``DecryptionError`` (used in CLI decryption for presenting error |
39 | conditions to the user). | |
6d08915c PG |
40 | |
41 | - Incorrect usage of the library. | |
42 | ||
43 | - ``InvalidParameter`` (non-conforming user supplied parameter), | |
44 | - ``InvalidHeader`` (data passed for reading not parsable into header), | |
45 | - ``FormatError`` (cannot handle header or parameter version), | |
46 | - ``RuntimeError``. | |
47 | ||
48 | - Bad internal state. If one of these is encountered it means that a state | |
49 | was reached that shouldn’t occur during normal processing. | |
50 | ||
51 | - ``InternalError``, | |
52 | - ``Unreachable``. | |
53 | ||
54 | Also, ``EndOfFile`` is used as a sentinel to communicate that a stream supplied | |
55 | for reading is exhausted. | |
56 | ||
f6cd676f PG |
57 | Initialization Vectors |
58 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
59 | ||
817cfffa | 60 | Initialization vectors are checked for reuse during the lifetime of a decryptor. |
704ceaa5 PG |
61 | The fixed counters for metadata files cannot be reused and attempts to do so |
62 | will cause a DuplicateIV error. This means the length of objects encrypted with | |
63 | a metadata counter is capped at 63 GB. | |
64 | ||
65 | For ordinary, non-metadata payload, there is an optional mode with strict IV | |
66 | checking that causes a crypto context to fail if an IV encountered or created | |
67 | was already used for decrypting or encrypting, respectively, an earlier object. | |
68 | Note that this mode can trigger false positives when decrypting non-linearly, | |
69 | e. g. when traversing the same object multiple times. Since the crypto context | |
70 | has no notion of a position in a PDT encrypted archive, this condition must be | |
71 | sorted out downstream. | |
72 | ||
73 | Command Line Utility | |
74 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
75 | ||
76 | ``crypto.py`` may be invoked as a script for decrypting, validating, and | |
77 | splitting PDT encrypted files. Consult the usage message for details. | |
78 | ||
79 | Usage examples: | |
80 | ||
81 | Decrypt from stdin using the password ‘foo’: :: | |
82 | ||
83 | $ crypto.py process foo -i - -o - <some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt >some-file.tar.gz | |
84 | ||
85 | Output verbose information about the encrypted objects in the archive: :: | |
86 | ||
87 | $ crypto.py process foo -v -i some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt -o /dev/null | |
88 | PDT: decrypt from some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt | |
89 | PDT: decrypt to /dev/null | |
90 | PDT: source: file some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt | |
91 | PDT: sink: file /dev/null | |
92 | PDT: 0 hdr | |
93 | PDT: · version = 1 : 0100 | |
94 | PDT: · paramversion = 1 : 0100 | |
95 | PDT: · nacl : d270 b031 00d1 87e2 c946 610d 7b7f 7e5f | |
96 | PDT: · iv : 02ee 3dd7 a963 1eb1 0100 0000 | |
97 | PDT: · ctsize = 591 : 4f02 0000 0000 0000 | |
98 | PDT: · tag : 5b2d 6d8b 8f82 4842 12fd 0b10 b6e3 369b | |
99 | PDT: 64 decrypt obj no. 1, 591 B | |
100 | PDT: · [64] 0% done, read block (591 B of 591 B remaining) | |
101 | PDT: · decrypt ciphertext 591 B | |
102 | PDT: · decrypt plaintext 591 B | |
103 | PDT: 655 finalize | |
104 | … | |
105 | ||
106 | Also, the mode *scrypt* allows deriving encryption keys. To calculate the | |
107 | encryption key from the password ‘foo’ and the salt of the first object in a | |
108 | PDT encrypted file: :: | |
109 | ||
110 | $ crypto.py scrypt foo -i some-file.pdtcrypt | |
4f6405d6 | 111 | {"paramversion": 1, "salt": "Cqzbk48e3peEjzWto8D0yA==", "key": "JH9EkMwaM4x9F5aim5gK/Q=="} |
704ceaa5 PG |
112 | |
113 | The computed 16 byte key is given in hexadecimal notation in the value to | |
114 | ``hash`` and can be fed into Python’s ``binascii.unhexlify()`` to obtain the | |
115 | corresponding binary representation. | |
116 | ||
117 | Note that in Scrypt hashing mode, no data integrity checks are being performed. | |
118 | If the wrong password is given, a wrong key will be derived. Whether the password | |
119 | was indeed correct can only be determined by decrypting. Note that since PDT | |
120 | archives essentially consist of a stream of independent objects, the salt and | |
121 | other parameters may change. Thus a key derived using above method from the | |
122 | first object doesn’t necessarily apply to any of the subsequent objects. | |
f6cd676f | 123 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
124 | """ |
125 | ||
7b3940e5 | 126 | import base64 |
00b3cd10 | 127 | import binascii |
50710d86 | 128 | import bisect |
00b3cd10 PG |
129 | import ctypes |
130 | import io | |
c46c8670 | 131 | from functools import reduce, partial |
f41973a6 | 132 | import mmap |
00b3cd10 PG |
133 | import os |
134 | import struct | |
a808459e | 135 | import stat |
00b3cd10 PG |
136 | import sys |
137 | import time | |
da82bc58 | 138 | import types |
2a307f41 | 139 | import errno |
00b3cd10 PG |
140 | try: |
141 | import enum34 | |
142 | except ImportError as exn: | |
143 | pass | |
144 | ||
6257d5b3 | 145 | if __name__ == "__main__": ## Work around the import mechanism lest Python’s |
00b3cd10 PG |
146 | pwd = os.getcwd() ## preference for local imports causes a cyclical |
147 | ## import (crypto → pylibscrypt → […] → ./tarfile → crypto). | |
148 | sys.path = [ p for p in sys.path if p.find ("deltatar") < 0 ] | |
149 | ||
150 | import pylibscrypt | |
151 | from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes | |
152 | from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend | |
15d3eefd | 153 | import cryptography |
00b3cd10 PG |
154 | |
155 | ||
a64085a8 | 156 | __all__ = [ "hdr_make", "hdr_read", "hdr_fmt", "hdr_fmt_pretty" |
b360b772 | 157 | , "scrypt_hashfile" |
3031b7ae PG |
158 | , "PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE", "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA" |
159 | , "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE", "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX" | |
2d6fd8c8 | 160 | ] |
00b3cd10 | 161 | |
a393d9cb PG |
162 | |
163 | ############################################################################### | |
15d3eefd PG |
164 | ## exceptions |
165 | ############################################################################### | |
166 | ||
167 | class EndOfFile (Exception): | |
168 | """Reached EOF.""" | |
ae3d0f2a PG |
169 | remainder = 0 |
170 | msg = 0 | |
8a8ac469 | 171 | def __init__ (self, n=None, msg=None): |
5d394c0d PG |
172 | if n is not None: |
173 | self.remainder = n | |
174 | self.msg = msg | |
15d3eefd | 175 | |
b0078f26 | 176 | |
b12110dd PG |
177 | class InvalidParameter (Exception): |
178 | """Inputs not valid for PDT encryption.""" | |
179 | pass | |
180 | ||
b0078f26 | 181 | |
15d3eefd PG |
182 | class InvalidHeader (Exception): |
183 | """Header not valid.""" | |
184 | pass | |
185 | ||
b0078f26 PG |
186 | |
187 | class InvalidGCMTag (Exception): | |
188 | """ | |
189 | The GCM tag calculated during decryption differs from that in the object | |
190 | header. | |
191 | """ | |
192 | pass | |
193 | ||
194 | ||
26b42ad4 | 195 | class InvalidIVFixedPart (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
196 | """ |
197 | IV fixed part not in supplied list: either the backup is corrupt or the | |
198 | current object does not belong to it. | |
199 | """ | |
26b42ad4 PG |
200 | pass |
201 | ||
b0078f26 | 202 | |
be124bca | 203 | class IVFixedPartError (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
204 | """ |
205 | Error creating a unique IV fixed part: repeated calls to system RNG yielded | |
206 | the same sequence of bytes as the last IV used. | |
207 | """ | |
be124bca PG |
208 | pass |
209 | ||
210 | ||
fac2cfe1 | 211 | class InvalidFileCounter (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
212 | """ |
213 | When encrypting, an attempted reuse of a dedicated counter (info file, | |
214 | index file) was caught. | |
215 | """ | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
216 | pass |
217 | ||
218 | ||
ee6aa239 | 219 | class DuplicateIV (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
220 | """ |
221 | During encryption, the current IV fixed part is identical to an already | |
222 | existing IV (same prefix and file counter). This indicates tampering or | |
223 | programmer error and cannot be recovered from. | |
224 | """ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
225 | pass |
226 | ||
227 | ||
228 | class NonConsecutiveIV (Exception): | |
89ec6e2f PG |
229 | """ |
230 | IVs not numbered consecutively. This is a hard error with strict IV | |
231 | checking. Precludes random access to the encrypted objects. | |
232 | """ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
233 | pass |
234 | ||
235 | ||
b12110dd PG |
236 | class FormatError (Exception): |
237 | """Unusable parameters in header.""" | |
238 | pass | |
239 | ||
b0078f26 | 240 | |
15d3eefd | 241 | class DecryptionError (Exception): |
89ec6e2f | 242 | """Error during decryption with ``crypto.py`` on the command line.""" |
15d3eefd PG |
243 | pass |
244 | ||
b0078f26 | 245 | |
70ad9458 | 246 | class Unreachable (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
247 | """ |
248 | Makeshift __builtin_unreachable(); always a programmer error if | |
249 | thrown. | |
250 | """ | |
70ad9458 PG |
251 | pass |
252 | ||
b0078f26 | 253 | |
b12110dd PG |
254 | class InternalError (Exception): |
255 | """Errors not ascribable to bad user inputs or cryptography.""" | |
256 | pass | |
257 | ||
15d3eefd PG |
258 | |
259 | ############################################################################### | |
a393d9cb PG |
260 | ## crypto layer version |
261 | ############################################################################### | |
262 | ||
263 | ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS = \ | |
c46c8670 | 264 | { 0: \ |
dd23cbc9 PG |
265 | { "kdf": ("dummy", 16) |
266 | , "enc": "passthrough" } | |
c46c8670 | 267 | , 1: \ |
dd23cbc9 PG |
268 | { "kdf": ( "scrypt" |
269 | , { "dkLen" : 16 | |
270 | , "N" : 1 << 16 | |
271 | , "r" : 8 | |
272 | , "p" : 1 | |
273 | , "NaCl_LEN" : 16 }) | |
274 | , "enc": "aes-gcm" } } | |
a393d9cb | 275 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
276 | ############################################################################### |
277 | ## constants | |
278 | ############################################################################### | |
279 | ||
dd47d6a2 | 280 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC = b"PDTCRYPT" |
00b3cd10 | 281 | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
282 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC = 8 # 8 |
283 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION = 2 # 10 | |
284 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION = 2 # 12 | |
285 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL = 16 # 28 | |
286 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV = 12 # 40 | |
287 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE = 8 # 48 | |
288 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_TAG = 16 # 64 GCM auth tag | |
00b3cd10 | 289 | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
290 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE = PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION \ |
291 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL \ | |
292 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE \ | |
293 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_TAG # = 64 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
294 | |
295 | # precalculate offsets since Python can’t do constant folding over names | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
296 | HDR_OFF_VERSION = PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC |
297 | HDR_OFF_PARAMVERSION = HDR_OFF_VERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION | |
298 | HDR_OFF_NACL = HDR_OFF_PARAMVERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION | |
299 | HDR_OFF_IV = HDR_OFF_NACL + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL | |
300 | HDR_OFF_CTSIZE = HDR_OFF_IV + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV | |
301 | HDR_OFF_TAG = HDR_OFF_CTSIZE + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE | |
00b3cd10 PG |
302 | |
303 | FMT_UINT16_LE = "<H" | |
304 | FMT_UINT64_LE = "<Q" | |
50710d86 | 305 | FMT_I2N_IV = "<8sL" # 8 random bytes ‖ 32 bit counter |
83f2d71e PG |
306 | FMT_I2N_HDR = ("<" # host byte order |
307 | "8s" # magic | |
308 | "H" # version | |
