Commit | Line | Data |
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00b3cd10 PG |
1 | #!/usr/bin/env python3 |
2 | ||
3 | """ | |
83f2d71e | 4 | Intra2net 2017 |
00b3cd10 PG |
5 | |
6 | =============================================================================== | |
704ceaa5 | 7 | crypto -- Encryption Layer for the Deltatar Backup |
00b3cd10 PG |
8 | =============================================================================== |
9 | ||
10 | Crypto stack: | |
11 | ||
12 | - AES-GCM for the symmetric encryption; | |
13 | - Scrypt as KDF. | |
14 | ||
15 | References: | |
16 | ||
17 | - NIST Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter | |
18 | Mode (GCM) and GMAC | |
19 | http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf | |
20 | ||
21 | - AES-GCM v1: | |
22 | https://cryptome.org/2014/01/aes-gcm-v1.pdf | |
23 | ||
24 | - Authentication weaknesses in GCM | |
25 | http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/Ferguson2.pdf | |
26 | ||
83f2d71e PG |
27 | Trouble with python-cryptography packages: authentication tags can only be |
28 | passed in advance: https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/3421 | |
29 | ||
6d08915c PG |
30 | Errors |
31 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
32 | ||
33 | Errors fall into roughly three categories: | |
34 | ||
704ceaa5 | 35 | - Cryptographical errors or invalid data. |
6d08915c PG |
36 | |
37 | - ``InvalidGCMTag`` (decryption failed on account of an invalid GCM | |
38 | tag), | |
39 | - ``InvalidIVFixedPart`` (IV fixed part of object not found in list), | |
f6cd676f | 40 | - ``DuplicateIV`` (the IV of an encrypted object already occurred), |
704ceaa5 PG |
41 | - ``DecryptionError`` (used in CLI decryption for presenting error |
42 | conditions to the user). | |
6d08915c PG |
43 | |
44 | - Incorrect usage of the library. | |
45 | ||
46 | - ``InvalidParameter`` (non-conforming user supplied parameter), | |
47 | - ``InvalidHeader`` (data passed for reading not parsable into header), | |
48 | - ``FormatError`` (cannot handle header or parameter version), | |
49 | - ``RuntimeError``. | |
50 | ||
51 | - Bad internal state. If one of these is encountered it means that a state | |
52 | was reached that shouldn’t occur during normal processing. | |
53 | ||
54 | - ``InternalError``, | |
55 | - ``Unreachable``. | |
56 | ||
57 | Also, ``EndOfFile`` is used as a sentinel to communicate that a stream supplied | |
58 | for reading is exhausted. | |
59 | ||
f6cd676f PG |
60 | Initialization Vectors |
61 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
62 | ||
63 | Initialization vectors are checked reuse during the lifetime of a decryptor. | |
704ceaa5 PG |
64 | The fixed counters for metadata files cannot be reused and attempts to do so |
65 | will cause a DuplicateIV error. This means the length of objects encrypted with | |
66 | a metadata counter is capped at 63 GB. | |
67 | ||
68 | For ordinary, non-metadata payload, there is an optional mode with strict IV | |
69 | checking that causes a crypto context to fail if an IV encountered or created | |
70 | was already used for decrypting or encrypting, respectively, an earlier object. | |
71 | Note that this mode can trigger false positives when decrypting non-linearly, | |
72 | e. g. when traversing the same object multiple times. Since the crypto context | |
73 | has no notion of a position in a PDT encrypted archive, this condition must be | |
74 | sorted out downstream. | |
75 | ||
76 | Command Line Utility | |
77 | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
78 | ||
79 | ``crypto.py`` may be invoked as a script for decrypting, validating, and | |
80 | splitting PDT encrypted files. Consult the usage message for details. | |
81 | ||
82 | Usage examples: | |
83 | ||
84 | Decrypt from stdin using the password ‘foo’: :: | |
85 | ||
86 | $ crypto.py process foo -i - -o - <some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt >some-file.tar.gz | |
87 | ||
88 | Output verbose information about the encrypted objects in the archive: :: | |
89 | ||
90 | $ crypto.py process foo -v -i some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt -o /dev/null | |
91 | PDT: decrypt from some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt | |
92 | PDT: decrypt to /dev/null | |
93 | PDT: source: file some-file.tar.gz.pdtcrypt | |
94 | PDT: sink: file /dev/null | |
95 | PDT: 0 hdr | |
96 | PDT: · version = 1 : 0100 | |
97 | PDT: · paramversion = 1 : 0100 | |
98 | PDT: · nacl : d270 b031 00d1 87e2 c946 610d 7b7f 7e5f | |
99 | PDT: · iv : 02ee 3dd7 a963 1eb1 0100 0000 | |
100 | PDT: · ctsize = 591 : 4f02 0000 0000 0000 | |
101 | PDT: · tag : 5b2d 6d8b 8f82 4842 12fd 0b10 b6e3 369b | |
102 | PDT: 64 decrypt obj no. 1, 591 B | |
103 | PDT: · [64] 0% done, read block (591 B of 591 B remaining) | |
104 | PDT: · decrypt ciphertext 591 B | |
105 | PDT: · decrypt plaintext 591 B | |
106 | PDT: 655 finalize | |
107 | … | |
108 | ||
109 | Also, the mode *scrypt* allows deriving encryption keys. To calculate the | |
110 | encryption key from the password ‘foo’ and the salt of the first object in a | |
111 | PDT encrypted file: :: | |
112 | ||
113 | $ crypto.py scrypt foo -i some-file.pdtcrypt | |
4f6405d6 | 114 | {"paramversion": 1, "salt": "Cqzbk48e3peEjzWto8D0yA==", "key": "JH9EkMwaM4x9F5aim5gK/Q=="} |
704ceaa5 PG |
115 | |
116 | The computed 16 byte key is given in hexadecimal notation in the value to | |
117 | ``hash`` and can be fed into Python’s ``binascii.unhexlify()`` to obtain the | |
118 | corresponding binary representation. | |
119 | ||
120 | Note that in Scrypt hashing mode, no data integrity checks are being performed. | |
121 | If the wrong password is given, a wrong key will be derived. Whether the password | |
122 | was indeed correct can only be determined by decrypting. Note that since PDT | |
123 | archives essentially consist of a stream of independent objects, the salt and | |
124 | other parameters may change. Thus a key derived using above method from the | |
125 | first object doesn’t necessarily apply to any of the subsequent objects. | |
f6cd676f | 126 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
127 | """ |
128 | ||
7b3940e5 | 129 | import base64 |
00b3cd10 | 130 | import binascii |
50710d86 | 131 | import bisect |
00b3cd10 PG |
132 | import ctypes |
133 | import io | |
c46c8670 | 134 | from functools import reduce, partial |
f41973a6 | 135 | import mmap |
00b3cd10 PG |
136 | import os |
137 | import struct | |
a808459e | 138 | import stat |
00b3cd10 PG |
139 | import sys |
140 | import time | |
da82bc58 | 141 | import types |
00b3cd10 PG |
142 | try: |
143 | import enum34 | |
144 | except ImportError as exn: | |
145 | pass | |
146 | ||
6257d5b3 | 147 | if __name__ == "__main__": ## Work around the import mechanism lest Python’s |
00b3cd10 PG |
148 | pwd = os.getcwd() ## preference for local imports causes a cyclical |
149 | ## import (crypto → pylibscrypt → […] → ./tarfile → crypto). | |
150 | sys.path = [ p for p in sys.path if p.find ("deltatar") < 0 ] | |
151 | ||
152 | import pylibscrypt | |
153 | from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes | |
154 | from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend | |
15d3eefd | 155 | import cryptography |
00b3cd10 PG |
156 | |
157 | ||
a64085a8 | 158 | __all__ = [ "hdr_make", "hdr_read", "hdr_fmt", "hdr_fmt_pretty" |
b360b772 | 159 | , "scrypt_hashfile" |
3031b7ae PG |
160 | , "PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE", "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA" |
161 | , "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE", "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX" | |
2d6fd8c8 | 162 | ] |
00b3cd10 | 163 | |
a393d9cb PG |
164 | |
165 | ############################################################################### | |
15d3eefd PG |
166 | ## exceptions |
167 | ############################################################################### | |
168 | ||
169 | class EndOfFile (Exception): | |
170 | """Reached EOF.""" | |
ae3d0f2a PG |
171 | remainder = 0 |
172 | msg = 0 | |
8a8ac469 | 173 | def __init__ (self, n=None, msg=None): |
5d394c0d PG |
174 | if n is not None: |
175 | self.remainder = n | |
176 | self.msg = msg | |
15d3eefd | 177 | |
b0078f26 | 178 | |
b12110dd PG |
179 | class InvalidParameter (Exception): |
180 | """Inputs not valid for PDT encryption.""" | |
181 | pass | |
182 | ||
b0078f26 | 183 | |
15d3eefd PG |
184 | class InvalidHeader (Exception): |
185 | """Header not valid.""" | |
186 | pass | |
187 | ||
b0078f26 PG |
188 | |
189 | class InvalidGCMTag (Exception): | |
190 | """ | |
191 | The GCM tag calculated during decryption differs from that in the object | |
192 | header. | |
193 | """ | |
194 | pass | |
195 | ||
196 | ||
26b42ad4 | 197 | class InvalidIVFixedPart (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
198 | """ |
199 | IV fixed part not in supplied list: either the backup is corrupt or the | |
200 | current object does not belong to it. | |
201 | """ | |
26b42ad4 PG |
202 | pass |
203 | ||
b0078f26 | 204 | |
be124bca | 205 | class IVFixedPartError (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
206 | """ |
207 | Error creating a unique IV fixed part: repeated calls to system RNG yielded | |
208 | the same sequence of bytes as the last IV used. | |
209 | """ | |
be124bca PG |
210 | pass |
211 | ||
212 | ||
fac2cfe1 | 213 | class InvalidFileCounter (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
214 | """ |
215 | When encrypting, an attempted reuse of a dedicated counter (info file, | |
216 | index file) was caught. | |
217 | """ | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
218 | pass |
219 | ||
220 | ||
ee6aa239 | 221 | class DuplicateIV (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
222 | """ |
223 | During encryption, the current IV fixed part is identical to an already | |
224 | existing IV (same prefix and file counter). This indicates tampering or | |
225 | programmer error and cannot be recovered from. | |
226 | """ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
227 | pass |
228 | ||
229 | ||
230 | class NonConsecutiveIV (Exception): | |
89ec6e2f PG |
231 | """ |
232 | IVs not numbered consecutively. This is a hard error with strict IV | |
233 | checking. Precludes random access to the encrypted objects. | |
234 | """ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
235 | pass |
236 | ||
237 | ||
b12110dd PG |
238 | class FormatError (Exception): |
239 | """Unusable parameters in header.""" | |
240 | pass | |
241 | ||
b0078f26 | 242 | |
15d3eefd | 243 | class DecryptionError (Exception): |
89ec6e2f | 244 | """Error during decryption with ``crypto.py`` on the command line.""" |
15d3eefd PG |
245 | pass |
246 | ||
b0078f26 | 247 | |
70ad9458 | 248 | class Unreachable (Exception): |
89ec6e2f PG |
249 | """ |
250 | Makeshift __builtin_unreachable(); always a programmer error if | |
251 | thrown. | |
252 | """ | |
70ad9458 PG |
253 | pass |
254 | ||
b0078f26 | 255 | |
b12110dd PG |
256 | class InternalError (Exception): |
257 | """Errors not ascribable to bad user inputs or cryptography.""" | |
258 | pass | |
259 | ||
15d3eefd PG |
260 | |
261 | ############################################################################### | |
a393d9cb PG |
262 | ## crypto layer version |
263 | ############################################################################### | |
264 | ||
265 | ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS = \ | |
c46c8670 | 266 | { 0: \ |
dd23cbc9 PG |
267 | { "kdf": ("dummy", 16) |
268 | , "enc": "passthrough" } | |
c46c8670 | 269 | , 1: \ |
dd23cbc9 PG |
270 | { "kdf": ( "scrypt" |
271 | , { "dkLen" : 16 | |
272 | , "N" : 1 << 16 | |
273 | , "r" : 8 | |
274 | , "p" : 1 | |
275 | , "NaCl_LEN" : 16 }) | |
276 | , "enc": "aes-gcm" } } | |
a393d9cb | 277 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
278 | ############################################################################### |
279 | ## constants | |
280 | ############################################################################### | |
281 | ||
dd47d6a2 | 282 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC = b"PDTCRYPT" |
00b3cd10 | 283 | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
284 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC = 8 # 8 |
285 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION = 2 # 10 | |
286 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION = 2 # 12 | |
287 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL = 16 # 28 | |