309 | "H" # paramversion | |
310 | "16s" # sodium chloride | |
311 | "12s" # iv | |
3b53fb98 PG |
312 | "Q" # size |
313 | "16s") # GCM tag | |
00b3cd10 PG |
314 | |
315 | # aes+gcm | |
addcec42 PG |
316 | AES_KEY_SIZE = 16 # b"0123456789abcdef" |
317 | AES_KEY_SIZE_B64 = 24 # b'MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZg==' | |
cb7a3911 PG |
318 | AES_GCM_MAX_SIZE = (1 << 36) - (1 << 5) # 2^39 - 2^8 b ≅ 64 GB |
319 | PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE_DEFAULT = 63 * (1 << 30) # 63 GB | |
320 | PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE = PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE_DEFAULT | |
00b3cd10 | 321 | |
3031b7ae | 322 | # index and info files are written on-the fly while encrypting so their |
817cfffa | 323 | # counters must be available in advance |
cb7a3911 PG |
324 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE = 1 # constant |
325 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE + 1 | |
326 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX + 1 # also for multivolume | |
327 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX_DEFAULT = 0xffFFffFF | |
328 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX_DEFAULT | |
2d6fd8c8 | 329 | |
be124bca PG |
330 | # IV structure and generation |
331 | PDTCRYPT_IV_GEN_MAX_RETRIES = 10 # × | |
332 | PDTCRYPT_IV_FIXEDPART_SIZE = 8 # B | |
333 | PDTCRYPT_IV_COUNTER_SIZE = 4 # B | |
39accaaa | 334 | |
addcec42 PG |
335 | # secret type: PW of string | KEY of char [16] |
336 | PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW = 0 | |
337 | PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY = 1 | |
338 | ||
00b3cd10 | 339 | ############################################################################### |
39accaaa | 340 | ## header, trailer |
00b3cd10 PG |
341 | ############################################################################### |
342 | # | |
343 | # Interface: | |
344 | # | |
345 | # struct hdrinfo | |
346 | # { version : u16 | |
347 | # , paramversion : u16 | |
348 | # , nacl : [u8; 16] | |
349 | # , iv : [u8; 12] | |
704ceaa5 PG |
350 | # , ctsize : usize |
351 | # , tag : [u8; 16] } | |
83f2d71e | 352 | # |
00b3cd10 | 353 | # fn hdr_read (f : handle) -> hdrinfo; |
c2d1c3ec | 354 | # fn hdr_make (f : handle, h : hdrinfo) -> IOResult<usize>; |
00b3cd10 PG |
355 | # fn hdr_fmt (h : hdrinfo) -> String; |
356 | # | |
357 | ||
83f2d71e | 358 | def hdr_read (data): |
704ceaa5 PG |
359 | """ |
360 | Read bytes as header structure. | |
361 | ||
362 | If the input could not be interpreted as a header, fail with | |
363 | ``InvalidHeader``. | |
364 | """ | |
83f2d71e | 365 | |
00b3cd10 | 366 | try: |
3b53fb98 | 367 | mag, version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag = \ |
83f2d71e PG |
368 | struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_HDR, data) |
369 | except Exception as exn: | |
15d3eefd PG |
370 | raise InvalidHeader ("error unpacking header from [%r]: %s" |
371 | % (binascii.hexlify (data), str (exn))) | |
00b3cd10 | 372 | |
dd47d6a2 | 373 | if mag != PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC: |
15d3eefd | 374 | raise InvalidHeader ("bad magic in header: expected [%s], got [%s]" |
dd47d6a2 | 375 | % (PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, mag)) |
00b3cd10 | 376 | |
15d3eefd | 377 | return \ |
00b3cd10 PG |
378 | { "version" : version |
379 | , "paramversion" : paramversion | |
380 | , "nacl" : nacl | |
381 | , "iv" : iv | |
382 | , "ctsize" : ctsize | |
3b53fb98 | 383 | , "tag" : tag |
00b3cd10 PG |
384 | } |
385 | ||
386 | ||
39accaaa | 387 | def hdr_read_stream (instr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
388 | """ |
389 | Read header from stream at the current position. | |
390 | ||
391 | Fail with ``InvalidHeader`` if insufficient bytes were read from the | |
392 | stream, or if the content could not be interpreted as a header. | |
393 | """ | |
dd47d6a2 | 394 | data = instr.read(PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
ae3d0f2a | 395 | ldata = len (data) |
8a8ac469 PG |
396 | if ldata == 0: |
397 | raise EndOfFile | |
398 | elif ldata != PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE: | |
399 | raise InvalidHeader ("hdr_read_stream: expected %d B, received %d B" | |
400 | % (PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE, ldata)) | |
47e27926 | 401 | return hdr_read (data) |
39accaaa PG |
402 | |
403 | ||
3b53fb98 | 404 | def hdr_from_params (version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag): |
704ceaa5 PG |
405 | """ |
406 | Assemble the necessary values into a PDTCRYPT header. | |
407 | ||
408 | :type version: int to fit uint16_t | |
409 | :type paramversion: int to fit uint16_t | |
410 | :type nacl: bytes to fit uint8_t[16] | |
411 | :type iv: bytes to fit uint8_t[12] | |
412 | :type size: int to fit uint64_t | |
413 | :type tag: bytes to fit uint8_t[16] | |
414 | """ | |
dd47d6a2 | 415 | buf = bytearray (PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
83f2d71e | 416 | bufv = memoryview (buf) |
00b3cd10 | 417 | |
00b3cd10 | 418 | try: |
83f2d71e | 419 | struct.pack_into (FMT_I2N_HDR, bufv, 0, |
dd47d6a2 | 420 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, |
3b53fb98 | 421 | version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag) |
83f2d71e | 422 | except Exception as exn: |
a83fa4ed | 423 | return False, "error assembling header: %s" % str (exn) |
00b3cd10 | 424 | |
83f2d71e | 425 | return True, bytes (buf) |
00b3cd10 | 426 | |
00b3cd10 | 427 | |
8a990744 PG |
428 | def hdr_make_dummy (s): |
429 | """ | |
430 | Create a header sized block of bytes initialized to a value derived from a | |
431 | string. Used to verify we’ve jumped back correctly to the actual position | |
432 | of the object header. | |
433 | """ | |
434 | c = reduce (lambda a, c: a + ord(c), s, 0) % 0xFF | |
dd47d6a2 | 435 | return bytes (bytearray (struct.pack ("B", c)) * PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
8a990744 PG |
436 | |
437 | ||
a393d9cb | 438 | def hdr_make (hdr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
439 | """ |
440 | Assemble a header from the given header structure. | |
441 | """ | |
a393d9cb PG |
442 | return hdr_from_params (version=hdr.get("version"), |
443 | paramversion=hdr.get("paramversion"), | |
444 | nacl=hdr.get("nacl"), iv=hdr.get("iv"), | |
3b53fb98 | 445 | ctsize=hdr.get("ctsize"), tag=hdr.get("tag")) |
a393d9cb PG |
446 | |
447 | ||
83f2d71e | 448 | HDR_FMT = "I2n_header { version: %d, paramversion: %d, nacl: %s[%d]," \ |
89131745 | 449 | " iv: %s[%d], ctsize: %d, tag: %s[%d] }" |
00b3cd10 | 450 | |
83f2d71e | 451 | def hdr_fmt (h): |
704ceaa5 | 452 | """Format a header structure into readable output.""" |
83f2d71e PG |
453 | return HDR_FMT % (h["version"], h["paramversion"], |
454 | binascii.hexlify (h["nacl"]), len(h["nacl"]), | |
455 | binascii.hexlify (h["iv"]), len(h["iv"]), | |
db1f3ac7 PG |
456 | h["ctsize"], |
457 | binascii.hexlify (h["tag"]), len(h["tag"])) | |
00b3cd10 | 458 | |
00b3cd10 | 459 | |
83f2d71e | 460 | def hex_spaced_of_bytes (b): |
704ceaa5 | 461 | """Format bytes object, hexdump style.""" |
83f2d71e PG |
462 | return " ".join ([ "%.2x%.2x" % (c1, c2) |
463 | for c1, c2 in zip (b[0::2], b[1::2]) ]) \ | |
464 | + (len (b) | 1 == len (b) and " %.2x" % b[-1] or "") # odd lengths | |
00b3cd10 | 465 | |
591a722f | 466 | |
3031b7ae PG |
467 | def hdr_iv_counter (h): |
468 | """Extract the variable part of the IV of the given header.""" | |
469 | _fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, h ["iv"]) | |
470 | return cnt | |
471 | ||
472 | ||
473 | def hdr_iv_fixed (h): | |
474 | """Extract the fixed part of the IV of the given header.""" | |
475 | fixed, _cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, h ["iv"]) | |
476 | return fixed | |
477 | ||
478 | ||
83f2d71e | 479 | hdr_dump = hex_spaced_of_bytes |
00b3cd10 | 480 | |
00b3cd10 | 481 | |
15d3eefd PG |
482 | HDR_FMT_PRETTY = \ |
483 | """version = %-4d : %s | |
484 | paramversion = %-4d : %s | |
485 | nacl : %s | |
486 | iv : %s | |
487 | ctsize = %-20d : %s | |
488 | tag : %s | |
83f2d71e | 489 | """ |
00b3cd10 | 490 | |
83f2d71e | 491 | def hdr_fmt_pretty (h): |
704ceaa5 PG |
492 | """ |
493 | Format header structure into multi-line representation of its contents and | |
494 | their raw representation. (Omit the implicit “PDTCRYPT” magic bytes that | |
495 | precede every header.) | |
496 | """ | |
83f2d71e PG |
497 | return HDR_FMT_PRETTY \ |
498 | % (h["version"], | |
499 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT16_LE, h["version"])), | |
500 | h["paramversion"], | |
501 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT16_LE, h["paramversion"])), | |
502 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["nacl"]), | |
503 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["iv"]), | |
504 | h["ctsize"], | |
15d3eefd PG |
505 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT64_LE, h["ctsize"])), |
506 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["tag"])) | |
00b3cd10 | 507 | |
f6cd676f PG |
508 | IV_FMT = "((f %s) (c %d))" |
509 | ||
510 | def iv_fmt (iv): | |
704ceaa5 | 511 | """Format the two components of an IV in a readable fashion.""" |
f6cd676f PG |
512 | fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
513 | return IV_FMT % (binascii.hexlify (fixed), cnt) | |
514 | ||
00b3cd10 | 515 | |
00b3cd10 | 516 | ############################################################################### |
f41973a6 PG |
517 | ## restoration |
518 | ############################################################################### | |
519 | ||
520 | class Location (object): | |
521 | n = 0 | |
522 | offset = 0 | |
523 | ||
524 | def restore_loc_fmt (loc): | |
525 | return "%d off:%d" \ | |
526 | % (loc.n, loc.offset) | |
527 | ||
528 | def locate_hdr_candidates (fd): | |
529 | """ | |
530 | Walk over instances of the magic string in the payload, collecting their | |
531 | positions. If the offset of the first found instance is not zero, the file | |
d52e2737 | 532 | begins with leading garbage. Used by desaster recovery. |
f41973a6 PG |
533 | |
534 | :return: The list of offsets in the file. | |
535 | """ | |
536 | cands = [] | |
537 | ||
538 | mm = mmap.mmap(fd, 0, mmap.MAP_SHARED, mmap.PROT_READ) | |
539 | pos = 0 | |
540 | while True: | |
541 | pos = mm.find (PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, pos) | |
542 | if pos == -1: | |
543 | break | |
544 | cands.append (pos) | |
545 | pos += 1 | |
546 | ||
547 | return cands | |
548 | ||
549 | ||
6c8073ab PG |
550 | HDR_CAND_GOOD = 0 # header marks begin of valid object |
551 | HDR_CAND_FISHY = 1 # inconclusive (tag mismatch, obj overlap etc.) | |
552 | HDR_CAND_JUNK = 2 # not a header / object unreadable | |
553 | ||
5ed4c57d PG |
554 | HDR_VERDICT_NAME = \ |
555 | { HDR_CAND_GOOD : "valid" | |
556 | , HDR_CAND_FISHY : "fishy" | |
557 | , HDR_CAND_JUNK : "junk" | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
560 | ||
561 | def verdict_fmt (vdt): | |
562 | return HDR_VERDICT_NAME [vdt] | |
563 | ||
6c8073ab PG |
564 | |
565 | def inspect_hdr (fd, off): | |
566 | """ | |
567 | Attempt to parse a header in *fd* at position *off*. | |
568 | ||
569 | Returns a verdict about the quality of that header plus the parsed header | |
570 | when readable. | |
571 | """ | |
572 | ||
573 | _ = os.lseek (fd, off, os.SEEK_SET) | |
574 | ||
575 | if os.lseek (fd, 0, os.SEEK_CUR) != off: | |
576 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
577 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (lseek() past EOF)" % off) | |
578 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
579 | ||
580 | raw = os.read (fd, PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) | |
581 | if len (raw) != PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE: | |
582 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
583 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (EOF inside header)" % off) | |
584 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
585 | ||
586 | try: | |
587 | hdr = hdr_read (raw) | |
588 | except InvalidHeader as exn: | |
589 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
590 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (invalid: [%s])" % (off, str (exn))) | |
591 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
592 | ||
593 | obj0 = off + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE | |
594 | objX = obj0 + hdr ["ctsize"] | |
595 | ||
596 | eof = os.lseek (fd, 0, os.SEEK_END) | |
597 | if eof < objX: | |
598 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