288 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV = 12 # 40 | |
289 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE = 8 # 48 | |
290 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_TAG = 16 # 64 GCM auth tag | |
00b3cd10 | 291 | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
292 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE = PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION \ |
293 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL \ | |
294 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE \ | |
295 | + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_TAG # = 64 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
296 | |
297 | # precalculate offsets since Python can’t do constant folding over names | |
dd47d6a2 PG |
298 | HDR_OFF_VERSION = PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_MAGIC |
299 | HDR_OFF_PARAMVERSION = HDR_OFF_VERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_VERSION | |
300 | HDR_OFF_NACL = HDR_OFF_PARAMVERSION + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_PARAMVERSION | |
301 | HDR_OFF_IV = HDR_OFF_NACL + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_NACL | |
302 | HDR_OFF_CTSIZE = HDR_OFF_IV + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_IV | |
303 | HDR_OFF_TAG = HDR_OFF_CTSIZE + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE_CTSIZE | |
00b3cd10 PG |
304 | |
305 | FMT_UINT16_LE = "<H" | |
306 | FMT_UINT64_LE = "<Q" | |
50710d86 | 307 | FMT_I2N_IV = "<8sL" # 8 random bytes ‖ 32 bit counter |
83f2d71e PG |
308 | FMT_I2N_HDR = ("<" # host byte order |
309 | "8s" # magic | |
310 | "H" # version | |
311 | "H" # paramversion | |
312 | "16s" # sodium chloride | |
313 | "12s" # iv | |
3b53fb98 PG |
314 | "Q" # size |
315 | "16s") # GCM tag | |
00b3cd10 PG |
316 | |
317 | # aes+gcm | |
addcec42 PG |
318 | AES_KEY_SIZE = 16 # b"0123456789abcdef" |
319 | AES_KEY_SIZE_B64 = 24 # b'MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZg==' | |
cb7a3911 PG |
320 | AES_GCM_MAX_SIZE = (1 << 36) - (1 << 5) # 2^39 - 2^8 b ≅ 64 GB |
321 | PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE_DEFAULT = 63 * (1 << 30) # 63 GB | |
322 | PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE = PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE_DEFAULT | |
00b3cd10 | 323 | |
3031b7ae PG |
324 | # index and info files are written on-the fly while encrypting so their |
325 | # counters must be available inadvance | |
cb7a3911 PG |
326 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE = 1 # constant |
327 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE + 1 | |
328 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX + 1 # also for multivolume | |
329 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX_DEFAULT = 0xffFFffFF | |
330 | AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX_DEFAULT | |
2d6fd8c8 | 331 | |
be124bca PG |
332 | # IV structure and generation |
333 | PDTCRYPT_IV_GEN_MAX_RETRIES = 10 # × | |
334 | PDTCRYPT_IV_FIXEDPART_SIZE = 8 # B | |
335 | PDTCRYPT_IV_COUNTER_SIZE = 4 # B | |
39accaaa | 336 | |
addcec42 PG |
337 | # secret type: PW of string | KEY of char [16] |
338 | PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW = 0 | |
339 | PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY = 1 | |
340 | ||
00b3cd10 | 341 | ############################################################################### |
39accaaa | 342 | ## header, trailer |
00b3cd10 PG |
343 | ############################################################################### |
344 | # | |
345 | # Interface: | |
346 | # | |
347 | # struct hdrinfo | |
348 | # { version : u16 | |
349 | # , paramversion : u16 | |
350 | # , nacl : [u8; 16] | |
351 | # , iv : [u8; 12] | |
704ceaa5 PG |
352 | # , ctsize : usize |
353 | # , tag : [u8; 16] } | |
83f2d71e | 354 | # |
00b3cd10 | 355 | # fn hdr_read (f : handle) -> hdrinfo; |
c2d1c3ec | 356 | # fn hdr_make (f : handle, h : hdrinfo) -> IOResult<usize>; |
00b3cd10 PG |
357 | # fn hdr_fmt (h : hdrinfo) -> String; |
358 | # | |
359 | ||
83f2d71e | 360 | def hdr_read (data): |
704ceaa5 PG |
361 | """ |
362 | Read bytes as header structure. | |
363 | ||
364 | If the input could not be interpreted as a header, fail with | |
365 | ``InvalidHeader``. | |
366 | """ | |
83f2d71e | 367 | |
00b3cd10 | 368 | try: |
3b53fb98 | 369 | mag, version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag = \ |
83f2d71e PG |
370 | struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_HDR, data) |
371 | except Exception as exn: | |
15d3eefd PG |
372 | raise InvalidHeader ("error unpacking header from [%r]: %s" |
373 | % (binascii.hexlify (data), str (exn))) | |
00b3cd10 | 374 | |
dd47d6a2 | 375 | if mag != PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC: |
15d3eefd | 376 | raise InvalidHeader ("bad magic in header: expected [%s], got [%s]" |
dd47d6a2 | 377 | % (PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, mag)) |
00b3cd10 | 378 | |
15d3eefd | 379 | return \ |
00b3cd10 PG |
380 | { "version" : version |
381 | , "paramversion" : paramversion | |
382 | , "nacl" : nacl | |
383 | , "iv" : iv | |
384 | , "ctsize" : ctsize | |
3b53fb98 | 385 | , "tag" : tag |
00b3cd10 PG |
386 | } |
387 | ||
388 | ||
39accaaa | 389 | def hdr_read_stream (instr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
390 | """ |
391 | Read header from stream at the current position. | |
392 | ||
393 | Fail with ``InvalidHeader`` if insufficient bytes were read from the | |
394 | stream, or if the content could not be interpreted as a header. | |
395 | """ | |
dd47d6a2 | 396 | data = instr.read(PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
ae3d0f2a | 397 | ldata = len (data) |
8a8ac469 PG |
398 | if ldata == 0: |
399 | raise EndOfFile | |
400 | elif ldata != PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE: | |
401 | raise InvalidHeader ("hdr_read_stream: expected %d B, received %d B" | |
402 | % (PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE, ldata)) | |
47e27926 | 403 | return hdr_read (data) |
39accaaa PG |
404 | |
405 | ||
3b53fb98 | 406 | def hdr_from_params (version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag): |
704ceaa5 PG |
407 | """ |
408 | Assemble the necessary values into a PDTCRYPT header. | |
409 | ||
410 | :type version: int to fit uint16_t | |
411 | :type paramversion: int to fit uint16_t | |
412 | :type nacl: bytes to fit uint8_t[16] | |
413 | :type iv: bytes to fit uint8_t[12] | |
414 | :type size: int to fit uint64_t | |
415 | :type tag: bytes to fit uint8_t[16] | |
416 | """ | |
dd47d6a2 | 417 | buf = bytearray (PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
83f2d71e | 418 | bufv = memoryview (buf) |
00b3cd10 | 419 | |
00b3cd10 | 420 | try: |
83f2d71e | 421 | struct.pack_into (FMT_I2N_HDR, bufv, 0, |
dd47d6a2 | 422 | PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, |
3b53fb98 | 423 | version, paramversion, nacl, iv, ctsize, tag) |
83f2d71e | 424 | except Exception as exn: |
a83fa4ed | 425 | return False, "error assembling header: %s" % str (exn) |
00b3cd10 | 426 | |
83f2d71e | 427 | return True, bytes (buf) |
00b3cd10 | 428 | |
00b3cd10 | 429 | |
8a990744 PG |
430 | def hdr_make_dummy (s): |
431 | """ | |
432 | Create a header sized block of bytes initialized to a value derived from a | |
433 | string. Used to verify we’ve jumped back correctly to the actual position | |
434 | of the object header. | |
435 | """ | |
436 | c = reduce (lambda a, c: a + ord(c), s, 0) % 0xFF | |
dd47d6a2 | 437 | return bytes (bytearray (struct.pack ("B", c)) * PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) |
8a990744 PG |
438 | |
439 | ||
a393d9cb | 440 | def hdr_make (hdr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
441 | """ |
442 | Assemble a header from the given header structure. | |
443 | """ | |
a393d9cb PG |
444 | return hdr_from_params (version=hdr.get("version"), |
445 | paramversion=hdr.get("paramversion"), | |
446 | nacl=hdr.get("nacl"), iv=hdr.get("iv"), | |
3b53fb98 | 447 | ctsize=hdr.get("ctsize"), tag=hdr.get("tag")) |
a393d9cb PG |
448 | |
449 | ||
83f2d71e | 450 | HDR_FMT = "I2n_header { version: %d, paramversion: %d, nacl: %s[%d]," \ |
89131745 | 451 | " iv: %s[%d], ctsize: %d, tag: %s[%d] }" |
00b3cd10 | 452 | |
83f2d71e | 453 | def hdr_fmt (h): |
704ceaa5 | 454 | """Format a header structure into readable output.""" |
83f2d71e PG |
455 | return HDR_FMT % (h["version"], h["paramversion"], |
456 | binascii.hexlify (h["nacl"]), len(h["nacl"]), | |
457 | binascii.hexlify (h["iv"]), len(h["iv"]), | |
db1f3ac7 PG |
458 | h["ctsize"], |
459 | binascii.hexlify (h["tag"]), len(h["tag"])) | |
00b3cd10 | 460 | |
00b3cd10 | 461 | |
83f2d71e | 462 | def hex_spaced_of_bytes (b): |
704ceaa5 | 463 | """Format bytes object, hexdump style.""" |
83f2d71e PG |
464 | return " ".join ([ "%.2x%.2x" % (c1, c2) |
465 | for c1, c2 in zip (b[0::2], b[1::2]) ]) \ | |
466 | + (len (b) | 1 == len (b) and " %.2x" % b[-1] or "") # odd lengths | |
00b3cd10 | 467 | |
591a722f | 468 | |
3031b7ae PG |
469 | def hdr_iv_counter (h): |
470 | """Extract the variable part of the IV of the given header.""" | |
471 | _fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, h ["iv"]) | |
472 | return cnt | |
473 | ||
474 | ||
475 | def hdr_iv_fixed (h): | |
476 | """Extract the fixed part of the IV of the given header.""" | |
477 | fixed, _cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, h ["iv"]) | |
478 | return fixed | |
479 | ||
480 | ||
83f2d71e | 481 | hdr_dump = hex_spaced_of_bytes |
00b3cd10 | 482 | |
00b3cd10 | 483 | |
15d3eefd PG |
484 | HDR_FMT_PRETTY = \ |
485 | """version = %-4d : %s | |
486 | paramversion = %-4d : %s | |
487 | nacl : %s | |
488 | iv : %s | |
489 | ctsize = %-20d : %s | |
490 | tag : %s | |
83f2d71e | 491 | """ |
00b3cd10 | 492 | |
83f2d71e | 493 | def hdr_fmt_pretty (h): |
704ceaa5 PG |
494 | """ |
495 | Format header structure into multi-line representation of its contents and | |
496 | their raw representation. (Omit the implicit “PDTCRYPT” magic bytes that | |
497 | precede every header.) | |
498 | """ | |
83f2d71e PG |
499 | return HDR_FMT_PRETTY \ |
500 | % (h["version"], | |
501 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT16_LE, h["version"])), | |
502 | h["paramversion"], | |
503 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT16_LE, h["paramversion"])), | |
504 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["nacl"]), | |
505 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["iv"]), | |
506 | h["ctsize"], | |
15d3eefd PG |
507 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (struct.pack (FMT_UINT64_LE, h["ctsize"])), |
508 | hex_spaced_of_bytes (h["tag"])) | |
00b3cd10 | 509 | |
f6cd676f PG |
510 | IV_FMT = "((f %s) (c %d))" |
511 | ||
512 | def iv_fmt (iv): | |
704ceaa5 | 513 | """Format the two components of an IV in a readable fashion.""" |
f6cd676f PG |
514 | fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
515 | return IV_FMT % (binascii.hexlify (fixed), cnt) | |
516 | ||
00b3cd10 | 517 | |
00b3cd10 | 518 | ############################################################################### |
f41973a6 PG |
519 | ## restoration |
520 | ############################################################################### | |
521 | ||
522 | class Location (object): | |
523 | n = 0 | |
524 | offset = 0 | |
525 | ||
526 | def restore_loc_fmt (loc): | |
527 | return "%d off:%d" \ | |
528 | % (loc.n, loc.offset) | |
529 | ||
530 | def locate_hdr_candidates (fd): | |
531 | """ | |
532 | Walk over instances of the magic string in the payload, collecting their | |
533 | positions. If the offset of the first found instance is not zero, the file | |
534 | begins with leading garbage. | |
535 | ||
536 | :return: The list of offsets in the file. | |
537 | """ | |
538 | cands = [] | |
539 | ||
540 | mm = mmap.mmap(fd, 0, mmap.MAP_SHARED, mmap.PROT_READ) | |
541 | pos = 0 | |
542 | while True: | |
543 | pos = mm.find (PDTCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, pos) | |
544 | if pos == -1: | |
545 | break | |
546 | cands.append (pos) | |
547 | pos += 1 | |
548 | ||
549 | return cands | |
550 | ||
551 | ||
6c8073ab PG |
552 | HDR_CAND_GOOD = 0 # header marks begin of valid object |
553 | HDR_CAND_FISHY = 1 # inconclusive (tag mismatch, obj overlap etc.) | |
554 | HDR_CAND_JUNK = 2 # not a header / object unreadable | |
555 | ||
556 | ||
557 | def inspect_hdr (fd, off): | |
558 | """ | |
559 | Attempt to parse a header in *fd* at position *off*. | |
560 | ||
561 | Returns a verdict about the quality of that header plus the parsed header | |
562 | when readable. | |
563 | """ | |
564 | ||
565 | _ = os.lseek (fd, off, os.SEEK_SET) | |
566 | ||
567 | if os.lseek (fd, 0, os.SEEK_CUR) != off: | |
568 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
569 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (lseek() past EOF)" % off) | |
570 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
571 | ||
572 | raw = os.read (fd, PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE) | |
573 | if len (raw) != PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE: | |
574 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
575 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (EOF inside header)" % off) | |
576 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
577 | ||
578 | try: | |
579 | hdr = hdr_read (raw) | |
580 | except InvalidHeader as exn: | |
581 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
582 | noise ("PDT: %d → dismissed (invalid: [%s])" % (off, str (exn))) | |
583 | return HDR_CAND_JUNK, None | |
584 | ||
585 | obj0 = off + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE | |
586 | objX = obj0 + hdr ["ctsize"] | |
587 | ||
588 | eof = os.lseek (fd, 0, os.SEEK_END) | |
589 | if eof < objX: | |
590 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
591 | noise ("PDT: %d → EOF inside object (%d≤%d≤%d); adjusting size to " | |
592 | "%d" % (off, obj0, eof, objX, (eof - obj0))) | |
593 | # try reading up to the end | |
594 | hdr ["ctsize"] = eof - obj0 | |
595 | return HDR_CAND_FISHY, hdr | |
596 | ||
597 | return HDR_CAND_GOOD, hdr | |
598 | ||
599 | ||
a808459e | 600 | def try_decrypt (ifd, off, hdr, secret, ofd=-1): |
6c8073ab | 601 | """ |
a808459e PG |
602 | Attempt to decrypt the object in the (seekable) descriptor *ifd* starting |
603 | at *off* using the metadata in *hdr* and *secret*. An output fd can be | |
604 | specified with *ofd*; if it is *-1* – the default –, the decrypted payload | |
605 | will be discarded. | |
70a33834 PG |
606 | |
607 | Always creates a fresh decryptor, so validation steps across objects don’t | |
608 | apply. | |
202104ed PG |
609 | |
610 | Errors during GCM tag validation are ignored. | |
6c8073ab | 611 | """ |
70a33834 PG |
612 | ctleft = hdr ["ctsize"] |
613 | pos = off | |
614 | ||
615 | ks = secret [0] | |
616 | if ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW: | |
617 | decr = Decrypt (password=secret [1]) | |
618 | elif ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
6257d5b3 | 619 | key = secret [1] |
70a33834 PG |
620 | decr = Decrypt (key=key) |
621 | else: | |
622 | raise RuntimeError | |
623 | ||
70a33834 PG |
624 | decr.next (hdr) |
625 | ||
626 | try: | |
a808459e | 627 | os.lseek (ifd, pos, os.SEEK_SET) |
70a33834 PG |
628 | while ctleft > 0: |
629 | cnksiz = min (ctleft, PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE) | |
a808459e | 630 | cnk = os.read (ifd, cnksiz) |
70a33834 PG |
631 | ctleft -= cnksiz |
632 | pos += cnksiz | |
a808459e PG |
633 | pt = decr.process (cnk) |
634 | if ofd != -1: | |
635 | os.write (ofd, pt) | |
202104ed PG |
636 | try: |
637 | pt = decr.done () | |
638 | except InvalidGCMTag: | |
639 | noise ("PDT: GCM tag mismatch for object %d–%d" | |
640 | % (off, off + hdr ["ctsize"])) | |
a808459e PG |
641 | if len (pt) > 0 and ofd != -1: |
642 | os.write (ofd, pt) | |
70a33834 | 643 | |
70a33834 PG |
644 | except Exception as exn: |
645 | noise ("PDT: error decrypting object %d–%d@%d, %d B remaining [%s]" | |
646 | % (off, off + hdr ["ctsize"], pos, ctleft, exn)) | |
647 | raise | |
6c8073ab | 648 | |
70a33834 | 649 | return pos - off |
6c8073ab PG |
650 | |
651 | ||
6690f5e0 PG |
652 | def readable_objects_offsets (ifd, secret, cands): |
653 | """ | |
654 | From a list of candidates, locate the ones that mark the start of actual | |
655 | readable PDTCRYPT objects. | |
656 | """ | |
657 | good = [] | |
24afaf18 PG |
658 | |
659 | for i, cand in enumerate (cands): | |
6690f5e0 PG |
660 | vdt, hdr = inspect_hdr (ifd, cand) |
661 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_JUNK: | |
662 | pass # ignore unreadable ones | |
663 | elif vdt in [HDR_CAND_GOOD, HDR_CAND_FISHY]: | |
24afaf18 | 664 | ctsize = hdr ["ctsize"] |
6690f5e0 | 665 | off0 = cand + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE |
24afaf18 | 666 | ok = try_decrypt (ifd, off0, hdr, secret) == ctsize |
6690f5e0 | 667 | if ok is True: |
24afaf18 PG |
668 | good.append ((cand, off0 + ctsize)) |
669 | ||
670 | overlap = find_overlaps (good) | |
671 | ||
672 | return [ g [0] for g in good ] | |
6690f5e0 PG |
673 | |
674 | ||
675 | def reconstruct_offsets (fname, secret): | |
676 | ifd = os.open (fname, os.O_RDONLY) | |
677 | ||
678 | try: | |
679 | cands = locate_hdr_candidates (ifd) | |
680 | return readable_objects_offsets (ifd, secret, cands) | |
681 | finally: | |
682 | os.close (ifd) | |
683 | ||
684 | ||
f41973a6 | 685 | ############################################################################### |
addcec42 PG |
686 | ## helpers |
687 | ############################################################################### | |
688 | ||
689 | def make_secret (password=None, key=None): | |
690 | """ | |
691 | Safely create a “secret” value that consists either of a key or a password. | |
692 | Inputs are validated: the password is accepted as (UTF-8 encoded) bytes or | |
693 | string; for the key only a bytes object of the proper size or a base64 | |
694 | encoded string thereof is accepted. | |
695 | ||
696 | If both are provided, the key is preferred over the password; no checks are | |
697 | performed whether the key is derived from the password. | |
698 | ||
699 | :returns: secret value if inputs were acceptable | None otherwise. | |
700 | """ | |
701 | if key is not None: | |
702 | if isinstance (key, str) is True: | |
703 | key = key.encode ("utf-8") | |
704 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is True: | |
705 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE: | |
706 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
6257d5b3 PG |
707 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE * 2: |
708 | try: | |
709 | key = binascii.unhexlify (key) | |
710 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
711 | except binascii.Error: # garbage in string | |
712 | pass | |
addcec42 PG |
713 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE_B64: |
714 | try: | |
715 | key = base64.b64decode (key) | |
716 | # the base64 processor is very tolerant and allows for | |
6257d5b3 | 717 | # arbitrary trailing and leading data thus the data obtained |
addcec42 PG |
718 | # must be checked for the proper length |
719 | if len (key) == AES_KEY_SIZE: | |
720 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY, key) | |
721 | except binascii.Error: # “incorrect padding” | |
722 | pass | |
723 | elif password is not None: | |
724 | if isinstance (password, str) is True: | |
725 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW, password) | |
726 | elif isinstance (password, bytes) is True: | |
727 | try: | |
728 | password = password.decode ("utf-8") | |
729 | return (PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW, password) | |
730 | except UnicodeDecodeError: | |
731 | pass | |
732 | ||
733 | return None | |
734 | ||
735 | ||
736 | ############################################################################### | |
6178061e PG |
737 | ## passthrough / null encryption |
738 | ############################################################################### | |
739 | ||
740 | class PassthroughCipher (object): | |
741 | ||
742 | tag = struct.pack ("<QQ", 0, 0) | |
743 | ||
744 | def __init__ (self) : pass | |
745 | ||
746 | def update (self, b) : return b | |
747 | ||
50710d86 | 748 | def finalize (self) : return b"" |
6178061e PG |
749 | |
750 | def finalize_with_tag (self, _) : return b"" | |
751 | ||
752 | ############################################################################### | |
a393d9cb | 753 | ## convenience wrapper |
00b3cd10 PG |
754 | ############################################################################### |
755 | ||
c46c8670 PG |
756 | |
757 | def kdf_dummy (klen, password, _nacl): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
758 | """ |
759 | Fake KDF for testing purposes that is called when parameter version zero is | |
760 | encountered. | |
761 | """ | |
c46c8670 PG |
762 | q, r = divmod (klen, len (password)) |
763 | if isinstance (password, bytes) is False: | |
764 | password = password.encode () | |
765 | return password * q + password [:r], b"" | |
766 | ||
767 | ||
768 | SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO = { } # static because needed for both the info file and the archive | |
769 | ||
770 | ||
771 | def kdf_scrypt (params, password, nacl): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
772 | """ |
773 | Wrapper for the Scrypt KDF, corresponds to parameter version one. The | |
774 | computation result is memoized based on the inputs to facilitate spawning | |
775 | multiple encryption contexts. | |
776 | """ | |
c46c8670 PG |
777 | N = params["N"] |
778 | r = params["r"] | |
779 | p = params["p"] | |
780 | dkLen = params["dkLen"] | |
781 | ||
782 | if nacl is None: | |
783 | nacl = os.urandom (params["NaCl_LEN"]) | |
784 | ||
785 | key_parms = (password, nacl, N, r, p, dkLen) | |
786 | global SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO | |
787 | if key_parms not in SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO: | |
788 | SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO [key_parms] = \ | |
789 | pylibscrypt.scrypt (password, nacl, N, r, p, dkLen) | |
790 | return SCRYPT_KEY_MEMO [key_parms], nacl | |
a64085a8 PG |
791 | |
792 | ||
da82bc58 | 793 | def kdf_by_version (paramversion=None, defs=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
794 | """ |
795 | Pick the KDF handler corresponding to the parameter version or the | |
796 | definition set. | |
797 | ||
798 | :rtype: function (password : str, nacl : str) -> str | |
799 | """ | |
da82bc58 PG |
800 | if paramversion is not None: |
801 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) | |
a64085a8 | 802 | if defs is None: |
1ed44e7b PG |
803 | raise InvalidParameter ("no encryption parameters for version %r" |
804 | % paramversion) | |
a64085a8 | 805 | (kdf, params) = defs["kdf"] |
c46c8670 PG |
806 | fn = None |
807 | if kdf == "scrypt" : fn = kdf_scrypt | |
808 | if kdf == "dummy" : fn = kdf_dummy | |
809 | if fn is None: | |
a64085a8 | 810 | raise ValueError ("key derivation method %r unknown" % kdf) |
c46c8670 | 811 | return partial (fn, params) |
a64085a8 PG |
812 | |
813 | ||
b360b772 PG |
814 | ############################################################################### |
815 | ## SCRYPT hashing | |
816 | ############################################################################### | |
817 | ||
818 | def scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins): | |
819 | """ | |
820 | Calculate the SCRYPT hash from the password and the information contained | |
821 | in the first header found in ``ins``. | |
822 | ||
823 | This does not validate whether the first object is encrypted correctly. | |
824 | """ | |
c1ecc2e2 PG |
825 | if isinstance (pw, str) is True: |
826 | pw = str.encode (pw) | |
827 | elif isinstance (pw, bytes) is False: | |
828 | raise InvalidParameter ("password must be a string, not %s" | |
829 | % type (password)) | |
830 | if isinstance (ins, io.BufferedReader) is False and \ | |
831 | isinstance (ins, io.FileIO) is False: | |
832 | raise InvalidParameter ("file to hash must be opened in “binary” mode") | |
b360b772 PG |
833 | hdr = None |
834 | try: | |
835 | hdr = hdr_read_stream (ins) | |
836 | except EndOfFile as exn: | |
837 | noise ("PDT: malformed input: end of file reading first object header") | |
838 | noise ("PDT:") | |
839 | return 1 | |
840 | ||
841 | nacl = hdr ["nacl"] | |
842 | pver = hdr ["paramversion"] | |
843 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
844 | noise ("PDT: salt of first object : %s" % binascii.hexlify (nacl)) | |
845 | noise ("PDT: parameter version of archive : %d" % pver) | |
846 | ||
847 | try: | |
848 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(pver, None) | |
849 | kdfname, params = defs ["kdf"] | |
850 | if kdfname != "scrypt": | |
851 | noise ("PDT: input is not an SCRYPT archive") | |
852 | noise ("") | |
853 | return 1 | |
854 | kdf = kdf_by_version (None, defs) | |
855 | except ValueError as exn: | |
856 | noise ("PDT: object has unknown parameter version %d" % pver) | |
857 | ||
858 | hsh, _void = kdf (pw, nacl) | |