599 | noise ("PDT: %d → EOF inside object (%d≤%d≤%d); adjusting size to " | |
600 | "%d" % (off, obj0, eof, objX, (eof - obj0))) | |
601 | # try reading up to the end | |
602 | hdr ["ctsize"] = eof - obj0 | |
603 | return HDR_CAND_FISHY, hdr | |
604 | ||
605 | return HDR_CAND_GOOD, hdr | |
606 | ||
607 | ||
a808459e | 608 | def try_decrypt (ifd, off, hdr, secret, ofd=-1): |
6c8073ab | 609 | """ |
a808459e PG |
610 | Attempt to decrypt the object in the (seekable) descriptor *ifd* starting |
611 | at *off* using the metadata in *hdr* and *secret*. An output fd can be | |
612 | specified with *ofd*; if it is *-1* – the default –, the decrypted payload | |
613 | will be discarded. | |
70a33834 PG |
614 | |
615 | Always creates a fresh decryptor, so validation steps across objects don’t | |
616 | apply. | |
202104ed | 617 | |
d52e2737 | 618 | Errors during GCM tag validation are ignored. Used by desaster recovery. |
6c8073ab | 619 | """ |
70a33834 PG |
620 | ctleft = hdr ["ctsize"] |
621 | pos = off | |
622 | ||
623 | ks = secret [0] | |
624 | if ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW: | |
625 | decr = Decrypt (password=secret [1]) | |
626 | elif ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
6257d5b3 | 627 | key = secret [1] |
70a33834 PG |
628 | decr = Decrypt (key=key) |
629 | else: | |
630 | raise RuntimeError | |
631 | ||
70a33834 PG |
632 | decr.next (hdr) |
633 | ||
634 | try: | |
a808459e | 635 | os.lseek (ifd, pos, os.SEEK_SET) |
37ccf5bc | 636 | pt = b"" |
70a33834 PG |
637 | while ctleft > 0: |
638 | cnksiz = min (ctleft, PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE) | |
a808459e | 639 | cnk = os.read (ifd, cnksiz) |
70a33834 PG |
640 | ctleft -= cnksiz |
641 | pos += cnksiz | |
a808459e PG |
642 | pt = decr.process (cnk) |
643 | if ofd != -1: | |
644 | os.write (ofd, pt) | |
202104ed PG |
645 | try: |
646 | pt = decr.done () | |
647 | except InvalidGCMTag: | |
648 | noise ("PDT: GCM tag mismatch for object %d–%d" | |
649 | % (off, off + hdr ["ctsize"])) | |
a808459e PG |
650 | if len (pt) > 0 and ofd != -1: |
651 | os.write (ofd, pt) | |
70a33834 | 652 | |
70a33834 PG |
653 | except Exception as exn: |
654 | noise ("PDT: error decrypting object %d–%d@%d, %d B remaining [%s]" | |
655 | % (off, off + hdr ["ctsize"], pos, ctleft, exn)) | |
656 | raise | |
6c8073ab | 657 | |
70a33834 | 658 | return pos - off |
6c8073ab PG |
659 | |
660 | ||
6690f5e0 PG |
661 | def readable_objects_offsets (ifd, secret, cands): |
662 | """ | |
663 | From a list of candidates, locate the ones that mark the start of actual | |
664 | readable PDTCRYPT objects. | |
665 | """ | |
666 | good = [] | |
24afaf18 PG |
667 | |
668 | for i, cand in enumerate (cands): | |
6690f5e0 PG |
669 | vdt, hdr = inspect_hdr (ifd, cand) |
670 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_JUNK: | |
671 | pass # ignore unreadable ones | |
672 | elif vdt in [HDR_CAND_GOOD, HDR_CAND_FISHY]: | |
24afaf18 | 673 | ctsize = hdr ["ctsize"] |
6690f5e0 | 674 | off0 = cand + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE |
24afaf18 | 675 | ok = try_decrypt (ifd, off0, hdr, secret) == ctsize |
6690f5e0 | 676 | if ok is True: |
24afaf18 PG |
677 | good.append ((cand, off0 + ctsize)) |
678 | ||
679 | overlap = find_overlaps (good) | |
680 | ||
681 | return [ g [0] for g in good ] | |
6690f5e0 PG |
682 | |
683 | ||
684 | def reconstruct_offsets (fname, secret): | |
685 | ifd = os.open (fname, os.O_RDONLY) | |
686 | ||
687 | try: | |
688 | cands = locate_hdr_candidates (ifd) | |
689 | return readable_objects_offsets (ifd, secret, cands) | |
690 | finally: | |
691 | os.close (ifd) | |
692 | ||
693 | ||
f41973a6 | 694 | ############################################################################### |
addcec42 PG |
695 | ## helpers |
696 | ############################################################################### | |
697 | ||
698 | def make_secret (password=None, key=None): | |
699 | """ | |
700 | Safely create a “secret” value that consists either of a key or a password. | |
701 | Inputs are validated: the password is accepted as (UTF-8 encoded) bytes or | |
702 | string; for the key only a bytes object of the proper size or a base64 | |
703 | encoded string thereof is accepted. | |
704 | ||
705 | If both are provided, the key is preferred over the password; no checks are | |
706 | performed whether the key is derived from the password. | |
707 | ||
708 | :returns: secret value if inputs were acceptable | None otherwise. | |
709 | """ | |
710 | if key is not None: | |
711 | if isinstance (key, str) is True: | |
712 | key = key.encode ("utf-8") | |
713 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is True: | |
714 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE: | |
715 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
6257d5b3 PG |
716 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE * 2: |
717 | try: | |
718 | key = binascii.unhexlify (key) | |
719 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
720 | except binascii.Error: # garbage in string | |
721 | pass | |
addcec42 PG |
722 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE_B64: |
723 | try: | |
724 | key = base64.b64decode (key) | |
725 | # the base64 processor is very tolerant and allows for | |
6257d5b3 | 726 | # arbitrary trailing and leading data thus the data obtained |
addcec42 PG |
727 | # must be checked for the proper length |
728 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE: | |
729 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
730 | except binascii.Error: # “incorrect padding” | |
731 | pass | |
732 | elif password is not None: | |
733 | if isinstance (password, str) is True: | |
734 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW, password) | |
735 | elif isinstance (password, bytes) is True: | |
736 | try: | |
737 | password = password.decode ("utf-8") | |
738 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW, password) | |
739 | except UnicodeDecodeError: | |
740 | pass | |
741 | ||
742 | return None | |
743 | ||
744 | ||
745 | ############################################################################### | |
6178061e PG |
746 | ## passthrough / null encryption |
747 | ############################################################################### | |
748 | ||
749 | class PassthroughCipher (object): | |
750 | ||
751 | tag = struct.pack ("<QQ", 0, 0) | |
752 | ||
753 | def __init__ (self) : pass | |
754 | ||
755 | def update (self, b) : return b | |
756 | ||
50710d86 | 757 | def finalize (self) : return b"" |
6178061e PG |
758 | |
759 | def finalize_with_tag (self, _) : return b"" | |
760 | ||
761 | ############################################################################### | |
a393d9cb | 762 | ## convenience wrapper |
00b3cd10 PG |
763 | ############################################################################### |
764 | ||
c46c8670 PG |
765 | |
766 | def kdf_dummy (klen, password, _nacl): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
767 | """ |
768 | Fake KDF for testing purposes that is called when parameter version zero is | |
769 | encountered. | |
770 | """ | |
c46c8670 PG |
771 | q, r = divmod (klen, len (password)) |
772 | if isinstance (password, bytes) is False: | |
773 | password = password.encode () | |
774 | return password * q + password [:r], b"" | |
775 | ||
776 | ||
777 | SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO = { } # static because needed for both the info file and the archive | |
778 | ||
779 | ||
780 | def kdf_scrypt (params, password, nacl): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
781 | """ |
782 | Wrapper for the Scrypt KDF, corresponds to parameter version one. The | |
783 | computation result is memoized based on the inputs to facilitate spawning | |
784 | multiple encryption contexts. | |
785 | """ | |
c46c8670 PG |
786 | N = params["N"] |
787 | r = params["r"] | |
788 | p = params["p"] | |
789 | dkLen = params["dkLen"] | |
790 | ||
791 | if nacl is None: | |
792 | nacl = os.urandom (params["NaCl_LEN"]) | |
793 | ||
794 | key_parms = (password, nacl, N, r, p, dkLen) | |
795 | global SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO | |
796 | if key_parms not in SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO: | |
797 | SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO [key_parms] = \ | |
798 | pylibscrypt.scrypt (password, nacl, N, r, p, dkLen) | |
799 | return SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO [key_parms], nacl | |
a64085a8 PG |
800 | |
801 | ||
da82bc58 | 802 | def kdf_by_version (paramversion=None, defs=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
803 | """ |
804 | Pick the KDF handler corresponding to the parameter version or the | |
805 | definition set. | |
806 | ||
807 | :rtype: function (password : str, nacl : str) -> str | |
808 | """ | |
da82bc58 PG |
809 | if paramversion is not None: |
810 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) | |
a64085a8 | 811 | if defs is None: |
1ed44e7b PG |
812 | raise InvalidParameter ("no encryption parameters for version %r" |
813 | % paramversion) | |
a64085a8 | 814 | (kdf, params) = defs["kdf"] |
c46c8670 PG |
815 | fn = None |
816 | if kdf == "scrypt" : fn = kdf_scrypt | |
817 | if kdf == "dummy" : fn = kdf_dummy | |
818 | if fn is None: | |
a64085a8 | 819 | raise ValueError ("key derivation method %r unknown" % kdf) |
c46c8670 | 820 | return partial (fn, params) |
a64085a8 PG |
821 | |
822 | ||
b360b772 PG |
823 | ############################################################################### |
824 | ## SCRYPT hashing | |
825 | ############################################################################### | |
826 | ||
827 | def scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins): | |
828 | """ | |
829 | Calculate the SCRYPT hash from the password and the information contained | |
830 | in the first header found in ``ins``. | |
831 | ||
832 | This does not validate whether the first object is encrypted correctly. | |
833 | """ | |
c1ecc2e2 PG |
834 | if isinstance (pw, str) is True: |
835 | pw = str.encode (pw) | |
836 | elif isinstance (pw, bytes) is False: | |
837 | raise InvalidParameter ("password must be a string, not %s" | |
1ae49141 | 838 | % type (pw)) |
c1ecc2e2 PG |
839 | if isinstance (ins, io.BufferedReader) is False and \ |
840 | isinstance (ins, io.FileIO) is False: | |
841 | raise InvalidParameter ("file to hash must be opened in “binary” mode") | |
b360b772 PG |
842 | hdr = None |
843 | try: | |
844 | hdr = hdr_read_stream (ins) | |
845 | except EndOfFile as exn: | |
846 | noise ("PDT: malformed input: end of file reading first object header") | |
847 | noise ("PDT:") | |
848 | return 1 | |
849 | ||
850 | nacl = hdr ["nacl"] | |
851 | pver = hdr ["paramversion"] | |
852 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
853 | noise ("PDT: salt of first object : %s" % binascii.hexlify (nacl)) | |
854 | noise ("PDT: parameter version of archive : %d" % pver) | |
855 | ||
856 | try: | |
857 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(pver, None) | |
858 | kdfname, params = defs ["kdf"] | |
859 | if kdfname != "scrypt": | |
860 | noise ("PDT: input is not an SCRYPT archive") | |
861 | noise ("") | |
862 | return 1 | |
863 | kdf = kdf_by_version (None, defs) | |
864 | except ValueError as exn: | |
865 | noise ("PDT: object has unknown parameter version %d" % pver) | |
866 | ||
867 | hsh, _void = kdf (pw, nacl) | |
868 | ||
c1ecc2e2 | 869 | return hsh, nacl, hdr ["version"], pver |
b360b772 PG |
870 | |
871 | ||
872 | def scrypt_hashfile (pw, fname): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
873 | """ |
874 | Calculate the SCRYPT hash from the password and the information contained | |
875 | in the first header found in the given file. The header is read only at | |
876 | offset zero. | |
877 | """ | |
b360b772 | 878 | with deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SOURCE, fname or "-") as ins: |
c1ecc2e2 | 879 | hsh, _void, _void, _void = scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins) |
b360b772 PG |
880 | return hsh |
881 | ||
882 | ||
883 | ############################################################################### | |
884 | ## AES-GCM context | |
885 | ############################################################################### | |
886 | ||
a393d9cb PG |
887 | class Crypto (object): |
888 | """ | |
889 | Encryption context to remain alive throughout an entire tarfile pass. | |
890 | """ | |
6178061e | 891 | enc = None |
a393d9cb PG |
892 | nacl = None |
893 | key = None | |
50710d86 PG |