859 | ||
c1ecc2e2 | 860 | return hsh, nacl, hdr ["version"], pver |
b360b772 PG |
861 | |
862 | ||
863 | def scrypt_hashfile (pw, fname): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
864 | """ |
865 | Calculate the SCRYPT hash from the password and the information contained | |
866 | in the first header found in the given file. The header is read only at | |
867 | offset zero. | |
868 | """ | |
b360b772 | 869 | with deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SOURCE, fname or "-") as ins: |
c1ecc2e2 | 870 | hsh, _void, _void, _void = scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins) |
b360b772 PG |
871 | return hsh |
872 | ||
873 | ||
874 | ############################################################################### | |
875 | ## AES-GCM context | |
876 | ############################################################################### | |
877 | ||
a393d9cb PG |
878 | class Crypto (object): |
879 | """ | |
880 | Encryption context to remain alive throughout an entire tarfile pass. | |
881 | """ | |
6178061e | 882 | enc = None |
a393d9cb PG |
883 | nacl = None |
884 | key = None | |
50710d86 PG |
885 | cnt = None # file counter (uint32_t != 0) |
886 | iv = None # current IV | |
30019abf PG |
887 | fixed = None # accu for 64 bit fixed parts of IV |
888 | used_ivs = None # tracks IVs | |
889 | strict_ivs = False # if True, panic on duplicate object IV | |
48db09ba PG |
890 | password = None |
891 | paramversion = None | |
633b18a9 PG |
892 | stats = { "in" : 0 |
893 | , "out" : 0 | |
894 | , "obj" : 0 } | |
fa47412e | 895 | |
fa47412e PG |
896 | ctsize = -1 |
897 | ptsize = -1 | |
3031b7ae PG |
898 | info_counter_used = False |
899 | index_counter_used = False | |
a393d9cb | 900 | |
a64085a8 | 901 | def __init__ (self, *al, **akv): |
30019abf | 902 | self.used_ivs = set () |
a64085a8 | 903 | self.set_parameters (*al, **akv) |
39accaaa PG |
904 | |
905 | ||
704ceaa5 | 906 | def next_fixed (self): |
be124bca | 907 | # NOP for decryption |
50710d86 PG |
908 | pass |
909 | ||
910 | ||
911 | def set_object_counter (self, cnt=None): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
912 | """ |
913 | Safely set the internal counter of encrypted objects. Numerous | |
914 | constraints apply: | |
915 | ||
916 | The same counter may not be reused in combination with one IV fixed | |
917 | part. This is validated elsewhere in the IV handling. | |
918 | ||
919 | Counter zero is invalid. The first two counters are reserved for | |
920 | metadata. The implementation does not allow for splitting metadata | |
921 | files over multiple encrypted objects. (This would be possible by | |
922 | assigning new fixed parts.) Thus in a Deltatar backup there is at most | |
923 | one object with a counter value of one and two. On creation of a | |
924 | context, the initial counter may be chosen. The globals | |
925 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` can be used to | |
926 | request one of the reserved values. If one of these values has been | |
927 | used, any further attempt of setting the counter to that value will | |
928 | be rejected with an ``InvalidFileCounter`` exception. | |
929 | ||
930 | Out of bounds values (i. e. below one and more than the maximum of 2³²) | |
931 | cause an ``InvalidParameter`` exception to be thrown. | |
932 | """ | |
50710d86 PG |
933 | if cnt is None: |
934 | self.cnt = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA | |
935 | return | |
936 | if cnt == 0 or cnt > AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX + 1: | |
b12110dd PG |
937 | raise InvalidParameter ("invalid counter value %d requested: " |
938 | "acceptable values are from 1 to %d" | |
939 | % (cnt, AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX)) | |
50710d86 PG |
940 | if cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE: |
941 | if self.info_counter_used is True: | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
942 | raise InvalidFileCounter ("attempted to reuse info file " |
943 | "counter %d: must be unique" % cnt) | |
50710d86 | 944 | self.info_counter_used = True |
3031b7ae PG |
945 | elif cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX: |
946 | if self.index_counter_used is True: | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
947 | raise InvalidFileCounter ("attempted to reuse index file " |
948 | " counter %d: must be unique" % cnt) | |
3031b7ae | 949 | self.index_counter_used = True |
50710d86 PG |
950 | if cnt <= AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX: |
951 | self.cnt = cnt | |
952 | return | |
953 | # cnt == AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX + 1 → wrap | |
954 | self.cnt = AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA | |
704ceaa5 | 955 | self.next_fixed () |
50710d86 PG |
956 | |
957 | ||
1f3fd7b0 | 958 | def set_parameters (self, password=None, key=None, paramversion=None, |
be124bca | 959 | nacl=None, counter=None, strict_ivs=False): |
704ceaa5 PG |
960 | """ |
961 | Configure the internal state of a crypto context. Not intended for | |
962 | external use. | |
963 | """ | |
be124bca | 964 | self.next_fixed () |
50710d86 | 965 | self.set_object_counter (counter) |
30019abf PG |
966 | self.strict_ivs = strict_ivs |
967 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
968 | if paramversion is not None: |
969 | self.paramversion = paramversion | |
970 | ||
1f3fd7b0 PG |
971 | if key is not None: |
972 | self.key, self.nacl = key, nacl | |
973 | return | |
974 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
975 | if password is not None: |
976 | if isinstance (password, bytes) is False: | |
977 | password = str.encode (password) | |
978 | self.password = password | |
979 | if paramversion is None and nacl is None: | |
980 | # postpone key setup until first header is available | |
981 | return | |
982 | kdf = kdf_by_version (paramversion) | |
983 | if kdf is not None: | |
984 | self.key, self.nacl = kdf (password, nacl) | |
fa47412e | 985 | |
39accaaa | 986 | |
39accaaa | 987 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
988 | """ |
989 | Encrypt / decrypt a buffer. Invokes the ``.update()`` method on the | |
990 | wrapped encryptor or decryptor, respectively. | |
991 | ||
992 | The Cryptography exception ``AlreadyFinalized`` is translated to an | |
993 | ``InternalError`` at this point. It may occur in sound code when the GC | |
994 | closes an encrypting stream after an error. Everywhere else it must be | |
995 | treated as a bug. | |
996 | """ | |
cb7a3911 PG |
997 | if self.enc is None: |
998 | raise RuntimeError ("process: context not initialized") | |
999 | self.stats ["in"] += len (buf) | |
fac2cfe1 PG |
1000 | try: |
1001 | out = self.enc.update (buf) | |
1002 | except cryptography.exceptions.AlreadyFinalized as exn: | |
1003 | raise InternalError (exn) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1004 | self.stats ["out"] += len (out) |
1005 | return out | |
39accaaa PG |
1006 | |
1007 | ||
30019abf | 1008 | def next (self, password, paramversion, nacl, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1009 | """ |
1010 | Prepare for encrypting another object: Reset the data counters and | |
1011 | change the configuration in case one of the variable parameters differs | |
1012 | from the last object. Also check the IV for duplicates and error out | |
1013 | if strict checking was requested. | |
1014 | """ | |
fa47412e PG |
1015 | self.ctsize = 0 |
1016 | self.ptsize = 0 | |
1017 | self.stats ["obj"] += 1 | |
30019abf PG |
1018 | |
1019 | self.check_duplicate_iv (iv) | |
1020 | ||
6178061e PG |
1021 | if ( self.paramversion != paramversion |
1022 | or self.password != password | |
1023 | or self.nacl != nacl): | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1024 | self.set_parameters (password=password, paramversion=paramversion, |
30019abf PG |
1025 | nacl=nacl, strict_ivs=self.strict_ivs) |
1026 | ||
1027 | ||
1028 | def check_duplicate_iv (self, iv): | |
704ceaa5 PG |
1029 | """ |
1030 | Add an IV (the 12 byte representation as in the header) to the list. With | |
1031 | strict checking enabled, this will throw a ``DuplicateIV``. Depending on | |
1032 | the context, this may indicate a serious error (IV reuse). | |
1033 | """ | |
30019abf PG |
1034 | if self.strict_ivs is True and iv in self.used_ivs: |
1035 | raise DuplicateIV ("iv %s was reused" % iv_fmt (iv)) | |
1036 | # vi has not been used before; add to collection | |
1037 | self.used_ivs.add (iv) | |
fa47412e PG |
1038 | |
1039 | ||
633b18a9 | 1040 | def counters (self): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1041 | """ |
1042 | Access the data counters. | |
1043 | """ | |
633b18a9 PG |
1044 | return self.stats ["obj"], self.stats ["in"], self.stats ["out"] |
1045 | ||
1046 | ||
8de91f4f PG |
1047 | def drop (self): |
1048 | """ | |
1049 | Clear the current context regardless of its finalization state. The | |
1050 | next operation must be ``.next()``. | |
1051 | """ | |
1052 | self.enc = None | |
1053 | ||
1054 | ||
39accaaa PG |
1055 | class Encrypt (Crypto): |
1056 | ||
48db09ba PG |
1057 | lastinfo = None |
1058 | version = None | |
72a42219 | 1059 | paramenc = None |
50710d86 | 1060 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1061 | def __init__ (self, version, paramversion, password=None, key=None, nacl=None, |
30019abf | 1062 | counter=AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA, strict_ivs=True): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1063 | """ |
1064 | The ctor will throw immediately if one of the parameters does not conform | |
1065 | to our expectations. | |
1066 | ||
1067 | counter=AES_GCM_IV_CNT_DATA, strict_ivs=True): | |
1068 | :type version: int to fit uint16_t | |
1069 | :type paramversion: int to fit uint16_t | |
1070 | :param password: mutually exclusive with ``key`` | |
1071 | :type password: bytes | |
1072 | :param key: mutually exclusive with ``password`` | |
1073 | :type key: bytes | |
1074 | :type nacl: bytes | |
1075 | :type counter: initial object counter the values | |
1076 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and | |
1077 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` are unique in each backup set | |
1078 | and cannot be reused even with different fixed parts. | |
1079 | :type strict_ivs: bool | |
1080 | """ | |
1f3fd7b0 PG |
1081 | if password is None and key is None \ |
1082 | or password is not None and key is not None : | |
1083 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: need either key or password") | |
1084 | ||
1085 | if key is not None: | |
1086 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is False: | |
1087 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: key must be provided as " | |
1088 | "bytes, not %s" % type (key)) | |
1089 | if nacl is None: | |
1090 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: salt must be provided along " | |
1091 | "with encryption key") | |
1092 | else: # password, no key | |
1093 | if isinstance (password, str) is False: | |
1094 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: password must be a string, not %s" | |
1095 | % type (password)) | |
1096 | if len (password) == 0: | |
1097 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: supplied empty password but not " | |
1098 | "permitted for PDT encrypted files") | |
36b9932a PG |
1099 | # version |
1100 | if isinstance (version, int) is False: | |
1101 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: version number must be an " | |
1102 | "integer, not %s" % type (version)) | |
1103 | if version < 0: | |
1104 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: version number must be a " | |
1105 | "nonnegative integer, not %d" % version) | |
1106 | # paramversion | |
1107 | if isinstance (paramversion, int) is False: | |
1108 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: crypto parameter version number " | |
1109 | "must be an integer, not %s" | |
1110 | % type (paramversion)) | |
1111 | if paramversion < 0: | |
1112 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: crypto parameter version number " | |
1113 | "must be a nonnegative integer, not %d" | |
1114 | % paramversion) | |
1115 | # salt | |
1116 | if nacl is not None: | |
1117 | if isinstance (nacl, bytes) is False: | |
1118 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: salt given, but of type %s " | |
1119 | "instead of bytes" % type (nacl)) | |
1120 | # salt length would depend on the actual encryption so it can’t be | |
1121 | # validated at this point | |
b12110dd | 1122 | self.fixed = [ ] |
48db09ba PG |
1123 | self.version = version |
1124 | self.paramenc = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get (paramversion) ["enc"] | |
72a42219 | 1125 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1126 | super().__init__ (password, key, paramversion, nacl, counter=counter, |
30019abf | 1127 | strict_ivs=strict_ivs) |
a393d9cb PG |
1128 | |
1129 | ||
be124bca PG |
1130 | def next_fixed (self, retries=PDTCRYPT_IV_GEN_MAX_RETRIES): |
1131 | """ | |
1132 | Generate the next IV fixed part by reading eight bytes from | |
1133 | ``/dev/urandom``. The buffer so obtained is tested against the fixed | |
1134 | parts used so far to prevent accidental reuse of IVs. After a | |
1135 | configurable number of attempts to create a unique fixed part, it will | |
1136 | refuse to continue with an ``IVFixedPartError``. This is unlikely to | |
1137 | ever happen on a normal system but may detect an issue with the random | |
1138 | generator. | |
1139 | ||
1140 | The list of fixed parts that were used by the context at hand can be | |
1141 | accessed through the ``.fixed`` list. Its last element is the fixed | |
1142 | part currently in use. | |
1143 | """ | |
1144 | i = 0 | |
1145 | while i < retries: | |
1146 | fp = os.urandom (PDTCRYPT_IV_FIXEDPART_SIZE) | |
1147 | if fp not in self.fixed: | |
1148 | self.fixed.append (fp) | |
1149 | return | |
1150 | i += 1 | |
1151 | raise IVFixedPartError ("error obtaining a unique IV fixed part from " | |
1152 | "/dev/urandom; giving up after %d tries" % i) | |
1153 | ||
1154 | ||
a393d9cb | 1155 | def iv_make (self): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1156 | """ |
1157 | Construct a 12-bytes IV from the current fixed part and the object | |
1158 | counter. | |
1159 | """ | |
b12110dd | 1160 | return struct.pack(FMT_I2N_IV, self.fixed [-1], self.cnt) |
a393d9cb PG |
1161 | |
1162 | ||
cb7a3911 | 1163 | def next (self, filename=None, counter=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1164 | """ |
1165 | Prepare for encrypting the next incoming object. Update the counter | |
1166 | and put together the IV, possibly changing prefixes. Then create the | |
1167 | new encryptor. | |
1168 | ||
1169 | The argument ``counter`` can be used to specify a file counter for this | |
1170 | object. Unless it is one of the reserved values, the counter of | |
1171 | subsequent objects will be computed from this one. | |
1172 | ||
1173 | If this is the first object in a series, ``filename`` is required, | |
1174 | otherwise it is reused if not present. The value is used to derive a | |
1175 | header sized placeholder to use until after encryption when all the | |
1176 | inputs to construct the final header are available. This is then | |
1177 | matched in ``.done()`` against the value found at the position of the | |
1178 | header. The motivation for this extra check is primarily to assist | |
1179 | format debugging: It makes stray headers easy to spot in malformed | |
1180 | PDTCRYPT files. | |
1181 | """ | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1182 | if filename is None: |
1183 | if self.lastinfo is None: | |
1184 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: filename is mandatory for " | |
1185 | "first object") | |
1186 | filename, _dummy = self.lastinfo | |
1187 | else: | |
1188 | if isinstance (filename, str) is False: | |
1189 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: filename must be a string, no %s" | |
1190 | % type (filename)) | |
3031b7ae PG |
1191 | if counter is not None: |
1192 | if isinstance (counter, int) is False: | |
1193 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: the supplied counter is of " | |
1194 | "invalid type %s; please pass an " | |
1195 | "integer instead" % type (counter)) | |
1196 | self.set_object_counter (counter) | |
fac2cfe1 | 1197 | |
50710d86 | 1198 | self.iv = self.iv_make () |
72a42219 | 1199 | if self.paramenc == "aes-gcm": |
6178061e PG |
1200 | self.enc = Cipher \ |
1201 | ( algorithms.AES (self.key) | |
1202 | , modes.GCM (self.iv) | |
1203 | , backend = default_backend ()) \ | |
1204 | .encryptor () | |
72a42219 | 1205 | elif self.paramenc == "passthrough": |
6178061e PG |
1206 | self.enc = PassthroughCipher () |
1207 | else: | |
b12110dd PG |
1208 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: parameter version %d not known" |
1209 | % self.paramversion) | |
48db09ba PG |
1210 | hdrdum = hdr_make_dummy (filename) |
1211 | self.lastinfo = (filename, hdrdum) | |
30019abf | 1212 | super().next (self.password, self.paramversion, self.nacl, self.iv) |
72a42219 | 1213 | |
3031b7ae | 1214 | self.set_object_counter (self.cnt + 1) |
48db09ba | 1215 | return hdrdum |
a393d9cb | 1216 | |
a393d9cb | 1217 | |
cd77dadb | 1218 | def done (self, cmpdata): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1219 | """ |
1220 | Complete encryption of an object. After this has been called, attempts | |
1221 | of encrypting further data will cause an error until ``.next()`` is | |
1222 | invoked properly. | |
1223 | ||
1224 | Returns a 64 bytes buffer containing the object header including all | |
1225 | values including the “late” ones e. g. the ciphertext size and the | |
1226 | GCM tag. | |
1227 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1228 | if isinstance (cmpdata, bytes) is False: |
1229 | raise InvalidParameter ("done: comparison input expected as bytes, " | |
1230 | "not %s" % type (cmpdata)) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1231 | if self.lastinfo is None: |
1232 | raise RuntimeError ("done: encryption context not initialized") | |
48db09ba PG |
1233 | filename, hdrdum = self.lastinfo |
1234 | if cmpdata != hdrdum: | |
b12110dd PG |
1235 | raise RuntimeError ("done: bad sync of header for object %d: " |
1236 | "preliminary data does not match; this likely " | |
1237 | "indicates a wrongly repositioned stream" | |
1238 | % self.cnt) | |
6178061e | 1239 | data = self.enc.finalize () |
633b18a9 | 1240 | self.stats ["out"] += len (data) |
cd77dadb | 1241 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
48db09ba PG |
1242 | ok, hdr = hdr_from_params (self.version, self.paramversion, self.nacl, |
1243 | self.iv, self.ctsize, self.enc.tag) | |
8a990744 | 1244 | if ok is False: |
b12110dd PG |
1245 | raise InternalError ("error constructing header: %r" % hdr) |
1246 | return data, hdr, self.fixed | |
a393d9cb | 1247 | |
a393d9cb | 1248 | |
cd77dadb | 1249 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1250 | """ |
1251 | Encrypt a chunk of plaintext with the active encryptor. Returns the | |
1252 | size of the input consumed. This **must** be checked downstream. If the | |
1253 | maximum possible object size has been reached, the current context must | |
1254 | be finalized and a new one established before any further data can be | |
1255 | encrypted. The second argument is the remainder of the plaintext that | |
1256 | was not encrypted for the caller to use immediately after the new | |
1257 | context is ready. | |
1258 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1259 | if isinstance (buf, bytes) is False: |
1260 | raise InvalidParameter ("process: expected byte buffer, not %s" | |
1261 | % type (buf)) | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1262 | bsize = len (buf) |
1263 | newptsize = self.ptsize + bsize | |
1264 | diff = newptsize - PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE | |
1265 | if diff > 0: | |
1266 | bsize -= diff | |
1267 | newptsize = PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE | |
1268 | self.ptsize = newptsize | |
1269 | data = super().process (buf [:bsize]) | |
cd77dadb | 1270 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
cb7a3911 | 1271 | return bsize, data |
cd77dadb PG |
1272 | |
1273 | ||
39accaaa | 1274 | class Decrypt (Crypto): |
a393d9cb | 1275 | |
3031b7ae | 1276 | tag = None # GCM tag, part of header |
3031b7ae | 1277 | last_iv = None # check consecutive ivs in strict mode |
39accaaa | 1278 | |
1f3fd7b0 | 1279 | def __init__ (self, password=None, key=None, counter=None, fixedparts=None, |
ee6aa239 | 1280 | strict_ivs=False): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1281 | """ |
1282 | Sanitizing ctor for the decryption context. ``fixedparts`` specifies a | |
1283 | list of IV fixed parts accepted during decryption. If a fixed part is | |
1284 | encountered that is not in the list, decryption will fail. | |
1285 | ||
1286 | :param password: mutually exclusive with ``key`` | |
1287 | :type password: bytes | |
1288 | :param key: mutually exclusive with ``password`` | |
1289 | :type key: bytes | |
1290 | :type counter: initial object counter the values | |
1291 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INFOFILE`` and | |
1292 | ``AES_GCM_IV_CNT_INDEX`` are unique in each backup set | |
1293 | and cannot be reused even with different fixed parts. | |
1294 | :type fixedparts: bytes list | |
1295 | """ | |
1f3fd7b0 PG |
1296 | if password is None and key is None \ |
1297 | or password is not None and key is not None : | |
1298 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: need either key or password") | |
1299 | ||
1300 | if key is not None: | |
1301 | if isinstance (key, bytes) is False: | |
1302 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: key must be provided as " | |
1303 | "bytes, not %s" % type (key)) | |
1304 | else: # password, no key | |
1305 | if isinstance (password, str) is False: | |
1306 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: password must be a string, not %s" | |
1307 | % type (password)) | |
1308 | if len (password) == 0: | |
1309 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: supplied empty password but not " | |
1310 | "permitted for PDT encrypted files") | |
36b9932a | 1311 | # fixed parts |
50710d86 | 1312 | if fixedparts is not None: |
36b9932a PG |
1313 | if isinstance (fixedparts, list) is False: |
1314 | raise InvalidParameter ("__init__: IV fixed parts must be " | |
1315 | "supplied as list, not %s" | |
1316 | % type (fixedparts)) | |
b12110dd PG |
1317 | self.fixed = fixedparts |
1318 | self.fixed.sort () | |
ee6aa239 | 1319 | |
a83fa4ed PG |
1320 | super().__init__ (password=password, key=key, counter=counter, |
1321 | strict_ivs=strict_ivs) | |
39accaaa PG |
1322 | |
1323 | ||
b12110dd | 1324 | def valid_fixed_part (self, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1325 | """ |
1326 | Check if a fixed part was already seen. | |
1327 | """ | |
50710d86 | 1328 | # check if fixed part is known |
b12110dd PG |
1329 | fixed, _cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
1330 | i = bisect.bisect_left (self.fixed, fixed) | |
1331 | return i != len (self.fixed) and self.fixed [i] == fixed | |
50710d86 PG |
1332 | |
1333 | ||
ee6aa239 | 1334 | def check_consecutive_iv (self, iv): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1335 | """ |
1336 | Check whether the counter part of the given IV is indeed the successor | |
1337 | of the currently present counter. This should always be the case for | |
1338 | the objects in a well formed PDT archive but should not be enforced | |
1339 | when decrypting out-of-order. | |
1340 | """ | |
ee6aa239 | 1341 | fixed, cnt = struct.unpack (FMT_I2N_IV, iv) |
3031b7ae PG |
1342 | if self.strict_ivs is True \ |
1343 | and self.last_iv is not None \ | |
ee6aa239 PG |
1344 | and self.last_iv [0] == fixed \ |
1345 | and self.last_iv [1] != cnt - 1: | |
f6cd676f | 1346 | raise NonConsecutiveIV ("iv %s counter not successor of " |
ee6aa239 | 1347 | "last object (expected %d, found %d)" |
f6cd676f | 1348 | % (iv_fmt (self.last_iv [1]), cnt)) |
ee6aa239 PG |
1349 | self.last_iv = (iv, cnt) |
1350 | ||
1351 | ||
79782fa9 | 1352 | def next (self, hdr): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1353 | """ |
1354 | Start decrypting the next object. The PDTCRYPT header for the object | |
1355 | can be given either as already parsed object or as bytes. | |
1356 | """ | |
dccfe104 PG |
1357 | if isinstance (hdr, bytes) is True: |
1358 | hdr = hdr_read (hdr) | |
36b9932a PG |
1359 | elif isinstance (hdr, dict) is False: |
1360 | # this won’t catch malformed specs though | |
1361 | raise InvalidParameter ("next: wrong type of parameter hdr: " | |
1362 | "expected bytes or spec, got %s" | |
fbfda3d4 | 1363 | % type (hdr)) |
36b9932a PG |
1364 | try: |
1365 | paramversion = hdr ["paramversion"] | |
1366 | nacl = hdr ["nacl"] | |
1367 | iv = hdr ["iv"] | |
1368 | tag = hdr ["tag"] | |
1369 | except KeyError: | |
1370 | raise InvalidHeader ("next: not a header %r" % hdr) | |
1371 | ||