894 | cnt = None # file counter (uint32_t != 0) |
895 | iv = None # current IV | |
30019abf PG |
896 | fixed = None # accu for 64 bit fixed parts of IV |
897 | used_ivs = None # tracks IVs | |
898 | strict_ivs = False # if True, panic on duplicate object IV | |
48db09ba PG |
899 | password = None |
900 | paramversion = None | |
633b18a9 PG |
901 | stats = { "in" : 0 |
902 | , "out" : 0 | |
903 | , "obj" : 0 } | |
fa47412e | 904 | |
fa47412e PG |
905 | ctsize = -1 |
906 | ptsize = -1 | |
3031b7ae PG |
907 | info_counter_used = False |
908 | index_counter_used = False | |
a393d9cb | 909 | |
a64085a8 | 910 | def __init__ (self, *al, **akv): |
30019abf | 911 | self.used_ivs = set () |
a64085a8 | 912 | self.set_parameters (*al, **akv) |
39accaaa PG |
913 | |
914 | ||
704ceaa5 | 915 | def next_fixed (self): |
be124bca | 916 | # NOP for decryption |
50710d86 PG |
917 | pass |
918 | ||
919 | ||
920 | def set_object_counter (self, cnt=None): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
921 | """ |
922 | Safely set the internal counter of encrypted objects. Numerous | |
923 | constraints apply: | |
924 | ||
925 | The same counter may not be reused in combination with one IV fixed | |
926 | part. This is validated elsewhere in the IV handling. | |
927 | ||
928 | Counter zero is invalid. The first two counters are reserved for | |
929 | metadata. The implementation does not allow for splitting metadata | |
930 | files over multiple encrypted objects. (This would be possible by | |
931 | assigning new fixed parts.) Thus in a Deltatar backup there is at most | |
932 | one object with a counter value of one and two. On creation of a | |
933 | context, the initial counter may be chosen. The globals | |
934 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` can be used to | |
935 | request one of the reserved values. If one of these values has been | |
936 | used, any further attempt of setting the counter to that value will | |
937 | be rejected with an ``InvalidFileCounter`` exception. | |
938 | ||
939 | Out of bounds values (i. e. below one and more than the maximum of 2³²) | |
940 | cause an ``InvalidParameter`` exception to be thrown. | |
941 | """ | |
50710d86 PG |
942 | if cnt is None: |
943 | self.cnt = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA | |
944 | return | |
945 | if cnt == 0 or cnt > AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX + 1: | |
b12110dd PG |
946 | raise InvalidParameter ("invalid counter value %d requested: " |
947 | "acceptable values are from 1 to %d" | |
948 | % (cnt, AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX)) | |
50710d86 PG |
949 | if cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE: |
950 | if self.info_counter_used is True: | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
951 | raise InvalidFileCounter ("attempted to reuse info file " |
952 | "counter %d: must be unique" % cnt) | |
50710d86 | 953 | self.info_counter_used = True |
3031b7ae PG |
954 | elif cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX: |
955 | if self.index_counter_used is True: | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
956 | raise InvalidFileCounter ("attempted to reuse index file " |
957 | " counter %d: must be unique" % cnt) | |
3031b7ae | 958 | self.index_counter_used = True |
50710d86 PG |
959 | if cnt <= AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX: |
960 | self.cnt = cnt | |
961 | return | |
962 | # cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX + 1 → wrap | |
963 | self.cnt = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA | |
704ceaa5 | 964 | self.next_fixed () |
50710d86 PG |
965 | |
966 | ||
1f3fd7b0 | 967 | def set_parameters (self, password=None, key=None, paramversion=None, |
be124bca | 968 | nacl=None, counter=None, strict_ivs=False): |
704ceaa5 PG |
969 | """ |
970 | Configure the internal state of a crypto context. Not intended for | |
971 | external use. | |
972 | """ | |
be124bca | 973 | self.next_fixed () |
50710d86 | 974 | self.set_object_counter (counter) |
30019abf PG |
975 | self.strict_ivs = strict_ivs |
976 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
977 | if paramversion is not None: |
978 | self.paramversion = paramversion | |
979 | ||
1f3fd7b0 PG |
980 | if key is not None: |
981 | self.key, self.nacl = key, nacl | |
982 | return | |
983 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
984 | if password is not None: |
985 | if isinstance (password, bytes) is False: | |
986 | password = str.encode (password) | |
987 | self.password = password | |
988 | if paramversion is None and nacl is None: | |
989 | # postpone key setup until first header is available | |
990 | return | |
991 | kdf = kdf_by_version (paramversion) | |
992 | if kdf is not None: | |
993 | self.key, self.nacl = kdf (password, nacl) | |
fa47412e | 994 | |
39accaaa | 995 | |
39accaaa | 996 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
997 | """ |
998 | Encrypt / decrypt a buffer. Invokes the ``.update()`` method on the | |
999 | wrapped encryptor or decryptor, respectively. | |
1000 | ||
1001 | The Cryptography exception ``AlreadyFinalized`` is translated to an | |
1002 | ``InternalError`` at this point. It may occur in sound code when the GC | |
1003 | closes an encrypting stream after an error. Everywhere else it must be | |
1004 | treated as a bug. | |
1005 | """ | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1006 | if self.enc is None: |
1007 | raise RuntimeError ("process: context not initialized") | |
1008 | self.stats ["in"] += len (buf) | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
1009 | try: |
1010 | out = self.enc.update (buf) | |
1011 | except cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized as exn: | |
1012 | raise InternalError (exn) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1013 | self.stats ["out"] += len (out) |
1014 | return out | |
39accaaa PG |
1015 | |
1016 | ||
30019abf | 1017 | def next (self, password, paramversion, nacl, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1018 | """ |
1019 | Prepare for encrypting another object: Reset the data counters and | |
1020 | change the configuration in case one of the variable parameters differs | |
1021 | from the last object. Also check the IV for duplicates and error out | |
1022 | if strict checking was requested. | |
1023 | """ | |
fa47412e PG |
1024 | self.ctsize = 0 |
1025 | self.ptsize = 0 | |
1026 | self.stats ["obj"] += 1 | |
30019abf PG |
1027 | |
1028 | self.check_duplicate_iv (iv) | |
1029 | ||
6178061e PG |
1030 | if ( self.paramversion != paramversion |
1031 | or self.password != password | |
1032 | or self.nacl != nacl): | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1033 | self.set_parameters (password=password, paramversion=paramversion, |
30019abf PG |
1034 | nacl=nacl, strict_ivs=self.strict_ivs) |
1035 | ||
1036 | ||
1037 | def check_duplicate_iv (self, iv): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
1038 | """ |
1039 | Add an IV (the 12 byte representation as in the header) to the list. With | |
1040 | strict checking enabled, this will throw a ``DuplicateIV``. Depending on | |
1041 | the context, this may indicate a serious error (IV reuse). | |
1042 | """ | |
30019abf PG |
1043 | if self.strict_ivs is True and iv in self.used_ivs: |
1044 | raise DuplicateIV ("iv %s was reused" % iv_fmt (iv)) | |
1045 | # vi has not been used before; add to collection | |
1046 | self.used_ivs.add (iv) | |
fa47412e PG |
1047 | |
1048 | ||
633b18a9 | 1049 | def counters (self): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1050 | """ |
1051 | Access the data counters. | |
1052 | """ | |
633b18a9 PG |
1053 | return self.stats ["obj"], self.stats ["in"], self.stats ["out"] |
1054 | ||
1055 | ||
8de91f4f PG |
1056 | def drop (self): |
1057 | """ | |
1058 | Clear the current context regardless of its finalization state. The | |
1059 | next operation must be ``.next()``. | |
1060 | """ | |
1061 | self.enc = None | |
1062 | ||
1063 | ||
39accaaa PG |
1064 | class Encrypt (Crypto): |
1065 | ||
48db09ba PG |
1066 | lastinfo = None |
1067 | version = None | |
72a42219 | 1068 | paramenc = None |
50710d86 | 1069 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1070 | def __init__ (self, version, paramversion, password=None, key=None, nacl=None, |
30019abf | 1071 | counter=AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA, strict_ivs=True): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1072 | """ |
1073 | The ctor will throw immediately if one of the parameters does not conform | |
1074 | to our expectations. | |
1075 | ||
1076 | counter=AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA, strict_ivs=True): | |
1077 | :type version: int to fit uint16_t | |
1078 | :type paramversion: int to fit uint16_t | |
1079 | :param password: mutually exclusive with ``key`` | |
1080 | :type password: bytes | |
1081 | :param key: mutually exclusive with ``password`` | |
1082 | :type key: bytes | |
1083 | :type nacl: bytes | |
1084 | :type counter: initial object counter the values | |
1085 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and | |
1086 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` are unique in each backup set | |
1087 | and cannot be reused even with different fixed parts. | |
1088 | :type strict_ivs: bool | |
1089 | """ | |
1f3fd7b0 PG |
1090 | if password is None and key is None \ |
1091 | or password is not None and key is not None : | |
1092 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: need either key or password") | |
1093 | ||
1094 | if key is not None: | |
1095 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is False: | |
1096 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: key must be provided as " | |
1097 | "bytes, not %s" % type (key)) | |
1098 | if nacl is None: | |
1099 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: salt must be provided along " | |
1100 | "with encryption key") | |
1101 | else: # password, no key | |
1102 | if isinstance (password, str) is False: | |
1103 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: password must be a string, not %s" | |
1104 | % type (password)) | |
1105 | if len (password) == 0: | |
1106 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: supplied empty password but not " | |
1107 | "permitted for PDT encrypted files") | |
36b9932a PG |
1108 | # version |
1109 | if isinstance (version, int) is False: | |
1110 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: version number must be an " | |
1111 | "integer, not %s" % type (version)) | |
1112 | if version < 0: | |
1113 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: version number must be a " | |
1114 | "nonnegative integer, not %d" % version) | |
1115 | # paramversion | |
1116 | if isinstance (paramversion, int) is False: | |
1117 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: crypto parameter version number " | |
1118 | "must be an integer, not %s" | |
1119 | % type (paramversion)) | |
1120 | if paramversion < 0: | |
1121 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: crypto parameter version number " | |
1122 | "must be a nonnegative integer, not %d" | |
1123 | % paramversion) | |
1124 | # salt | |
1125 | if nacl is not None: | |
1126 | if isinstance (nacl, bytes) is False: | |
1127 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: salt given, but of type %s " | |
1128 | "instead of bytes" % type (nacl)) | |
1129 | # salt length would depend on the actual encryption so it can’t be | |
1130 | # validated at this point | |
b12110dd | 1131 | self.fixed = [ ] |
48db09ba PG |
1132 | self.version = version |
1133 | self.paramenc = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get (paramversion) ["enc"] | |
72a42219 | 1134 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1135 | super().__init__ (password, key, paramversion, nacl, counter=counter, |
30019abf | 1136 | strict_ivs=strict_ivs) |
a393d9cb PG |
1137 | |
1138 | ||
be124bca PG |
1139 | def next_fixed (self, retries=PDTCRYPT_IV_GEN_MAX_RETRIES): |
1140 | """ | |
1141 | Generate the next IV fixed part by reading eight bytes from | |
1142 | ``/dev/urandom``. The buffer so obtained is tested against the fixed | |
1143 | parts used so far to prevent accidental reuse of IVs. After a | |
1144 | configurable number of attempts to create a unique fixed part, it will | |
1145 | refuse to continue with an ``IVFixedPartError``. This is unlikely to | |
1146 | ever happen on a normal system but may detect an issue with the random | |
1147 | generator. | |
1148 | ||
1149 | The list of fixed parts that were used by the context at hand can be | |