30019abf | 1372 | super().next (self.password, paramversion, nacl, iv) |
b12110dd | 1373 | if self.fixed is not None and self.valid_fixed_part (iv) is False: |
f6cd676f PG |
1374 | raise InvalidIVFixedPart ("iv %s has invalid fixed part" |
1375 | % iv_fmt (iv)) | |
3031b7ae | 1376 | self.check_consecutive_iv (iv) |
ee6aa239 | 1377 | |
36b9932a | 1378 | self.tag = tag |
b12110dd PG |
1379 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get (paramversion, None) |
1380 | if defs is None: | |
1381 | raise FormatError ("header contains unknown parameter version %d; " | |
1382 | "maybe the file was created by a more recent " | |
1383 | "version of Deltatar" % paramversion) | |
50710d86 | 1384 | enc = defs ["enc"] |
6178061e PG |
1385 | if enc == "aes-gcm": |
1386 | self.enc = Cipher \ | |
1387 | ( algorithms.AES (self.key) | |
36b9932a | 1388 | , modes.GCM (iv, tag=self.tag) |
6178061e PG |
1389 | , backend = default_backend ()) \ |
1390 | . decryptor () | |
1391 | elif enc == "passthrough": | |
1392 | self.enc = PassthroughCipher () | |
1393 | else: | |
b12110dd PG |
1394 | raise InternalError ("encryption parameter set %d refers to unknown " |
1395 | "mode %r" % (paramversion, enc)) | |
f484f2d1 | 1396 | self.set_object_counter (self.cnt + 1) |
39accaaa PG |
1397 | |
1398 | ||
db1f3ac7 | 1399 | def done (self, tag=None): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1400 | """ |
1401 | Stop decryption of the current object and finalize it with the active | |
1402 | context. This will throw an *InvalidGCMTag* exception to indicate that | |
1403 | the authentication tag does not match the data. If the tag is correct, | |
1404 | the rest of the plaintext is returned. | |
1405 | """ | |
633b18a9 | 1406 | data = b"" |
db1f3ac7 PG |
1407 | try: |
1408 | if tag is None: | |
f484f2d1 | 1409 | data = self.enc.finalize () |
db1f3ac7 | 1410 | else: |
36b9932a PG |
1411 | if isinstance (tag, bytes) is False: |
1412 | raise InvalidParameter ("done: wrong type of parameter " | |
1413 | "tag: expected bytes, got %s" | |
1414 | % type (tag)) | |
f484f2d1 | 1415 | data = self.enc.finalize_with_tag (self.tag) |
b0078f26 | 1416 | except cryptography.exceptions.InvalidTag: |
f08c604b | 1417 | raise InvalidGCMTag ("done: tag mismatch of object %d: %s " |
b0078f26 | 1418 | "rejected by finalize ()" |
f08c604b | 1419 | % (self.cnt, binascii.hexlify (self.tag))) |
50710d86 | 1420 | self.ctsize += len (data) |
633b18a9 | 1421 | self.stats ["out"] += len (data) |
b0078f26 | 1422 | return data |
00b3cd10 PG |
1423 | |
1424 | ||
47e27926 | 1425 | def process (self, buf): |
704ceaa5 PG |
1426 | """ |
1427 | Decrypt the bytes object *buf* with the active decryptor. | |
1428 | """ | |
36b9932a PG |
1429 | if isinstance (buf, bytes) is False: |
1430 | raise InvalidParameter ("process: expected byte buffer, not %s" | |
1431 | % type (buf)) | |
47e27926 PG |
1432 | self.ctsize += len (buf) |
1433 | data = super().process (buf) | |
1434 | self.ptsize += len (data) | |
1435 | return data | |
1436 | ||
1437 | ||
00b3cd10 | 1438 | ############################################################################### |
770173c5 PG |
1439 | ## testing helpers |
1440 | ############################################################################### | |
1441 | ||
cb7a3911 | 1442 | def _patch_global (glob, vow, n=None): |
770173c5 PG |
1443 | """ |
1444 | Adapt upper file counter bound for testing IV logic. Completely unsafe. | |
1445 | """ | |
1446 | assert vow == "I am fully aware that this will void my warranty." | |
cb7a3911 PG |
1447 | r = globals () [glob] |
1448 | if n is None: | |
1449 | n = globals () [glob + "_DEFAULT"] | |
1450 | globals () [glob] = n | |
770173c5 PG |
1451 | return r |
1452 | ||
cb7a3911 PG |
1453 | _testing_set_AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX = \ |
1454 | partial (_patch_global, "AES_GCM_IV_CNT_MAX") | |
1455 | ||
1456 | _testing_set_PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE = \ | |
1457 | partial (_patch_global, "PDTCRYPT_MAX_OBJ_SIZE") | |
1458 | ||
a808459e PG |
1459 | def open2_dump_file (fname, dir_fd, force=False): |
1460 | outfd = -1 | |
1461 | ||
1462 | oflags = os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY | |
6690f5e0 | 1463 | if force is True: |
a808459e PG |
1464 | oflags |= os.O_TRUNC |
1465 | else: | |
1466 | oflags |= os.O_EXCL | |
1467 | ||
1468 | try: | |
1469 | outfd = os.open (fname, oflags, | |
1470 | stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR, dir_fd=dir_fd) | |
1471 | except FileExistsError as exn: | |
1472 | noise ("PDT: refusing to overwrite existing file %s" % fname) | |
1473 | noise ("") | |
1474 | raise RuntimeError ("destination file %s already exists" % fname) | |
1475 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1476 | noise ("PDT: new output file %s (fd=%d)" % (fname, outfd)) | |
1477 | ||
1478 | return outfd | |
1479 | ||
770173c5 | 1480 | ############################################################################### |
00b3cd10 PG |
1481 | ## freestanding invocation |
1482 | ############################################################################### | |
1483 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
1484 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS = 0 |
1485 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT = 1 | |
f41973a6 | 1486 | PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN = 2 |
da82bc58 PG |
1487 | |
1488 | PDTCRYPT_SUB = \ | |
1489 | { "process" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS | |
f41973a6 PG |
1490 | , "scrypt" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT |
1491 | , "scan" : PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN } | |
da82bc58 | 1492 | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1493 | PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT = 1 << 0 # decrypt archive with password |
1494 | PDTCRYPT_SPLIT = 1 << 1 # split archive into individual objects | |
da82bc58 | 1495 | PDTCRYPT_HASH = 1 << 2 # output scrypt hash for file and given password |
e3abcdf0 | 1496 | |
a808459e PG |
1497 | PDTCRYPT_SPLITNAME = "pdtcrypt-object-%d.bin" |
1498 | PDTCRYPT_RESCUENAME = "pdtcrypt-rescue-object-%0.5d.bin" | |
e3abcdf0 | 1499 | |
70ad9458 | 1500 | PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE = False |
ee6aa239 | 1501 | PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS = False |
b07633d3 | 1502 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = False |
15d3eefd | 1503 | PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE = 1 << 12 |
70ad9458 PG |
1504 | PDTCRYPT_SINK = 0 |
1505 | PDTCRYPT_SOURCE = 1 | |
1506 | SELF = None | |
1507 | ||
77058bab PG |
1508 | PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_VER = 1 |
1509 | PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_PVER = 1 | |
1510 | ||
7b3940e5 PG |
1511 | # scrypt hashing output control |
1512 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR = 0 | |
1513 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS = 1 | |
4f6405d6 | 1514 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_DEFAULT = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR |
7b3940e5 PG |
1515 | |
1516 | PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_FORMAT = \ | |
1517 | { "i2n" : PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR | |
1518 | , "params" : PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS } | |
1519 | ||
4c62ddc0 | 1520 | PDTCRYPT_TT_COLUMNS = 80 # assume standard terminal |
15d3eefd PG |
1521 | |
1522 | class PDTDecryptionError (Exception): | |
1523 | """Decryption failed.""" | |
1524 | ||
e3abcdf0 PG |
1525 | class PDTSplitError (Exception): |
1526 | """Decryption failed.""" | |
1527 | ||
15d3eefd PG |
1528 | |
1529 | def noise (*a, **b): | |
591a722f | 1530 | print (file=sys.stderr, *a, **b) |
15d3eefd PG |
1531 | |
1532 | ||
89e1073c PG |
1533 | class PassthroughDecryptor (object): |
1534 | ||
1535 | curhdr = None # write current header on first data write | |
1536 | ||
1537 | def __init__ (self): | |
1538 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1539 | noise ("PDT: no encryption; data passthrough") | |
1540 | ||
1541 | def next (self, hdr): | |
1542 | ok, curhdr = hdr_make (hdr) | |
1543 | if ok is False: | |
1544 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("bad header %r" % hdr) | |
1545 | self.curhdr = curhdr | |
1546 | ||
1547 | def done (self): | |
1548 | if self.curhdr is not None: | |
1549 | return self.curhdr | |
1550 | return b"" | |
1551 | ||
1552 | def process (self, d): | |
1553 | if self.curhdr is not None: | |
1554 | d = self.curhdr + d | |
1555 | self.curhdr = None | |
1556 | return d | |
1557 | ||
1558 | ||
a83fa4ed | 1559 | def depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs): |
15d3eefd | 1560 | """ |
a83fa4ed PG |
1561 | Remove PDTCRYPT layer from all objects encrypted with the secret. Used on a |
1562 | Deltatar backup this will yield a (possibly Gzip compressed) tarball. | |
15d3eefd PG |
1563 | """ |
1564 | ctleft = -1 # length of ciphertext to consume | |
1565 | ctcurrent = 0 # total ciphertext of current object | |
15d3eefd PG |
1566 | total_obj = 0 # total number of objects read |
1567 | total_pt = 0 # total plaintext bytes | |
1568 | total_ct = 0 # total ciphertext bytes | |
1569 | total_read = 0 # total bytes read | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1570 | outfile = None # Python file object for output |
1571 | ||
89e1073c | 1572 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT: # decryptor |
a83fa4ed PG |
1573 | ks = secret [0] |
1574 | if ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_PW: | |
1575 | decr = Decrypt (password=secret [1], strict_ivs=PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS) | |
1576 | elif ks == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
6257d5b3 | 1577 | key = secret [1] |
a83fa4ed PG |
1578 | decr = Decrypt (key=key, strict_ivs=PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS) |
1579 | else: | |
1580 | raise InternalError ("‘%d’ does not specify a valid kind of secret" | |
1581 | % ks) | |
89e1073c PG |
1582 | else: |
1583 | decr = PassthroughDecryptor () | |
1584 | ||
e3abcdf0 PG |
1585 | def nextout (_): |
1586 | """Dummy for non-split mode: output file does not vary.""" | |
1587 | return outs | |
1588 | ||
1589 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT: | |
1590 | def nextout (outfile): | |
1591 | """ | |
1592 | We were passed an fd as outs for accessing the destination | |
1593 | directory where extracted archive components are supposed | |
1594 | to end up in. | |
1595 | """ | |
1596 | ||
1597 | if outfile is None: | |
1598 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1599 | noise ("PDT: no output file to close at this point") | |
77058bab PG |
1600 | else: |
1601 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1602 | noise ("PDT: release output file %r" % outfile) | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1603 | # cleanup happens automatically by the GC; the next |
1604 | # line will error out on account of an invalid fd | |
1605 | #outfile.close () | |
1606 | ||
1607 | assert total_obj > 0 | |
1608 | fname = PDTCRYPT_SPLITNAME % total_obj | |
1609 | try: | |
a808459e PG |
1610 | outfd = open2_dump_file (fname, outs, force=PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE) |
1611 | except RuntimeError as exn: | |
1612 | raise PDTSplitError (exn) | |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1613 | return os.fdopen (outfd, "wb", closefd=True) |
1614 | ||
15d3eefd | 1615 | |
47d22679 | 1616 | def tell (s): |
b09a99eb | 1617 | """ESPIPE is normal on non-seekable stdio stream.""" |
47d22679 PG |
1618 | try: |
1619 | return s.tell () | |
1620 | except OSError as exn: | |
b09a99eb | 1621 | if exn.errno == os.errno.ESPIPE: |
47d22679 PG |
1622 | return -1 |
1623 | ||
e3abcdf0 | 1624 | def out (pt, outfile): |
15d3eefd PG |
1625 | npt = len (pt) |
1626 | nonlocal total_pt | |
1627 | total_pt += npt | |
70ad9458 | 1628 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1629 | noise ("PDT:\t· decrypt plaintext %d B" % (npt)) |
1630 | try: | |
e3abcdf0 | 1631 | nn = outfile.write (pt) |
15d3eefd PG |
1632 | except OSError as exn: # probably ENOSPC |
1633 | raise DecryptionError ("error (%s)" % exn) | |
1634 | if nn != npt: | |
1635 | raise DecryptionError ("write aborted after %d of %d B" % (nn, npt)) | |
1636 | ||
1637 | while True: | |
1638 | if ctleft <= 0: | |
1639 | # current object completed; in a valid archive this marks either | |
1640 | # the start of a new header or the end of the input | |