1150 | accessed through the ``.fixed`` list. Its last element is the fixed | |
1151 | part currently in use. | |
1152 | """ | |
1153 | i = 0 | |
1154 | while i < retries: | |
1155 | fp = os.urandom (PDTCRYPT_IV_FIXEDPART_SIZE) | |
1156 | if fp not in self.fixed: | |
1157 | self.fixed.append (fp) | |
1158 | return | |
1159 | i += 1 | |
1160 | raise IVFixedPartError ("error obtaining a unique IV fixed part from " | |
1161 | "/dev/urandom; giving up after %d tries" % i) | |
1162 | ||
1163 | ||
a393d9cb | 1164 | def iv_make (self): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1165 | """ |
1166 | Construct a 12-bytes IV from the current fixed part and the object | |
1167 | counter. | |
1168 | """ | |
b12110dd | 1169 | return struct.pack(FMT_I2N_IV, self.fixed [-1], self.cnt) |
a393d9cb PG |
1170 | |
1171 | ||
cb7a3911 | 1172 | def next (self, filename=None, counter=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1173 | """ |
1174 | Prepare for encrypting the next incoming object. Update the counter | |
1175 | and put together the IV, possibly changing prefixes. Then create the | |
1176 | new encryptor. | |
1177 | ||
1178 | The argument ``counter`` can be used to specify a file counter for this | |
1179 | object. Unless it is one of the reserved values, the counter of | |
1180 | subsequent objects will be computed from this one. | |
1181 | ||
1182 | If this is the first object in a series, ``filename`` is required, | |
1183 | otherwise it is reused if not present. The value is used to derive a | |
1184 | header sized placeholder to use until after encryption when all the | |
1185 | inputs to construct the final header are available. This is then | |
1186 | matched in ``.done()`` against the value found at the position of the | |
1187 | header. The motivation for this extra check is primarily to assist | |
1188 | format debugging: It makes stray headers easy to spot in malformed | |
1189 | PDTCRYPT files. | |
1190 | """ | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1191 | if filename is None: |
1192 | if self.lastinfo is None: | |
1193 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: filename is mandatory for " | |
1194 | "first object") | |
1195 | filename, _dummy = self.lastinfo | |
1196 | else: | |
1197 | if isinstance (filename, str) is False: | |
1198 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: filename must be a string, no %s" | |
1199 | % type (filename)) | |
3031b7ae PG |
1200 | if counter is not None: |
1201 | if isinstance (counter, int) is False: | |
1202 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: the supplied counter is of " | |
1203 | "invalid type %s; please pass an " | |
1204 | "integer instead" % type (counter)) | |
1205 | self.set_object_counter (counter) | |
fac2cfe1 | 1206 | |
50710d86 | 1207 | self.iv = self.iv_make () |
72a42219 | 1208 | if self.paramenc == "aes-gcm": |
6178061e PG |
1209 | self.enc = Cipher \ |
1210 | ( algorithms.AES (self.key) | |
1211 | , modes.GCM (self.iv) | |
1212 | , backend = default_backend ()) \ | |
1213 | .encryptor () | |
72a42219 | 1214 | elif self.paramenc == "passthrough": |
6178061e PG |
1215 | self.enc = PassthroughCipher () |
1216 | else: | |
b12110dd PG |
1217 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: parameter version %d not known" |
1218 | % self.paramversion) | |
48db09ba PG |
1219 | hdrdum = hdr_make_dummy (filename) |
1220 | self.lastinfo = (filename, hdrdum) | |
30019abf | 1221 | super().next (self.password, self.paramversion, self.nacl, self.iv) |
72a42219 | 1222 | |
3031b7ae | 1223 | self.set_object_counter (self.cnt + 1) |
48db09ba | 1224 | return hdrdum |
a393d9cb | 1225 | |
a393d9cb | 1226 | |
cd77dadb | 1227 | def done (self, cmpdata): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1228 | """ |
1229 | Complete encryption of an object. After this has been called, attempts | |
1230 | of encrypting further data will cause an error until ``.next()`` is | |
1231 | invoked properly. | |
1232 | ||
1233 | Returns a 64 bytes buffer containing the object header including all | |
1234 | values including the “late” ones e. g. the ciphertext size and the | |
1235 | GCM tag. | |
1236 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1237 | if isinstance (cmpdata, bytes) is False: |
1238 | raise InvalidParameter ("done: comparison input expected as bytes, " | |
1239 | "not %s" % type (cmpdata)) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1240 | if self.lastinfo is None: |
1241 | raise RuntimeError ("done: encryption context not initialized") | |
48db09ba PG |
1242 | filename, hdrdum = self.lastinfo |
1243 | if cmpdata != hdrdum: | |
b12110dd PG |
1244 | raise RuntimeError ("done: bad sync of header for object %d: " |
1245 | "preliminary data does not match; this likely " | |
1246 | "indicates a wrongly repositioned stream" | |
1247 | % self.cnt) | |
6178061e | 1248 | data = self.enc.finalize () |
633b18a9 | 1249 | self.stats ["out"] += len (data) |
cd77dadb | 1250 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
48db09ba PG |
1251 | ok, hdr = hdr_from_params (self.version, self.paramversion, self.nacl, |
1252 | self.iv, self.ctsize, self.enc.tag) | |
8a990744 | 1253 | if ok is False: |
b12110dd PG |
1254 | raise InternalError ("error constructing header: %r" % hdr) |
1255 | return data, hdr, self.fixed | |
a393d9cb | 1256 | |
a393d9cb | 1257 | |
cd77dadb | 1258 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1259 | """ |
1260 | Encrypt a chunk of plaintext with the active encryptor. Returns the | |
1261 | size of the input consumed. This **must** be checked downstream. If the | |
1262 | maximum possible object size has been reached, the current context must | |
1263 | be finalized and a new one established before any further data can be | |
1264 | encrypted. The second argument is the remainder of the plaintext that | |
1265 | was not encrypted for the caller to use immediately after the new | |
1266 | context is ready. | |
1267 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1268 | if isinstance (buf, bytes) is False: |
1269 | raise InvalidParameter ("process: expected byte buffer, not %s" | |
1270 | % type (buf)) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1271 | bsize = len (buf) |
1272 | newptsize = self.ptsize + bsize | |
1273 | diff = newptsize - PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE | |
1274 | if diff > 0: | |
1275 | bsize -= diff | |
1276 | newptsize = PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE | |
1277 | self.ptsize = newptsize | |
1278 | data = super().process (buf [:bsize]) | |
cd77dadb | 1279 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
cb7a3911 | 1280 | return bsize, data |
cd77dadb PG |
1281 | |
1282 | ||
39accaaa | 1283 | class Decrypt (Crypto): |
a393d9cb | 1284 | |
3031b7ae | 1285 | tag = None # GCM tag, part of header |
3031b7ae | 1286 | last_iv = None # check consecutive ivs in strict mode |
39accaaa | 1287 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1288 | def __init__ (self, password=None, key=None, counter=None, fixedparts=None, |
ee6aa239 | 1289 | strict_ivs=False): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1290 | """ |
1291 | Sanitizing ctor for the decryption context. ``fixedparts`` specifies a | |
1292 | list of IV fixed parts accepted during decryption. If a fixed part is | |
1293 | encountered that is not in the list, decryption will fail. | |
1294 | ||
1295 | :param password: mutually exclusive with ``key`` | |
1296 | :type password: bytes | |
1297 | :param key: mutually exclusive with ``password`` | |
1298 | :type key: bytes | |
1299 | :type counter: initial object counter the values | |
1300 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and | |
1301 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` are unique in each backup set | |
1302 | and cannot be reused even with different fixed parts. | |
1303 | :type fixedparts: bytes list | |
1304 | """ | |
1f3fd7b0 PG |
1305 | if password is None and key is None \ |
1306 | or password is not None and key is not None : | |
1307 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: need either key or password") | |
1308 | ||
1309 | if key is not None: | |
1310 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is False: | |
1311 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: key must be provided as " | |
1312 | "bytes, not %s" % type (key)) | |
1313 | else: # password, no key | |
1314 | if isinstance (password, str) is False: | |
1315 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: password must be a string, not %s" | |
1316 | % type (password)) | |
1317 | if len (password) == 0: | |
1318 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: supplied empty password but not " | |
1319 | "permitted for PDT encrypted files") | |
36b9932a | 1320 | # fixed parts |
50710d86 | 1321 | if fixedparts is not None: |
36b9932a PG |
1322 | if isinstance (fixedparts, list) is False: |
1323 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: IV fixed parts must be " | |
1324 | "supplied as list, not %s" | |
1325 | % type (fixedparts)) | |
b12110dd PG |
1326 | self.fixed = fixedparts |
1327 | self.fixed.sort () | |
ee6aa239 | 1328 | |
a83fa4ed PG |
1329 | super().__init__ (password=password, key=key, counter=counter, |
1330 | strict_ivs=strict_ivs) | |
39accaaa PG |
1331 | |
1332 | ||
b12110dd | 1333 | def valid_fixed_part (self, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1334 | """ |
1335 | Check if a fixed part was already seen. | |
1336 | """ | |
50710d86 | 1337 | # check if fixed part is known |
b12110dd PG |
1338 | fixed, _cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
1339 | i = bisect.bisect_left (self.fixed, fixed) | |
1340 | return i != len (self.fixed) and self.fixed [i] == fixed | |
50710d86 PG |
1341 | |
1342 | ||
ee6aa239 | 1343 | def check_consecutive_iv (self, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1344 | """ |
1345 | Check whether the counter part of the given IV is indeed the successor | |
1346 | of the currently present counter. This should always be the case for | |
1347 | the objects in a well formed PDT archive but should not be enforced | |
1348 | when decrypting out-of-order. | |
1349 | """ | |
ee6aa239 | 1350 | fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
3031b7ae PG |
1351 | if self.strict_ivs is True \ |
1352 | and self.last_iv is not None \ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
1353 | and self.last_iv [0] == fixed \ |
1354 | and self.last_iv [1] != cnt - 1: | |
f6cd676f | 1355 | raise NonConsecutiveIV ("iv %s counter not successor of " |
ee6aa239 | 1356 | "last object (expected %d, found %d)" |
afa13ebc | 1357 | % (fixed, iv_fmt (self.last_iv [1]), cnt)) |
4c842b5d | 1358 | self.last_iv = (fixed, cnt) |
ee6aa239 PG |
1359 | |
1360 | ||
79782fa9 | 1361 | def next (self, hdr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1362 | """ |
1363 | Start decrypting the next object. The PDTCRYPT header for the object | |
1364 | can be given either as already parsed object or as bytes. | |
1365 | """ | |
dccfe104 PG |
1366 | if isinstance (hdr, bytes) is True: |
1367 | hdr = hdr_read (hdr) | |
36b9932a PG |
1368 | elif isinstance (hdr, dict) is False: |
1369 | # this won’t catch malformed specs though | |
1370 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: wrong type of parameter hdr: " | |
1371 | "expected bytes or spec, got %s" | |
fbfda3d4 | 1372 | % type (hdr)) |
36b9932a PG |
1373 | try: |
1374 | paramversion = hdr ["paramversion"] | |
1375 | nacl = hdr ["nacl"] | |
1376 | iv = hdr ["iv"] | |
1377 | tag = hdr ["tag"] | |
1378 | except KeyError: | |
1379 | raise InvalidHeader ("next: not a header %r" % hdr) | |
1380 | ||
30019abf | 1381 | super().next (self.password, paramversion, nacl, iv) |
b12110dd | 1382 | if self.fixed is not None and self.valid_fixed_part (iv) is False: |
f6cd676f PG |
1383 | raise InvalidIVFixedPart ("iv %s has invalid fixed part" |
1384 | % iv_fmt (iv)) | |
3031b7ae | 1385 | self.check_consecutive_iv (iv) |
ee6aa239 | 1386 | |
36b9932a | 1387 | self.tag = tag |
b12110dd PG |
1388 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get (paramversion, None) |
1389 | if defs is None: | |
1390 | raise FormatError ("header contains unknown parameter version %d; " | |
1391 | "maybe the file was created by a more recent " | |
1392 | "version of Deltatar" % paramversion) | |
50710d86 | 1393 | enc = defs ["enc"] |
6178061e PG |
1394 | if enc == "aes-gcm": |
1395 | self.enc = Cipher \ | |
1396 | ( algorithms.AES (self.key) | |
36b9932a | 1397 | , modes.GCM (iv, tag=self.tag) |
6178061e PG |
1398 | , backend = default_backend ()) \ |
1399 | . decryptor () | |
1400 | elif enc == "passthrough": | |
1401 | self.enc = PassthroughCipher () | |
1402 | else: | |
b12110dd PG |
1403 | raise InternalError ("encryption parameter set %d refers to unknown " |
1404 | "mode %r" % (paramversion, enc)) | |
f484f2d1 | 1405 | self.set_object_counter (self.cnt + 1) |
39accaaa PG |
1406 | |
1407 | ||
db1f3ac7 | 1408 | def done (self, tag=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1409 | """ |
1410 | Stop decryption of the current object and finalize it with the active | |
1411 | context. This will throw an *InvalidGCMTag* exception to indicate that | |
1412 | the authentication tag does not match the data. If the tag is correct, | |
1413 | the rest of the plaintext is returned. | |
1414 | """ | |
633b18a9 | 1415 | data = b"" |
db1f3ac7 PG |
1416 | try: |
1417 | if tag is None: | |
f484f2d1 | 1418 | data = self.enc.finalize () |
db1f3ac7 | 1419 | else: |
36b9932a PG |
1420 | if isinstance (tag, bytes) is False: |
1421 | raise InvalidParameter ("done: wrong type of parameter " | |
1422 | "tag: expected bytes, got %s" | |
1423 | % type (tag)) | |
f484f2d1 | 1424 | data = self.enc.finalize_with_tag (self.tag) |
b0078f26 | 1425 | except cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag: |
f08c604b | 1426 | raise InvalidGCMTag ("done: tag mismatch of object %d: %s " |
b0078f26 | 1427 | "rejected by finalize ()" |
f08c604b | 1428 | % (self.cnt, binascii.hexlify (self.tag))) |
50710d86 | 1429 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
633b18a9 | 1430 | self.stats ["out"] += len (data) |
b0078f26 | 1431 | return data |
00b3cd10 PG |
1432 | |
1433 | ||
47e27926 | 1434 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1435 | """ |
1436 | Decrypt the bytes object *buf* with the active decryptor. | |
1437 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1438 | if isinstance (buf, bytes) is False: |
1439 | raise InvalidParameter ("process: expected byte buffer, not %s" | |
1440 | % type (buf)) | |
47e27926 PG |
1441 | self.ctsize += len (buf) |
1442 | data = super().process (buf) | |
1443 | self.ptsize += len (data) | |
1444 | return data | |
1445 | ||
1446 | ||
00b3cd10 | 1447 | ############################################################################### |
770173c5 PG |
1448 | ## testing helpers |
1449 | ############################################################################### | |
1450 | ||
cb7a3911 | 1451 | def _patch_global (glob, vow, n=None): |
770173c5 PG |
1452 | """ |
1453 | Adapt upper file counter bound for testing IV logic. Completely unsafe. | |
1454 | """ | |
1455 | assert vow == "I am fully aware that this will void my warranty." | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1456 | r = globals () [glob] |
1457 | if n is None: | |
1458 | n = globals () [glob + "_DEFAULT"] | |
1459 | globals () [glob] = n | |
770173c5 PG |
1460 | return r |
1461 | ||
cb7a3911 PG |
1462 | _testing_set_AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX = \ |
1463 | partial (_patch_global, "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX") | |
1464 | ||
1465 | _testing_set_PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE = \ | |
1466 | partial (_patch_global, "PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE") | |
1467 | ||
a808459e PG |
1468 | def open2_dump_file (fname, dir_fd, force=False): |
1469 | outfd = -1 | |
1470 | ||
1471 | oflags = os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY | |
6690f5e0 | 1472 | if force is True: |
a808459e PG |
1473 | oflags |= os.O_TRUNC |
1474 | else: | |
1475 | oflags |= os.O_EXCL | |
1476 | ||
1477 | try: | |
1478 | outfd = os.open (fname, oflags, | |
1479 | stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR, dir_fd=dir_fd) | |
1480 | except FileExistsError as exn: | |
1481 | noise ("PDT: refusing to overwrite existing file %s" % fname) | |
1482 | noise ("") | |
1483 | raise RuntimeError ("destination file %s already exists" % fname) | |
1484 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1485 | noise ("PDT: new output file %s (fd=%d)" % (fname, outfd)) | |
1486 | ||
1487 | return outfd | |
1488 | ||
770173c5 | 1489 | ############################################################################### |
00b3cd10 PG |
1490 | ## freestanding invocation |
1491 | ############################################################################### | |
1492 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
1493 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS = 0 |
1494 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT = 1 | |
f41973a6 | 1495 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN = 2 |
da82bc58 PG |
1496 | |
1497 | PDTCRYPT_SUB = \ | |
1498 | { "process" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS | |
f41973a6 PG |
1499 | , "scrypt" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT |
1500 | , "scan" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN } | |
da82bc58 | 1501 | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1502 | PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT = 1 << 0 # decrypt archive with password |
1503 | PDTCRYPT_SPLIT = 1 << 1 # split archive into individual objects | |
da82bc58 | 1504 | PDTCRYPT_HASH = 1 << 2 # output scrypt hash for file and given password |
e3abcdf0 | 1505 | |
a808459e PG |
1506 | PDTCRYPT_SPLITNAME = "pdtcrypt-object-%d.bin" |
1507 | PDTCRYPT_RESCUENAME = "pdtcrypt-rescue-object-%0.5d.bin" | |
e3abcdf0 | 1508 | |
70ad9458 | 1509 | PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE = False |
ee6aa239 | 1510 | PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS = False |
b07633d3 | 1511 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = False |
15d3eefd | 1512 | PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE = 1 << 12 |
70ad9458 PG |
1513 | PDTCRYPT_SINK = 0 |
1514 | PDTCRYPT_SOURCE = 1 | |
1515 | SELF = None | |
1516 | ||
77058bab PG |
1517 | PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_VER = 1 |
1518 | PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_PVER = 1 | |
1519 | ||
7b3940e5 PG |
1520 | # scrypt hashing output control |
1521 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR = 0 | |
1522 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS = 1 | |
4f6405d6 | 1523 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_DEFAULT = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR |
7b3940e5 PG |
1524 | |
1525 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_FORMAT = \ | |
1526 | { "i2n" : PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR | |
1527 | , "params" : PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS } | |
1528 | ||
4c62ddc0 | 1529 | PDTCRYPT_TT_COLUMNS = 80 # assume standard terminal |
15d3eefd PG |
1530 | |
1531 | class PDTDecryptionError (Exception): | |
1532 | """Decryption failed.""" | |
1533 | ||
e3abcdf0 PG |
1534 | class PDTSplitError (Exception): |
1535 | """Decryption failed.""" | |
1536 | ||
15d3eefd PG |
1537 | |
1538 | def noise (*a, **b): | |
591a722f | 1539 | print (file=sys.stderr, *a, **b) |
15d3eefd PG |
1540 | |
1541 | ||
89e1073c PG |
1542 | class PassthroughDecryptor (object): |
1543 | ||
1544 | curhdr = None # write current header on first data write | |
1545 | ||
1546 | def __init__ (self): | |
1547 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1548 | noise ("PDT: no encryption; data passthrough") | |
1549 | ||
1550 | def next (self, hdr): | |
1551 | ok, curhdr = hdr_make (hdr) | |
1552 | if ok is False: | |
1553 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("bad header %r" % hdr) | |
1554 | self.curhdr = curhdr | |
1555 | ||
1556 | def done (self): | |
1557 | if self.curhdr is not None: | |
1558 | return self.curhdr | |
1559 | return b"" | |
1560 | ||
1561 | def process (self, d): | |
1562 | if self.curhdr is not None: | |
1563 | d = self.curhdr + d | |
1564 | self.curhdr = None | |
1565 | return d | |
1566 | ||
1567 | ||
a83fa4ed | 1568 | def depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs): |
15d3eefd | 1569 | """ |
a83fa4ed PG |
1570 | Remove PDTCRYPT layer from all objects encrypted with the secret. Used on a |
1571 | Deltatar backup this will yield a (possibly Gzip compressed) tarball. | |
15d3eefd PG |
1572 | """ |
1573 | ctleft = -1 # length of ciphertext to consume | |
1574 | ctcurrent = 0 # total ciphertext of current object | |
15d3eefd PG |
1575 | total_obj = 0 # total number of objects read |
1576 | total_pt = 0 # total plaintext bytes | |
1577 | total_ct = 0 # total ciphertext bytes | |
1578 | total_read = 0 # total bytes read | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1579 | outfile = None # Python file object for output |
1580 | ||
89e1073c | 1581 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT: # decryptor |
a83fa4ed PG |
1582 | ks = secret [0] |
1583 | if ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW: | |
1584 | decr = Decrypt (password=secret [1], strict_ivs=PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS) | |
1585 | elif ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
6257d5b3 | 1586 | key = secret [1] |
a83fa4ed PG |
1587 | decr = Decrypt (key=key, strict_ivs=PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS) |
1588 | else: | |
1589 | raise InternalError ("‘%d’ does not specify a valid kind of secret" | |
1590 | % ks) | |
89e1073c PG |
1591 | else: |
1592 | decr = PassthroughDecryptor () | |
1593 | ||
e3abcdf0 PG |
1594 | def nextout (_): |
1595 | """Dummy for non-split mode: output file does not vary.""" | |
1596 | return outs | |
1597 | ||
1598 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT: | |
1599 | def nextout (outfile): | |
1600 | """ | |
1601 | We were passed an fd as outs for accessing the destination | |
1602 | directory where extracted archive components are supposed | |
1603 | to end up in. | |
1604 | """ | |
1605 | ||
1606 | if outfile is None: | |
1607 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1608 | noise ("PDT: no output file to close at this point") | |
375fb496 TJ |
1609 | else: |
1610 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1611 | noise ("PDT: release output file %r" % outfile) | |
1612 | # cleanup happens automatically by the GC; the next | |
1613 | # line will error out on account of an invalid fd | |
1614 | #outfile.close () | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1615 | |
1616 | assert total_obj > 0 | |
1617 | fname = PDTCRYPT_SPLITNAME % total_obj | |
1618 | try: | |
a808459e PG |
1619 | outfd = open2_dump_file (fname, outs, force=PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE) |
1620 | except RuntimeError as exn: | |
1621 | raise PDTSplitError (exn) | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1622 | return os.fdopen (outfd, "wb", closefd=True) |
1623 | ||
15d3eefd | 1624 | |
47d22679 | 1625 | def tell (s): |
b09a99eb | 1626 | """ESPIPE is normal on non-seekable stdio stream.""" |
47d22679 PG |
1627 | try: |
1628 | return s.tell () | |
1629 | except OSError as exn: | |
2a307f41 | 1630 | if exn.errno == errno.ESPIPE: |
47d22679 PG |
1631 | return -1 |
1632 | ||
e3abcdf0 | 1633 | def out (pt, outfile): |
15d3eefd PG |
1634 | npt = len (pt) |
1635 | nonlocal total_pt | |
1636 | total_pt += npt | |
70ad9458 | 1637 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1638 | noise ("PDT:\t· decrypt plaintext %d B" % (npt)) |
1639 | try: | |
e3abcdf0 | 1640 | nn = outfile.write (pt) |
15d3eefd PG |
1641 | except OSError as exn: # probably ENOSPC |
1642 | raise DecryptionError ("error (%s)" % exn) | |
1643 | if nn != npt: | |
1644 | raise DecryptionError ("write aborted after %d of %d B" % (nn, npt)) | |
1645 | ||
1646 | while True: | |
1647 | if ctleft <= 0: | |
1648 | # current object completed; in a valid archive this marks either | |
1649 | # the start of a new header or the end of the input | |
1650 | if ctleft == 0: # current object requires finalization | |
70ad9458 | 1651 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
47d22679 | 1652 | noise ("PDT: %d finalize" % tell (ins)) |
5d394c0d PG |
1653 | try: |
1654 | pt = decr.done () | |
1655 | except InvalidGCMTag as exn: | |
f08c604b PG |
1656 | raise DecryptionError ("error finalizing object %d (%d B): " |
1657 | "%r" % (total_obj, len (pt), exn)) \ | |
1658 | from exn | |
e3abcdf0 | 1659 | out (pt, outfile) |
70ad9458 | 1660 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1661 | noise ("PDT:\t· object validated") |
1662 | ||
70ad9458 | 1663 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
47d22679 | 1664 | noise ("PDT: %d hdr" % tell (ins)) |