1641 | if ctleft == 0: # current object requires finalization | |
70ad9458 | 1642 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
47d22679 | 1643 | noise ("PDT: %d finalize" % tell (ins)) |
5d394c0d PG |
1644 | try: |
1645 | pt = decr.done () | |
1646 | except InvalidGCMTag as exn: | |
f08c604b PG |
1647 | raise DecryptionError ("error finalizing object %d (%d B): " |
1648 | "%r" % (total_obj, len (pt), exn)) \ | |
1649 | from exn | |
e3abcdf0 | 1650 | out (pt, outfile) |
70ad9458 | 1651 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1652 | noise ("PDT:\t· object validated") |
1653 | ||
70ad9458 | 1654 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
47d22679 | 1655 | noise ("PDT: %d hdr" % tell (ins)) |
15d3eefd PG |
1656 | try: |
1657 | hdr = hdr_read_stream (ins) | |
dd47d6a2 | 1658 | total_read += PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE |
ae3d0f2a PG |
1659 | except EndOfFile as exn: |
1660 | total_read += exn.remainder | |
dd47d6a2 | 1661 | if total_ct + total_obj * PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE != total_read: |
15d3eefd PG |
1662 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("ciphertext processed (%d B) plus " |
1663 | "overhead (%d × %d B) does not match " | |
1664 | "the number of bytes read (%d )" | |
dd47d6a2 | 1665 | % (total_ct, total_obj, PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE, |
15d3eefd PG |
1666 | total_read)) |
1667 | # the single good exit | |
1668 | return total_read, total_obj, total_ct, total_pt | |
1669 | except InvalidHeader as exn: | |
1670 | raise PDTDecryptionError ("invalid header at position %d in %r " | |
ee6aa239 | 1671 | "(%s)" % (tell (ins), exn, ins)) |
70ad9458 | 1672 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1673 | pretty = hdr_fmt_pretty (hdr) |
1674 | noise (reduce (lambda a, e: (a + "\n" if a else "") + "PDT:\t· " + e, | |
1675 | pretty.splitlines (), "")) | |
1676 | ctcurrent = ctleft = hdr ["ctsize"] | |
89e1073c | 1677 | |
15d3eefd | 1678 | decr.next (hdr) |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1679 | |
1680 | total_obj += 1 # used in file counter with split mode | |
1681 | ||
1682 | # finalization complete or skipped in case of first object in | |
1683 | # stream; create a new output file if necessary | |
1684 | outfile = nextout (outfile) | |
15d3eefd | 1685 | |
70ad9458 | 1686 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd | 1687 | noise ("PDT: %d decrypt obj no. %d, %d B" |
47d22679 | 1688 | % (tell (ins), total_obj, ctleft)) |
15d3eefd PG |
1689 | |
1690 | # always allocate a new buffer since python-cryptography doesn’t allow | |
1691 | # passing a bytearray :/ | |
1692 | nexpect = min (ctleft, PDTCRYPT_BLOCKSIZE) | |
70ad9458 | 1693 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd | 1694 | noise ("PDT:\t· [%d] %d%% done, read block (%d B of %d B remaining)" |
47d22679 | 1695 | % (tell (ins), |
15d3eefd PG |
1696 | 100 - ctleft * 100 / (ctcurrent > 0 and ctcurrent or 1), |
1697 | nexpect, ctleft)) | |
1698 | ct = ins.read (nexpect) | |
1699 | nct = len (ct) | |
1700 | if nct < nexpect: | |
47d22679 | 1701 | off = tell (ins) |
ae3d0f2a PG |
1702 | raise EndOfFile (nct, |
1703 | "hit EOF after %d of %d B in block [%d:%d); " | |
15d3eefd PG |
1704 | "%d B ciphertext remaining for object no %d" |
1705 | % (nct, nexpect, off, off + nexpect, ctleft, | |
1706 | total_obj)) | |
1707 | ctleft -= nct | |
1708 | total_ct += nct | |
1709 | total_read += nct | |
1710 | ||
70ad9458 | 1711 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
15d3eefd PG |
1712 | noise ("PDT:\t· decrypt ciphertext %d B" % (nct)) |
1713 | pt = decr.process (ct) | |
e3abcdf0 | 1714 | out (pt, outfile) |
15d3eefd | 1715 | |
d6c15a52 | 1716 | |
70ad9458 | 1717 | def deptdcrypt_mk_stream (kind, path): |
d6c15a52 | 1718 | """Create stream from file or stdio descriptor.""" |
70ad9458 | 1719 | if kind == PDTCRYPT_SINK: |
d6c15a52 | 1720 | if path == "-": |
70ad9458 | 1721 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: sink: stdout") |
d6c15a52 PG |
1722 | return sys.stdout.buffer |
1723 | else: | |
70ad9458 | 1724 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: sink: file %s" % path) |
d6c15a52 | 1725 | return io.FileIO (path, "w") |
70ad9458 | 1726 | if kind == PDTCRYPT_SOURCE: |
d6c15a52 | 1727 | if path == "-": |
70ad9458 | 1728 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: source: stdin") |
d6c15a52 PG |
1729 | return sys.stdin.buffer |
1730 | else: | |
70ad9458 | 1731 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: source: file %s" % path) |
d6c15a52 PG |
1732 | return io.FileIO (path, "r") |
1733 | ||
1734 | raise ValueError ("bogus stream “%s” / %s" % (kind, path)) | |
1735 | ||
15d3eefd | 1736 | |
a83fa4ed | 1737 | def mode_depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs): |
da82bc58 PG |
1738 | try: |
1739 | total_read, total_obj, total_ct, total_pt = \ | |
a83fa4ed | 1740 | depdtcrypt (mode, secret, ins, outs) |
da82bc58 PG |
1741 | except DecryptionError as exn: |
1742 | noise ("PDT: Decryption failed:") | |
1743 | noise ("PDT:") | |
1744 | noise ("PDT: “%s”" % exn) | |
1745 | noise ("PDT:") | |
a83fa4ed | 1746 | noise ("PDT: Did you specify the correct key / password?") |
da82bc58 PG |
1747 | noise ("") |
1748 | return 1 | |
1749 | except PDTSplitError as exn: | |
1750 | noise ("PDT: Split operation failed:") | |
1751 | noise ("PDT:") | |
1752 | noise ("PDT: “%s”" % exn) | |
1753 | noise ("PDT:") | |
a83fa4ed | 1754 | noise ("PDT: Hint: target directory should be empty.") |
da82bc58 PG |
1755 | noise ("") |
1756 | return 1 | |
1757 | ||
1758 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1759 | noise ("PDT: decryption successful" ) | |
1760 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes read" % total_read) | |
1761 | noise ("PDT: %.10d objects decrypted" % total_obj ) | |
1762 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes ciphertext" % total_ct ) | |
1763 | noise ("PDT: %.10d bytes plaintext" % total_pt ) | |
1764 | noise ("" ) | |
1765 | ||
1766 | return 0 | |
1767 | ||
1768 | ||
7b3940e5 | 1769 | def mode_scrypt (pw, ins=None, nacl=None, fmt=PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR): |
77058bab | 1770 | hsh = None |
7b3940e5 | 1771 | paramversion = PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_PVER |
77058bab PG |
1772 | if ins is not None: |
1773 | hsh, nacl, version, paramversion = scrypt_hashsource (pw, ins) | |
1774 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) | |
1775 | else: | |
1776 | nacl = binascii.unhexlify (nacl) | |
7b3940e5 | 1777 | defs = ENCRYPTION_PARAMETERS.get(paramversion, None) |
77058bab PG |
1778 | version = PDTCRYPT_DEFAULT_VER |
1779 | ||
1780 | kdfname, params = defs ["kdf"] | |
1781 | if hsh is None: | |
1782 | kdf = kdf_by_version (None, defs) | |
1783 | hsh, _void = kdf (pw, nacl) | |
da82bc58 PG |
1784 | |
1785 | import json | |
7b3940e5 PG |
1786 | |
1787 | if fmt == PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_INTRANATOR: | |
1788 | out = json.dumps ({ "salt" : base64.b64encode (nacl).decode () | |
1789 | , "key" : base64.b64encode (hsh) .decode () | |
1790 | , "paramversion" : paramversion }) | |
1791 | elif fmt == PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS: | |
1792 | out = json.dumps ({ "salt" : binascii.hexlify (nacl).decode () | |
1793 | , "key" : binascii.hexlify (hsh) .decode () | |
1794 | , "version" : version | |
1795 | , "scrypt_params" : { "N" : params ["N"] | |
1796 | , "r" : params ["r"] | |
1797 | , "p" : params ["p"] | |
1798 | , "dkLen" : params ["dkLen"] } }) | |
1799 | else: | |
1800 | raise RuntimeError ("bad scrypt output scheme %r" % fmt) | |
1801 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
1802 | print (out) |
1803 | ||
1804 | ||
4c62ddc0 PG |
1805 | def noise_output_candidates (cands, indent=8, cols=PDTCRYPT_TT_COLUMNS): |
1806 | """ | |
1807 | Print a list of offsets without garbling the terminal too much. | |
1808 | ||
1809 | The indent is counted from column zero; if it is wide enough, the “PDT: ” | |
1810 | marker will be prepended, considered part of the indentation. | |
1811 | """ | |
1812 | wd = cols - 1 | |
1813 | nc = len (cands) | |
1814 | idt = " " * indent if indent < 5 else "PDT: " + " " * (indent - 5) | |
1815 | line = idt | |
1816 | lpos = indent | |
1817 | sep = "," | |
1818 | lsep = len (sep) | |
1819 | init = True # prevent leading separator | |
1820 | ||
1821 | if indent >= wd: | |
1822 | raise ValueError ("the requested indentation exceeds the line " | |
1823 | "width by %d" % (indent - wd)) | |
1824 | ||
1825 | for n in cands: | |
1826 | ns = "%d" % n | |
1827 | lns = len (ns) | |
1828 | if init is False: | |
1829 | line += sep | |
1830 | lpos += lsep | |
1831 | ||
1832 | lpos += lns | |
1833 | if lpos > wd: # line break | |
1834 | noise (line) | |
1835 | line = idt | |
1836 | lpos = indent + lns | |
1837 | elif init is True: | |
1838 | init = False | |
1839 | else: # space | |
1840 | line += ' ' | |
1841 | lpos += 1 | |
1842 | ||
1843 | line += ns | |
1844 | ||
1845 | if lpos != indent: | |
1846 | noise (line) | |
1847 | ||
1848 | ||
15047fe4 PG |
1849 | SLICE_START = 1 # ordering is important to have starts of intervals |
1850 | SLICE_END = 0 # sorted before equal ends | |
1851 | ||
1852 | def find_overlaps (slices): | |
1853 | """ | |
1854 | Find overlapping slices: iterate open/close points of intervals, tracking | |
1855 | the ones open at any time. | |
1856 | """ | |
1857 | bounds = [] | |
1858 | inside = set () # of indices into bounds | |
1859 | ovrlp = set () # of indices into bounds | |
1860 | ||
1861 | for i, s in enumerate (slices): | |
1862 | bounds.append ((s [0], SLICE_START, i)) | |
1863 | bounds.append ((s [1], SLICE_END , i)) | |
1864 | bounds = sorted (bounds) | |
1865 | ||
1866 | for val in bounds: | |
1867 | i = val [2] | |
1868 | if val [1] == SLICE_START: | |
1869 | inside.add (i) | |
1870 | else: | |
1871 | if len (inside) > 1: # closing one that overlapped | |
1872 | ovrlp |= inside | |
1873 | inside.remove (i) | |
1874 | ||
1875 | return [ slices [i] for i in ovrlp ] | |
1876 | ||
1877 | ||
a808459e | 1878 | def mode_scan (secret, fname, outs=None, nacl=None): |
f41973a6 PG |
1879 | """ |
1880 | Dissect a binary file, looking for PDTCRYPT headers and objects. | |
a808459e PG |
1881 | |
1882 | If *outs* is supplied, recoverable data will be dumped into the specified | |
1883 | directory. | |
f41973a6 PG |
1884 | """ |
1885 | try: | |
a808459e | 1886 | ifd = os.open (fname, os.O_RDONLY) |
f41973a6 PG |
1887 | except FileNotFoundError: |
1888 | noise ("PDT: failed to open %s readonly" % fname) | |
1889 | noise ("") | |
1890 | usage (err=True) | |
1891 | ||
1892 | try: | |
1893 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
1894 | noise ("PDT: scan for potential sync points") | |
a808459e | 1895 | cands = locate_hdr_candidates (ifd) |
f41973a6 PG |
1896 | if len (cands) == 0: |
1897 | noise ("PDT: scan complete: input does not contain potential PDT " | |
1898 | "headers; giving up.") | |
1899 | return -1 | |
1900 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
4c62ddc0 PG |
1901 | noise ("PDT: scan complete: found %d candidates:" % len (cands)) |
1902 | noise_output_candidates (cands) | |
6c8073ab | 1903 | except: |
a808459e | 1904 | os.close (ifd) |
6c8073ab | 1905 | raise |
f41973a6 | 1906 | |
15047fe4 | 1907 | junk, todo, slices = [], [], [] |
6c8073ab | 1908 | try: |
a808459e | 1909 | nobj = 0 |
6c8073ab | 1910 | for cand in cands: |
a808459e PG |
1911 | nobj += 1 |
1912 | vdt, hdr = inspect_hdr (ifd, cand) | |
15047fe4 | 1913 | |
6c8073ab PG |
1914 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_JUNK: |
1915 | junk.append (cand) | |
1916 | else: | |
1917 | off0 = cand + PDTCRYPT_HDR_SIZE | |
1918 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
a808459e | 1919 | noise ("PDT: obj %d: read payload @%d" % (nobj, off0)) |
70a33834 PG |
1920 | pretty = hdr_fmt_pretty (hdr) |
1921 | noise (reduce (lambda a, e: (a + "\n" if a else "") + "PDT:\t· " + e, | |
1922 | pretty.splitlines (), "")) | |
6c8073ab | 1923 | |
a808459e PG |
1924 | ofd = -1 |
1925 | if outs is not None: | |
1926 | ofname = PDTCRYPT_RESCUENAME % nobj | |
1927 | ofd = open2_dump_file (ofname, outs, force=PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE) | |
1928 | ||
15047fe4 | 1929 | ctsize = hdr ["ctsize"] |
a808459e | 1930 | try: |
15047fe4 PG |
1931 | l = try_decrypt (ifd, off0, hdr, secret, ofd=ofd) |
1932 | ok = l == ctsize | |
1933 | slices.append ((off0, off0 + l)) | |
a808459e PG |
1934 | finally: |
1935 | if ofd != -1: | |