15d3eefd PG |
1665 | try: |
1666 | hdr = hdr_read_stream (ins) | |
dd47d6a2 | 1667 | total_read += PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE |
ae3d0f2a PG |
1668 | except EndOfFile as exn: |
1669 | total_read += exn.remainder | |
dd47d6a2 | 1670 | if total_ct + total_obj * PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE != total_read: |
15d3eefd PG |
1671 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("ciphertext processed (%d B) plus " |
1672 | "overhead (%d × %d B) does not match " | |
1673 | "the number of bytes read (%d )" | |
dd47d6a2 | 1674 | % (total_ct, total_obj, PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE, |
15d3eefd PG |
1675 | total_read)) |
1676 | # the single good exit | |
1677 | return total_read, total_obj, total_ct, total_pt | |
1678 | except InvalidHeader as exn: | |
1679 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("invalid header at position %d in %r " | |
ee6aa239 | 1680 | "(%s)" % (tell (ins), exn, ins)) |
70ad9458 | 1681 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1682 | pretty = hdr_fmt_pretty (hdr) |
1683 | noise (reduce (lambda a, e: (a + "\n" if a else "") + "PDT:\t· " + e, | |
1684 | pretty.splitlines (), "")) | |
1685 | ctcurrent = ctleft = hdr ["ctsize"] | |
89e1073c | 1686 | |
15d3eefd | 1687 | decr.next (hdr) |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1688 | |
1689 | total_obj += 1 # used in file counter with split mode | |
1690 | ||
1691 | # finalization complete or skipped in case of first object in | |
1692 | # stream; create a new output file if necessary | |
1693 | outfile = nextout (outfile) | |
15d3eefd | 1694 | |
70ad9458 | 1695 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd | 1696 | noise ("PDT: %d decrypt obj no. %d, %d B" |
47d22679 | 1697 | % (tell (ins), total_obj, ctleft)) |
15d3eefd PG |
1698 | |
1699 | # always allocate a new buffer since python-cryptography doesn’t allow | |
1700 | # passing a bytearray :/ | |
1701 | nexpect = min (ctleft, PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE) | |
70ad9458 | 1702 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd | 1703 | noise ("PDT:\t· [%d] %d%% done, read block (%d B of %d B remaining)" |
47d22679 | 1704 | % (tell (ins), |
15d3eefd PG |
1705 | 100 - ctleft * 100 / (ctcurrent > 0 and ctcurrent or 1), |
1706 | nexpect, ctleft)) | |
1707 | ct = ins.read (nexpect) | |
1708 | nct = len (ct) | |
1709 | if nct < nexpect: | |
47d22679 | 1710 | off = tell (ins) |
ae3d0f2a PG |
1711 | raise EndOfFile (nct, |
1712 | "hit EOF after %d of %d B in block [%d:%d); " | |
15d3eefd PG |
1713 | "%d B ciphertext remaining for object no %d" |
1714 | % (nct, nexpect, off, off + nexpect, ctleft, | |
1715 | total_obj)) | |
1716 | ctleft -= nct | |
1717 | total_ct += nct | |
1718 | total_read += nct | |
1719 | ||
70ad9458 | 1720 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1721 | noise ("PDT:\t· decrypt ciphertext %d B" % (nct)) |
1722 | pt = decr.process (ct) | |
e3abcdf0 | 1723 | out (pt, outfile) |
15d3eefd | 1724 | |
d6c15a52 | 1725 | |
70ad9458 | 1726 | def deptdcrypt_mk_stream (kind, path): |
d6c15a52 | 1727 | """Create stream from file or stdio descriptor.""" |
70ad9458 | 1728 | if kind == PDTCRYPT_SINK: |
d6c15a52 | 1729 | if path == "-": |
70ad9458 | 1730 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: sink: stdout") |
d6c15a52 PG |
1731 | return sys.stdout.buffer |
1732 | else: | |
70ad9458 | 1733 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: sink: file %s" % path) |
d6c15a52 | 1734 | return io.FileIO (path, "w") |
70ad9458 | 1735 | if kind == PDTCRYPT_SOURCE: |
d6c15a52 | 1736 | if path == "-": |
70ad9458 | 1737 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: source: stdin") |
d6c15a52 PG |
1738 | return sys.stdin.buffer |
1739 | else: | |
70ad9458 | 1740 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: source: file %s" % path) |
d6c15a52 PG |
1741 | return io.FileIO (path, "r") |
1742 | ||
1743 | raise ValueError ("bogus stream “%s” / %s" % (kind, path)) | |
1744 | ||
15d3eefd | 1745 | |
a83fa4ed | 1746 | def mode_depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs): |
da82bc58 PG |
1747 | try: |
1748 | total_read, total_obj, total_ct, total_pt = \ | |
a83fa4ed | 1749 | depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs) |
da82bc58 PG |
1750 | except DecryptionError as exn: |
1751 | noise ("PDT: Decryption failed:") | |
1752 | noise ("PDT:") | |
1753 | noise ("PDT: “%s”" % exn) | |
1754 | noise ("PDT:") | |
a83fa4ed | 1755 | noise ("PDT: Did you specify the correct key / password?") |
da82bc58 PG |
1756 | noise ("") |
1757 | return 1 | |
1758 | except PDTSplitError as exn: | |
1759 | noise ("PDT: Split operation failed:") | |
1760 | noise ("PDT:") | |
1761 | noise ("PDT: “%s”" % exn) | |
1762 | noise ("PDT:") | |
a83fa4ed | 1763 | noise ("PDT: Hint: target directory should be empty.") |
da82bc58 PG |
1764 | noise ("") |
1765 | return 1 | |
1766 | ||
1767 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1768 | noise ("PDT: decryption successful" ) | |
1769 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes read" % total_read) | |
1770 | noise ("PDT: %.10d objects decrypted" % total_obj ) | |
1771 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes ciphertext" % total_ct ) | |
1772 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes plaintext" % total_pt ) | |
1773 | noise ("" ) | |
1774 | ||
1775 | return 0 | |
1776 | ||
1777 | ||
7b3940e5 | 1778 | def mode_scrypt (pw, ins=None, nacl=None, fmt=PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR): |
77058bab | 1779 | hsh = None |
7b3940e5 | 1780 | paramversion = PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_PVER |
77058bab PG |
1781 | if ins is not None: |
1782 | hsh, nacl, version, paramversion = scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins) | |
1783 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) | |
1784 | else: | |
1785 | nacl = binascii.unhexlify (nacl) | |
7b3940e5 | 1786 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) |
77058bab PG |
1787 | version = PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_VER |
1788 | ||
1789 | kdfname, params = defs ["kdf"] | |
1790 | if hsh is None: | |
1791 | kdf = kdf_by_version (None, defs) | |
1792 | hsh, _void = kdf (pw, nacl) | |
da82bc58 PG |
1793 | |
1794 | import json | |
7b3940e5 PG |
1795 | |
1796 | if fmt == PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR: | |
1797 | out = json.dumps ({ "salt" : base64.b64encode (nacl).decode () | |
1798 | , "key" : base64.b64encode (hsh) .decode () | |
1799 | , "paramversion" : paramversion }) | |
1800 | elif fmt == PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS: | |
1801 | out = json.dumps ({ "salt" : binascii.hexlify (nacl).decode () | |
1802 | , "key" : binascii.hexlify (hsh) .decode () | |
1803 | , "version" : version | |
1804 | , "scrypt_params" : { "N" : params ["N"] | |
1805 | , "r" : params ["r"] | |
1806 | , "p" : params ["p"] | |
1807 | , "dkLen" : params ["dkLen"] } }) | |
1808 | else: | |
1809 | raise RuntimeError ("bad scrypt output scheme %r" % fmt) | |
1810 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
1811 | print (out) |
1812 | ||
1813 | ||
4c62ddc0 PG |
1814 | def noise_output_candidates (cands, indent=8, cols=PDTCRYPT_TT_COLUMNS): |
1815 | """ | |
1816 | Print a list of offsets without garbling the terminal too much. | |
1817 | ||
1818 | The indent is counted from column zero; if it is wide enough, the “PDT: ” | |
1819 | marker will be prepended, considered part of the indentation. | |
1820 | """ | |
1821 | wd = cols - 1 | |
1822 | nc = len (cands) | |
1823 | idt = " " * indent if indent < 5 else "PDT: " + " " * (indent - 5) | |
1824 | line = idt | |
1825 | lpos = indent | |
1826 | sep = "," | |
1827 | lsep = len (sep) | |
1828 | init = True # prevent leading separator | |
1829 | ||
1830 | if indent >= wd: | |
1831 | raise ValueError ("the requested indentation exceeds the line " | |
1832 | "width by %d" % (indent - wd)) | |
1833 | ||
1834 | for n in cands: | |
1835 | ns = "%d" % n | |
1836 | lns = len (ns) | |
1837 | if init is False: | |
1838 | line += sep | |
1839 | lpos += lsep | |
1840 | ||
1841 | lpos += lns | |
1842 | if lpos > wd: # line break | |
1843 | noise (line) | |
1844 | line = idt | |
1845 | lpos = indent + lns | |
1846 | elif init is True: | |
1847 | init = False | |
1848 | else: # space | |
1849 | line += ' ' | |
1850 | lpos += 1 | |
1851 | ||
1852 | line += ns | |
1853 | ||
1854 | if lpos != indent: | |
1855 | noise (line) | |
1856 | ||
1857 | ||
15047fe4 PG |
1858 | SLICE_START = 1 # ordering is important to have starts of intervals |
1859 | SLICE_END = 0 # sorted before equal ends | |
1860 | ||
1861 | def find_overlaps (slices): | |
1862 | """ | |
1863 | Find overlapping slices: iterate open/close points of intervals, tracking | |
1864 | the ones open at any time. | |
1865 | """ | |
1866 | bounds = [] | |
1867 | inside = set () # of indices into bounds | |
1868 | ovrlp = set () # of indices into bounds | |
1869 | ||
1870 | for i, s in enumerate (slices): | |
1871 | bounds.append ((s [0], SLICE_START, i)) | |
1872 | bounds.append ((s [1], SLICE_END , i)) | |
1873 | bounds = sorted (bounds) | |
1874 | ||
1875 | for val in bounds: | |
1876 | i = val [2] | |
1877 | if val [1] == SLICE_START: | |
1878 | inside.add (i) | |
1879 | else: | |
1880 | if len (inside) > 1: # closing one that overlapped | |
1881 | ovrlp |= inside | |
1882 | inside.remove (i) | |
1883 | ||
1884 | return [ slices [i] for i in ovrlp ] | |
1885 | ||
1886 | ||
a808459e | 1887 | def mode_scan (secret, fname, outs=None, nacl=None): |
f41973a6 PG |
1888 | """ |
1889 | Dissect a binary file, looking for PDTCRYPT headers and objects. | |
a808459e PG |
1890 | |
1891 | If *outs* is supplied, recoverable data will be dumped into the specified | |
1892 | directory. | |
f41973a6 PG |
1893 | """ |
1894 | try: | |
a808459e | 1895 | ifd = os.open (fname, os.O_RDONLY) |
f41973a6 PG |
1896 | except FileNotFoundError: |
1897 | noise ("PDT: failed to open %s readonly" % fname) | |
1898 | noise ("") | |
1899 | usage (err=True) | |
1900 | ||
1901 | try: | |
1902 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1903 | noise ("PDT: scan for potential sync points") | |
a808459e | 1904 | cands = locate_hdr_candidates (ifd) |
f41973a6 PG |
1905 | if len (cands) == 0: |
1906 | noise ("PDT: scan complete: input does not contain potential PDT " | |
1907 | "headers; giving up.") | |
1908 | return -1 | |
1909 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
4c62ddc0 PG |
1910 | noise ("PDT: scan complete: found %d candidates:" % len (cands)) |
1911 | noise_output_candidates (cands) | |
6c8073ab | 1912 | except: |
a808459e | 1913 | os.close (ifd) |
6c8073ab | 1914 | raise |
f41973a6 | 1915 | |
15047fe4 | 1916 | junk, todo, slices = [], [], [] |
6c8073ab | 1917 | try: |
a808459e | 1918 | nobj = 0 |
6c8073ab | 1919 | for cand in cands: |
a808459e PG |
1920 | nobj += 1 |
1921 | vdt, hdr = inspect_hdr (ifd, cand) | |
15047fe4 | 1922 | |
5ed4c57d PG |
1923 | vdts = verdict_fmt (vdt) |
1924 | ||
6c8073ab | 1925 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_JUNK: |
5ed4c57d | 1926 | noise ("PDT: obj %d: %s object: bad header, skipping" % vdts) |
6c8073ab PG |
1927 | junk.append (cand) |
1928 | else: | |
1929 | off0 = cand + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE | |
1930 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
a808459e | 1931 | noise ("PDT: obj %d: read payload @%d" % (nobj, off0)) |
70a33834 PG |
1932 | pretty = hdr_fmt_pretty (hdr) |
1933 | noise (reduce (lambda a, e: (a + "\n" if a else "") + "PDT:\t· " + e, | |
1934 | pretty.splitlines (), "")) | |
6c8073ab | 1935 | |
a808459e PG |
1936 | ofd = -1 |
1937 | if outs is not None: | |
1938 | ofname = PDTCRYPT_RESCUENAME % nobj | |
1939 | ofd = open2_dump_file (ofname, outs, force=PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE) | |
1940 | ||
15047fe4 | 1941 | ctsize = hdr ["ctsize"] |
a808459e | 1942 | try: |
15047fe4 PG |
1943 | l = try_decrypt (ifd, off0, hdr, secret, ofd=ofd) |
1944 | ok = l == ctsize | |
1945 | slices.append ((off0, off0 + l)) | |
a808459e PG |
1946 | finally: |
1947 | if ofd != -1: | |
1948 | os.close (ofd) | |
70a33834 | 1949 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_GOOD and ok is True: |
5ed4c57d PG |
1950 | noise ("PDT: %d → ✓ %s object %d–%d" |
1951 | % (cand, vdts, off0, off0 + ctsize)) | |
70a33834 | 1952 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_FISHY and ok is True: |
5ed4c57d PG |
1953 | noise ("PDT: %d → × %s object %d–%d, corrupt header" |