1936 | os.close (ofd) | |
70a33834 | 1937 | if vdt == HDR_CAND_GOOD and ok is True: |
6c8073ab | 1938 | noise ("PDT: %d → ✓ valid object %d–%d" |
15047fe4 | 1939 | % (cand, off0, off0 + ctsize)) |
70a33834 | 1940 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_FISHY and ok is True: |
6c8073ab | 1941 | noise ("PDT: %d → × object %d–%d, corrupt header" |
15047fe4 | 1942 | % (cand, off0, off0 + ctsize)) |
70a33834 | 1943 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_GOOD and ok is False: |
6c8073ab | 1944 | noise ("PDT: %d → × object %d–%d, problematic payload" |
15047fe4 | 1945 | % (cand, off0, off0 + ctsize)) |
70a33834 | 1946 | elif vdt == HDR_CAND_FISHY and ok is False: |
6c8073ab | 1947 | noise ("PDT: %d → × object %d–%d, corrupt header, problematic " |
15047fe4 | 1948 | "ciphertext" % (cand, off0, off0 + ctsize)) |
6c8073ab PG |
1949 | else: |
1950 | raise Unreachable | |
1951 | finally: | |
a808459e | 1952 | os.close (ifd) |
7b3940e5 | 1953 | |
70a33834 PG |
1954 | if len (junk) == 0: |
1955 | noise ("PDT: all headers ok") | |
1956 | else: | |
1957 | noise ("PDT: %d candidates not parseable as headers:" % len (junk)) | |
1958 | noise_output_candidates (junk) | |
1959 | ||
15047fe4 PG |
1960 | overlap = find_overlaps (slices) |
1961 | if len (overlap) > 0: | |
1962 | noise ("PDT: %d objects overlapping others" % len (overlap)) | |
1963 | for slice in overlap: | |
1964 | noise ("PDT: × %d→%d" % (slice [0], slice [1])) | |
1965 | ||
70ad9458 PG |
1966 | def usage (err=False): |
1967 | out = print | |
1968 | if err is True: | |
1969 | out = noise | |
5afcb45d | 1970 | indent = ' ' * len (SELF) |
da82bc58 | 1971 | out ("usage: %s SUBCOMMAND { --help" % SELF) |
5afcb45d | 1972 | out (" %s | [ -v ] { -p PASSWORD | -k KEY }" % indent) |
77058bab PG |
1973 | out (" %s [ { -i | --in } { - | SOURCE } ]" % indent) |
1974 | out (" %s [ { -n | --nacl } { SALT } ]" % indent) | |
1975 | out (" %s [ { -o | --out } { - | DESTINATION } ]" % indent) | |
1976 | out (" %s [ -D | --no-decrypt ] [ -S | --split ]" % indent) | |
7b3940e5 | 1977 | out (" %s [ -f | --format ]" % indent) |
70ad9458 PG |
1978 | out ("") |
1979 | out ("\twhere") | |
da82bc58 PG |
1980 | out ("\t\tSUBCOMMAND main mode: { process | scrypt }") |
1981 | out ("\t\t where:") | |
1982 | out ("\t\t process: extract objects from PDT archive") | |
1983 | out ("\t\t scrypt: calculate hash from password and first object") | |
a83fa4ed PG |
1984 | out ("\t\t-p PASSWORD password to derive the encryption key from") |
1985 | out ("\t\t-k KEY encryption key as 16 bytes in hexadecimal notation") | |
e3abcdf0 | 1986 | out ("\t\t-s enforce strict handling of initialization vectors") |
70ad9458 PG |
1987 | out ("\t\t-i SOURCE file name to read from") |
1988 | out ("\t\t-o DESTINATION file to write output to") | |
77058bab | 1989 | out ("\t\t-n SALT provide salt for scrypt mode in hex encoding") |
70ad9458 | 1990 | out ("\t\t-v print extra info") |
e3abcdf0 PG |
1991 | out ("\t\t-S split into files at object boundaries; this") |
1992 | out ("\t\t requires DESTINATION to refer to directory") | |
1993 | out ("\t\t-D PDT header and ciphertext passthrough") | |
7b3940e5 | 1994 | out ("\t\t-f format of SCRYPT hash output (“default” or “parameters”)") |
70ad9458 PG |
1995 | out ("") |
1996 | out ("\tinstead of filenames, “-” may used to specify stdin / stdout") | |
1997 | out ("") | |
1998 | sys.exit ((err is True) and 42 or 0) | |
1999 | ||
2000 | ||
a83fa4ed PG |
2001 | def bail (msg): |
2002 | noise (msg) | |
2003 | noise ("") | |
2004 | usage (err=True) | |
2005 | raise Unreachable | |
2006 | ||
2007 | ||
70ad9458 | 2008 | def parse_argv (argv): |
6690f5e0 | 2009 | global PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE |
70ad9458 | 2010 | global SELF |
7b3940e5 PG |
2011 | mode = PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT |
2012 | secret = None | |
2013 | insspec = None | |
2014 | outsspec = None | |
a808459e | 2015 | outs = None |
7b3940e5 | 2016 | nacl = None |
4f6405d6 | 2017 | scrypt_format = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_DEFAULT |
70ad9458 PG |
2018 | |
2019 | argvi = iter (argv) | |
2020 | SELF = os.path.basename (next (argvi)) | |
2021 | ||
da82bc58 PG |
2022 | try: |
2023 | rawsubcmd = next (argvi) | |
2024 | subcommand = PDTCRYPT_SUB [rawsubcmd] | |
2025 | except StopIteration: | |
a83fa4ed | 2026 | bail ("ERROR: subcommand required") |
da82bc58 | 2027 | except KeyError: |
a83fa4ed | 2028 | bail ("ERROR: invalid subcommand “%s” specified" % rawsubcmd) |
da82bc58 | 2029 | |
59d74e2b PG |
2030 | def checked_arg (): |
2031 | nonlocal argvi | |
2032 | try: | |
2033 | return next (argvi) | |
2034 | except StopIteration: | |
2035 | bail ("ERROR: argument list incomplete") | |
2036 | ||
addcec42 | 2037 | def checked_secret (s): |
a83fa4ed PG |
2038 | nonlocal secret |
2039 | if secret is None: | |
addcec42 | 2040 | secret = s |
da82bc58 | 2041 | else: |
a83fa4ed | 2042 | bail ("ERROR: encountered “%s” but secret already given" % arg) |
da82bc58 | 2043 | |
70ad9458 PG |
2044 | for arg in argvi: |
2045 | if arg in [ "-h", "--help" ]: | |
2046 | usage () | |
2047 | raise Unreachable | |
2048 | elif arg in [ "-v", "--verbose", "--wtf" ]: | |
2049 | global PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE | |
2050 | PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE = True | |
2051 | elif arg in [ "-i", "--in", "--source" ]: | |
59d74e2b | 2052 | insspec = checked_arg () |
70ad9458 | 2053 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt from %s" % insspec) |
a83fa4ed | 2054 | elif arg in [ "-p", "--password" ]: |
59d74e2b | 2055 | arg = checked_arg () |
addcec42 | 2056 | checked_secret (make_secret (password=arg)) |
a83fa4ed | 2057 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypting with password") |
70ad9458 | 2058 | else: |
da82bc58 PG |
2059 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_PROCESS: |
2060 | if arg in [ "-s", "--strict-ivs" ]: | |
2061 | global PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS | |
2062 | PDTCRYPT_STRICTIVS = True | |
77058bab PG |
2063 | elif arg in [ "-o", "--out", "--dest", "--sink" ]: |
2064 | outsspec = checked_arg () | |
2065 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt to %s" % outsspec) | |
da82bc58 | 2066 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--force" ]: |
da82bc58 PG |
2067 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = True |
2068 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: overwrite existing files") | |
2069 | elif arg in [ "-S", "--split" ]: | |
2070 | mode |= PDTCRYPT_SPLIT | |
2071 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: split files") | |
2072 | elif arg in [ "-D", "--no-decrypt" ]: | |
2073 | mode &= ~PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT | |
2074 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: not decrypting") | |
a83fa4ed | 2075 | elif arg in [ "-k", "--key" ]: |
59d74e2b | 2076 | arg = checked_arg () |
addcec42 | 2077 | checked_secret (make_secret (key=arg)) |
a83fa4ed | 2078 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypting with key") |
da82bc58 | 2079 | else: |
a83fa4ed | 2080 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) |
da82bc58 | 2081 | elif subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
77058bab PG |
2082 | if arg in [ "-n", "--nacl", "--salt" ]: |
2083 | nacl = checked_arg () | |
2084 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: salt key with %s" % nacl) | |
7b3940e5 PG |
2085 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--format" ]: |
2086 | arg = checked_arg () | |
2087 | try: | |
2088 | scrypt_format = PDTCRYPT_SCRYPT_FORMAT [arg] | |
2089 | except KeyError: | |
2090 | bail ("ERROR: invalid scrypt output format %s" % arg) | |
2091 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
2092 | noise ("PDT: scrypt output format “%s”" % scrypt_format) | |
77058bab PG |
2093 | else: |
2094 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) | |
f41973a6 | 2095 | elif subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: |
a808459e PG |
2096 | if arg in [ "-o", "--out", "--dest", "--sink" ]: |
2097 | outsspec = checked_arg () | |
2098 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: decrypt to %s" % outsspec) | |
2099 | elif arg in [ "-f", "--force" ]: | |
a808459e PG |
2100 | PDTCRYPT_OVERWRITE = True |
2101 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: noise ("PDT: overwrite existing files") | |
2102 | else: | |
2103 | bail ("ERROR: unexpected positional argument “%s”" % arg) | |
70ad9458 | 2104 | |
a83fa4ed | 2105 | if secret is None: |
ecb9676d | 2106 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: |
a83fa4ed | 2107 | noise ("ERROR: no password or key specified, trying $PDTCRYPT_PASSWORD") |
ecb9676d PG |
2108 | epw = os.getenv ("PDTCRYPT_PASSWORD") |
2109 | if epw is not None: | |
addcec42 | 2110 | checked_secret (make_secret (password=epw.strip ())) |
a83fa4ed PG |
2111 | |
2112 | if secret is None: | |
2113 | if PDTCRYPT_VERBOSE is True: | |
2114 | noise ("ERROR: no password or key specified, trying $PDTCRYPT_KEY") | |
2115 | ek = os.getenv ("PDTCRYPT_KEY") | |
2116 | if ek is not None: | |
addcec42 | 2117 | checked_secret (make_secret (key=ek.strip ())) |
ecb9676d | 2118 | |
a83fa4ed | 2119 | if secret is None: |
da82bc58 | 2120 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
a83fa4ed | 2121 | bail ("ERROR: scrypt hash mode requested but no password given") |
da82bc58 | 2122 | elif mode & PDTCRYPT_DECRYPT: |
6257d5b3 | 2123 | bail ("ERROR: decryption requested but no password given") |
a83fa4ed | 2124 | |
a808459e PG |
2125 | if mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT and outsspec is None: |
2126 | bail ("ERROR: split mode is incompatible with stdout sink " | |
2127 | "(the default)") | |
2128 | ||
2129 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN and outsspec is None: | |
2130 | pass # no output by default in scan mode | |
2131 | elif mode & PDTCRYPT_SPLIT or subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: | |
2132 | # destination must be directory | |
2133 | if outsspec == "-": | |
2134 | bail ("ERROR: mode is incompatible with stdout sink") | |
2135 | try: | |
2136 | try: | |
2137 | os.makedirs (outsspec, 0o700) | |
2138 | except FileExistsError: | |
2139 | # if it’s a directory with appropriate perms, everything is | |
2140 | # good; otherwise, below invocation of open(2) will fail | |
2141 | pass | |
2142 | outs = os.open (outsspec, os.O_DIRECTORY, 0o600) | |
2143 | except FileNotFoundError as exn: | |
2144 | bail ("ERROR: cannot create target directory “%s”" % outsspec) | |
2145 | except NotADirectoryError as exn: | |
2146 | bail ("ERROR: target path “%s” is not a directory" % outsspec) | |
2147 | else: | |
2148 | outs = deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SINK, outsspec or "-") | |
2149 | ||
f41973a6 PG |
2150 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCAN: |
2151 | if insspec is None: | |
2152 | bail ("ERROR: please supply an input file for scanning") | |
2153 | if insspec == '-': | |
2154 | bail ("ERROR: input must be seekable; please specify a file") | |
a808459e | 2155 | return True, partial (mode_scan, secret, insspec, outs, nacl=nacl) |
f41973a6 | 2156 | |
77058bab PG |
2157 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: |
2158 | if secret [0] == PDTCRYPT_SECRET_KEY: | |
2159 | bail ("ERROR: scrypt mode requires a password") | |
2160 | if insspec is not None and nacl is not None \ | |
2161 | or insspec is None and nacl is None : | |
2162 | bail ("ERROR: please supply either an input file or " | |
2163 | "the salt") | |
70ad9458 PG |
2164 | |
2165 | # default to stdout | |
77058bab PG |
2166 | ins = None |
2167 | if insspec is not None or subcommand != PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: | |
2168 | ins = deptdcrypt_mk_stream (PDTCRYPT_SOURCE, insspec or "-") | |
da82bc58 PG |
2169 | |
2170 | if subcommand == PDTCRYPT_SUB_SCRYPT: | |
7b3940e5 PG |
2171 | return True, partial (mode_scrypt, secret [1].encode (), ins, nacl, |
2172 | fmt=scrypt_format) | |
da82bc58 | 2173 | |
a83fa4ed | 2174 | return True, partial (mode_depdtcrypt, mode, secret, ins, outs) |
15d3eefd PG |
2175 | |
2176 | ||
00b3cd10 | 2177 | def main (argv): |
da82bc58 | 2178 | ok, runner = parse_argv (argv) |
f08c604b | 2179 | |
da82bc58 | 2180 | if ok is True: return runner () |
15d3eefd | 2181 | |
da82bc58 | 2182 | return 1 |
f08c604b | 2183 | |
00b3cd10 PG |
2184 | |
2185 | if __name__ == "__main__": | |
2186 | sys.exit (main (sys.argv)) | |
2187 |