1954 | % (cand, vdts, off0, off0 + ctsize)) | |
70a33834 | 1955 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_GOOD and ok is False: |
5ed4c57d PG |
1956 | noise ("PDT: %d → × %s object %d–%d, problematic payload" |
1957 | % (cand, vdts, off0, off0 + ctsize)) | |
70a33834 | 1958 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_FISHY and ok is False: |
5ed4c57d PG |
1959 | noise ("PDT: %d → × %s object %d–%d, corrupt header, problematic " |
1960 | "ciphertext" % (cand, vdts, off0, off0 + ctsize)) | |
6c8073ab PG |
1961 | else: |
1962 | raise Unreachable | |
1963 | finally: | |
a808459e | 1964 | os.close (ifd) |
7b3940e5 | 1965 | |
70a33834 PG |
1966 | if len (junk) == 0: |
1967 | noise ("PDT: all headers ok") | |
1968 | else: | |
1969 | noise ("PDT: %d candidates not parseable as headers:" % len (junk)) | |
1970 | noise_output_candidates (junk) | |
1971 | ||
15047fe4 PG |
1972 | overlap = find_overlaps (slices) |
1973 | if len (overlap) > 0: | |
1974 | noise ("PDT: %d objects overlapping others" % len (overlap)) | |
1975 | for slice in overlap: | |
1976 | noise ("PDT: × %d→%d" % (slice [0], slice [1])) | |
1977 | ||
70ad9458 PG |
1978 | def usage (err=False): |
1979 | out = print | |
1980 | if err is True: | |
1981 | out = noise | |
5afcb45d | 1982 | indent = ' ' * len (SELF) |
da82bc58 | 1983 | out ("usage: %s SUBCOMMAND { --help" % SELF) |
5afcb45d | 1984 | out (" %s | [ -v ] { -p PASSWORD | -k KEY }" % indent) |
77058bab PG |
1985 | out (" %s [ { -i | --in } { - | SOURCE } ]" % indent) |
1986 | out (" %s [ { -n | --nacl } { SALT } ]" % indent) | |
1987 | out (" %s [ { -o | --out } { - | DESTINATION } ]" % indent) | |
1988 | out (" %s [ -D | --no-decrypt ] [ -S | --split ]" % indent) | |
7b3940e5 | 1989 | out (" %s [ -f | --format ]" % indent) |
70ad9458 PG |
1990 | out ("") |
1991 | out ("\twhere") | |
da82bc58 PG |
1992 | out ("\t\tSUBCOMMAND main mode: { process | scrypt }") |
1993 | out ("\t\t where:") | |
1994 | out ("\t\t process: extract objects from PDT archive") | |
1995 | out ("\t\t scrypt: calculate hash from password and first object") | |
a83fa4ed PG |
1996 | out ("\t\t-p PASSWORD password to derive the encryption key from") |
1997 | out ("\t\t-k KEY encryption key as 16 bytes in hexadecimal notation") | |
e3abcdf0 | 1998 | out ("\t\t-s enforce strict handling of initialization vectors") |
70ad9458 PG |
1999 | out ("\t\t-i SOURCE file name to read from") |
2000 | out ("\t\t-o DESTINATION file to write output to") | |
77058bab | 2001 | out ("\t\t-n SALT provide salt for scrypt mode in hex encoding") |
70ad9458 | 2002 | out ("\t\t-v print extra info") |
e3abcdf0 PG |
2003 | out ("\t\t-S split into files at object boundaries; this") |
2004 | out ("\t\t requires DESTINATION to refer to directory") | |
2005 | out ("\t\t-D PDT header and ciphertext passthrough") | |
7b3940e5 | 2006 | out ("\t\t-f format of SCRYPT hash output (“default” or “parameters”)") |
70ad9458 PG |
2007 | out ("") |
2008 | out ("\tinstead of filenames, “-” may used to specify stdin / stdout") | |
2009 | out ("") | |
2010 | sys.exit ((err is True) and 42 or 0) | |
2011 | ||
2012 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
2013 | def bail (msg): |
2014 | noise (msg) | |
2015 | noise ("") | |
2016 | usage (err=True) | |
2017 | raise Unreachable | |
2018 | ||
2019 | ||
70ad9458 | 2020 | def parse_argv (argv): |
6690f5e0 | 2021 | global PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE |
70ad9458 | 2022 | global SELF |
7b3940e5 PG |
2023 | mode = PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT |
2024 | secret = None | |
2025 | insspec = None | |
2026 | outsspec = None | |
a808459e | 2027 | outs = None |
7b3940e5 | 2028 | nacl = None |
4f6405d6 | 2029 | scrypt_format = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_DEFAULT |
70ad9458 PG |
2030 | |
2031 | argvi = iter (argv) | |
2032 | SELF = os.path.basename (next (argvi)) | |
2033 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
2034 | try: |
2035 | rawsubcmd = next (argvi) | |
2036 | subcommand = PDTCRYPT_SUB [rawsubcmd] | |
2037 | except StopIteration: | |
a83fa4ed | 2038 | bail ("ERROR: subcommand required") |
da82bc58 | 2039 | except KeyError: |
a83fa4ed | 2040 | bail ("ERROR: invalid subcommand “%s” specified" % rawsubcmd) |
da82bc58 | 2041 | |
59d74e2b PG |
2042 | def checked_arg (): |
2043 | nonlocal argvi | |
2044 | try: | |
2045 | return next (argvi) | |
2046 | except StopIteration: | |
2047 | bail ("ERROR: argument list incomplete") | |
2048 | ||
addcec42 | 2049 | def checked_secret (s): |
a83fa4ed PG |
2050 | nonlocal secret |
2051 | if secret is None: | |
addcec42 | 2052 | secret = s |
da82bc58 | 2053 | else: |
a83fa4ed | 2054 | bail ("ERROR: encountered “%s” but secret already given" % arg) |
da82bc58 | 2055 | |
70ad9458 PG |
2056 | for arg in argvi: |
2057 | if arg in [ "-h", "--help" ]: | |
2058 | usage () | |
2059 | raise Unreachable | |
2060 | elif arg in [ "-v", "--verbose", "--wtf" ]: | |
2061 | global PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE | |
2062 | PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE = True | |
2063 | elif arg in [ "-i", "--in", "--source" ]: | |
59d74e2b | 2064 | insspec = checked_arg () |
70ad9458 | 2065 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt from %s" % insspec) |
a83fa4ed | 2066 | elif arg in [ "-p", "--password" ]: |
59d74e2b | 2067 | arg = checked_arg () |
addcec42 | 2068 | checked_secret (make_secret (password=arg)) |
a83fa4ed | 2069 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypting with password") |
70ad9458 | 2070 | else: |
da82bc58 PG |
2071 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS: |
2072 | if arg in [ "-s", "--strict-ivs" ]: | |
2073 | global PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS | |
2074 | PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS = True | |
77058bab PG |
2075 | elif arg in [ "-o", "--out", "--dest", "--sink" ]: |
2076 | outsspec = checked_arg () | |
2077 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt to %s" % outsspec) | |
da82bc58 | 2078 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--force" ]: |
da82bc58 PG |
2079 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = True |
2080 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: overwrite existing files") | |
2081 | elif arg in [ "-S", "--split" ]: | |
2082 | mode |= PDTCRYPT_SPLIT | |
2083 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: split files") | |
2084 | elif arg in [ "-D", "--no-decrypt" ]: | |
2085 | mode &= ~PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT | |
2086 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: not decrypting") | |
a83fa4ed | 2087 | elif arg in [ "-k", "--key" ]: |
59d74e2b | 2088 | arg = checked_arg () |
addcec42 | 2089 | checked_secret (make_secret (key=arg)) |
a83fa4ed | 2090 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypting with key") |
da82bc58 | 2091 | else: |
a83fa4ed | 2092 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) |
da82bc58 | 2093 | elif subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
77058bab PG |
2094 | if arg in [ "-n", "--nacl", "--salt" ]: |
2095 | nacl = checked_arg () | |
2096 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: salt key with %s" % nacl) | |
7b3940e5 PG |
2097 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--format" ]: |
2098 | arg = checked_arg () | |
2099 | try: | |
2100 | scrypt_format = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_FORMAT [arg] | |
2101 | except KeyError: | |
2102 | bail ("ERROR: invalid scrypt output format %s" % arg) | |
2103 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
2104 | noise ("PDT: scrypt output format “%s”" % scrypt_format) | |
77058bab PG |
2105 | else: |
2106 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) | |
f41973a6 | 2107 | elif subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: |
a808459e PG |
2108 | if arg in [ "-o", "--out", "--dest", "--sink" ]: |
2109 | outsspec = checked_arg () | |
2110 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt to %s" % outsspec) | |
2111 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--force" ]: | |
a808459e PG |
2112 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = True |
2113 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: overwrite existing files") | |
2114 | else: | |
2115 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) | |
70ad9458 | 2116 | |
a83fa4ed | 2117 | if secret is None: |
ecb9676d | 2118 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
a83fa4ed | 2119 | noise ("ERROR: no password or key specified, trying $PDTCRYPT_PASSWORD") |
ecb9676d PG |
2120 | epw = os.getenv ("PDTCRYPT_PASSWORD") |
2121 | if epw is not None: | |
addcec42 | 2122 | checked_secret (make_secret (password=epw.strip ())) |
a83fa4ed PG |
2123 | |
2124 | if secret is None: | |
2125 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
2126 | noise ("ERROR: no password or key specified, trying $PDTCRYPT_KEY") | |
2127 | ek = os.getenv ("PDTCRYPT_KEY") | |
2128 | if ek is not None: | |
addcec42 | 2129 | checked_secret (make_secret (key=ek.strip ())) |
ecb9676d | 2130 | |
a83fa4ed | 2131 | if secret is None: |
da82bc58 | 2132 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
a83fa4ed | 2133 | bail ("ERROR: scrypt hash mode requested but no password given") |
da82bc58 | 2134 | elif mode & PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT: |
6257d5b3 | 2135 | bail ("ERROR: decryption requested but no password given") |
a83fa4ed | 2136 | |
a808459e PG |
2137 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT and outsspec is None: |
2138 | bail ("ERROR: split mode is incompatible with stdout sink " | |
2139 | "(the default)") | |
2140 | ||
2141 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN and outsspec is None: | |
2142 | pass # no output by default in scan mode | |
2143 | elif mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT or subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: | |
2144 | # destination must be directory | |
2145 | if outsspec == "-": | |
2146 | bail ("ERROR: mode is incompatible with stdout sink") | |
2147 | try: | |
2148 | try: | |
2149 | os.makedirs (outsspec, 0o700) | |
2150 | except FileExistsError: | |
2151 | # if it’s a directory with appropriate perms, everything is | |
2152 | # good; otherwise, below invocation of open(2) will fail | |
2153 | pass | |
2154 | outs = os.open (outsspec, os.O_DIRECTORY, 0o600) | |
2155 | except FileNotFoundError as exn: | |
2156 | bail ("ERROR: cannot create target directory “%s”" % outsspec) | |
2157 | except NotADirectoryError as exn: | |
2158 | bail ("ERROR: target path “%s” is not a directory" % outsspec) | |
2159 | else: | |
2160 | outs = deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SINK, outsspec or "-") | |
2161 | ||
f41973a6 PG |
2162 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: |
2163 | if insspec is None: | |
2164 | bail ("ERROR: please supply an input file for scanning") | |
2165 | if insspec == '-': | |
2166 | bail ("ERROR: input must be seekable; please specify a file") | |
a808459e | 2167 | return True, partial (mode_scan, secret, insspec, outs, nacl=nacl) |
f41973a6 | 2168 | |
77058bab PG |
2169 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
2170 | if secret [0] == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
2171 | bail ("ERROR: scrypt mode requires a password") | |
2172 | if insspec is not None and nacl is not None \ | |
2173 | or insspec is None and nacl is None : | |
2174 | bail ("ERROR: please supply either an input file or " | |
2175 | "the salt") | |
70ad9458 PG |
2176 | |
2177 | # default to stdout | |
77058bab PG |
2178 | ins = None |
2179 | if insspec is not None or subcommand != PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: | |
2180 | ins = deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SOURCE, insspec or "-") | |
da82bc58 PG |
2181 | |
2182 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: | |
7b3940e5 PG |
2183 | return True, partial (mode_scrypt, secret [1].encode (), ins, nacl, |
2184 | fmt=scrypt_format) | |
da82bc58 | 2185 | |
a83fa4ed | 2186 | return True, partial (mode_depdtcrypt, mode, secret, ins, outs) |
15d3eefd PG |
2187 | |
2188 | ||
00b3cd10 | 2189 | def main (argv): |
da82bc58 | 2190 | ok, runner = parse_argv (argv) |
f08c604b | 2191 | |
da82bc58 | 2192 | if ok is True: return runner () |
15d3eefd | 2193 | |
da82bc58 | 2194 | return 1 |
f08c604b | 2195 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
2196 | |
2197 | if __name__ == "__main__": | |
2198 | sys.exit (main (sys.argv)) | |
2199 |